FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY
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GERMANY, THE NEW PARTNER

By Konrad Adenauer

BEFORE my recent trip to the United States, a number of agreements were signed in Paris which are of importance to the entire free world. They establish a new community of the Western European peoples; they provide for Germany's admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; they create the basis for lasting German-French coöperation; and, finally, they introduce Germany as a free partner into the community of free nations. The new agreements will decisively influence the political and economic future of Europe. Also, since they constitute part of the organizational structure established by the Atlantic Community in furtherance of its aims, they will have a strong influence on the non-European members of the Atlantic Pact, including the United States.

Three problems had to be solved. First, Germany was supposed to become an equal partner in the community of free nations. This called for ending the occupation of Germany and granting the Federal Republic of Germany full power over its domestic and foreign affairs. These aims had already been embodied in the Contractual Agreements—or the Treaty on Germany, to use our name—which were signed in Bonn on May 26, 1952, by representatives of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic. However, the agreements were linked indissolubly with the European Defense Community Treaty and were to enter into force simultaneously with it. Some of the provisions actually referred to agreements contained in the E.D.C. Treaty, for instance with regard to the stationing of troops. Therefore, new agreements had to be formally concluded, and all those provisions which had become obsolete because of the failure of the E.D.C. Treaty and subsequent political developments had to be revised. All participants desired to renegotiate as few of the matters covered by the Bonn treaties as possible; they sought instead to take note of the parts that were

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still valid and usable and to extend these if they could and to eliminate the parts that were obsolete. This, in fact, is what was done. On the whole, therefore, the new treaty follows the pattern of the old Bonn agreements. It returns sovereignty to Germany. The only restrictions are those resulting from the position of the Allies in Berlin and the relationship between the Three Powers and the Soviet Union within Germany.

The treaty, further, contains provisions regarding legal and factual questions in a transitional period after the end of the occupation, as well as contractual provisions for the stationing of Allied troops in Germany. When it comes into effect Germany will be a completely free and equal partner of the Western Community—joining it and fulfilling her duties within it of her own volition. This freedom of decision and action is the guarantee of the strength of our alliance.

The second problem that had to be solved was to fill the vacuum which was created when the French National Assembly rejected the European Defense Community on August 30. This event had indeed caused an acute crisis. Disappointment and confusion spread in Europe and in the United States. Developments seemed to be proving that the free peoples of Europe were incapable of organizing themselves to defend their freedom and provide for their security. Above all, the failure of E.D.C. was bound to convince world Communism that it had won the cold war in Europe. This dangerous situation had to be overcome as quickly as possible. The self-confidence of the free peoples had to be restored.

I would like to stress here, as I did in speaking before the German Bundestag, that it was British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who took the initiative for reaching a new solution. In a remarkably short time they succeeded in mobilizing the forces striving for the unification of Europe—forces which had remained alive in all European countries—and in bringing forward realistic suggestions which were able to win prompt and unanimous approval of the people of free Europe.

The basic idea of the new arrangements was that the anti-German character of the Brussels Treaty should be abandoned and that the Treaty should be extended by the admission of Germany and Italy. Since Britain was already a member of the Brussels Pact she was thus a full partner of the new European organi-

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zation from the beginning. The negotiations brought to life the possibilities of European integration latent in the Brussels Pact. The authority of the Council of Ministers, provided for from the beginning, was vastly extended; the tasks of the community were increased; and, finally, a parliamentary body was formed, composed of representatives of the signatory states and exercising some parliamentary control (though as yet restricted) over the activities of the new community.

The Brussels Pact also provides for the control of measures for defense. The size of the defense contribution to be made by each signatory can be increased beyond the amount originally provided for in the E.D.C. Treaty only by unanimous vote. To put it differently: whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, up to now and probably in the future, fixes a minimum for the defense contributions of the various states, Brussels also fixes a maximum. Personally, I believe that the NATO minimum and the Brussels Pact maximum will, in most cases, be the same. Also, the experience gained through the work of NATO has shown that it is much more difficult to reach the required minimum even approximately than to surpass it. The Brussels Pact is a purely defensive alliance, just as is NATO. It has all the characteristics of a system of collective security. It is designed to protect the signatory states against attack from the outside. It does not grant protection or support to any of the signatory Powers in the event that they themselves become aggressors. It limits the effective strength both of troops and of armaments.

I would like to stress that the Western European Union, in the view of all its member states, is not by any means a primarily military alliance. It is an instrument of European integration in all fields.

The third question which had to be answered at the London and Paris Conferences was how the new Brussels Pact could be brought into a contractual relationship with NATO. They had to be combined for two reasons. First, the new alliance had to be incorporated in the framework of the Atlantic community in the way in which E.D.C., which had been intended to serve as the European cornerstone of NATO, was supposed to be incorporated. In addition, since NATO was already functioning and its provisions had proved workable, everyone wanted to avoid building up another complicated military organization in Europe. The solution was found by arranging for Germany, so far the only

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member of the Brussels Pact not a member of NATO, to enter NATO. In addition, the Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe will be in command of the troops of the Brussels Pact states on the Continent and will have far-reaching authority of inspection and direction with regard to their military integration.

In looking at the new agreements and trying to evaluate them as a whole one sees that in comparison to what was originally planned they are loose in structure but larger in scope. It should be frankly admitted, I believe, that the degree of integration is less in the new forms than would have been the case in E.D.C. and in the political community as originally projected. My political friends and I do not hesitate to say that we regret this. I believe, however, that the West European Union as it has now been newly conceived provides sufficient starting points from which European unity may be pursued step by step and completed finally in every field. European unity still remains an unalterable aim of German policy.

One invaluable advantage of the new solution, however, is the fact that Great Britain has committed herself, in a truly revolutionary act, to full participation in the new organization and that she will not withdraw her troops from the Continent against a majority vote of the Brussels Pact signatories. Great Britain has sacrificed a most important sovereign right in favor of international coöperation. In my opinion we owe sincere gratitude to the British Government and to Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden for this courageous deed.

To my mind, the decisive importance of the new agreements lies in the fact that the passionate struggle over methods for unifying Europe has not been able to prevent the eventual unification of Europe, as threatened for a time after August 30. The unity of the Western World, which seemed to have been shattered by this conflict, has been reëstablished. I am convinced that the foundation of our existence as free nations was in fact seriously endangered. It is my hope that the leaders of world Communism have now grasped the fact that the democracies are able to overcome the difficulties that arise from the free exchange of different opinions and to do what is necessary.

Another encouraging development offers proof of the growing strength of European solidarity, namely the conclusion of the German-French agreements on the Saar, the strengthening of German-French economic relations and the German-French cul-

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tural agreement. One of the principal political aims of the free world is to reconcile France and Germany and bring them together in a common effort for the welfare of their people. The successful outcome of the German-French discussions fills me with special satisfaction. The coöperation of Germany and France is an absolutely essential element for the maintenance of peace in Europe. It is also a guarantee that Europe can affirm her intellectual position in the world and that her creative powers are not exhausted.

The individual treaties have a special meaning collectively for the Federal Republic of Germany because they signified agreement on its international status and brought the end of the occupation. It seems to me, however, that the most important effect of the new agreements on the great majority of people in Germany lies in the fact that the policy of solidarity and coöperation with the West, planned and pursued for so long, has now finally found concrete expression.

We in the Federal Republic have achieved a high degree of political stability, as I think was proved by the elections of September 6, 1953. Then, and also in the recent *landtag* elections, voters in the Federal Republic decisively rejected radical political ideologies. Everywhere they have cast their ballots in favor of freedom, democracy and coöperation with the free world. Even in the Soviet Zone, where the people live under the yoke of Communism, they have given the world vivid proof at the cost of their lives that they desire nothing more than freedom. I refer to the June uprisings of 1953, a unique demonstration previously unheard of in the Communist-controlled world.

This cry for freedom, this desire for a life devoted to peaceful work in the community of free peoples, demanded an answer. I am grateful that this answer was so quickly given by the American people and their government. It was given in many forms and by people in every walk of life. Support of this sort not only encouraged us in our struggle for freedom but also helped us to survive the first frightful years following the catastrophe into which National Socialist tyranny had plunged our country. But when Germans saw that the ratification of the treaties of Bonn and Paris was continually postponed, uncertainty developed as to whether Germany was welcome in the community of free nations. People wondered whether Germany, alone and dependent upon herself, and in a focal position in the cold war, would be

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forced to try to maintain herself—in a way predestined to failure—as a free nation in an unsafe world.

Germany is divided by the conflict between East and West. The demarcation line which betokens this great strain runs across our country. The fate which has befallen Korea and Indo-China is evidenced even more clearly in Germany, and is better understood there than anywhere else. All too understandably, our people were seized by a great unrest following the collapse of E.D.C. I am happy to be able to state that this unrest has passed. The goal and the path lie clearly before us. I cannot better express our feelings than to cite our basic law: The German people are filled with the resolve to serve world peace in a united Europe.

We profoundly regret that the portion of the German people living in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany is still excluded from taking part in this service to peace. We are devoting all our efforts to removing this unnatural and dangerous division by peaceful means, so that Germany may be reunited. In common with the three Western Powers, the Government of the Federal Republic has pointed out a practical method—reunification by free and internationally supervised elections. We now know that reunification in peace will be possible only within the framework of normalized relations between the free and the Communist worlds. Thus to work with other countries toward a relaxation of tension means for Germans not only work for the maintenance of world peace but also for the fulfillment of their most important national goal—reunification.

We are especially well acquainted with Soviet aims and with the methods by which they are attained. This knowledge has been dearly paid for with the suffering of millions of human beings. For that reason the Germans have become immune to the Communist idea. For that reason they condemn any political adventure as a means of settling their relations with the Soviet-led power bloc. For that reason they are convinced that an attempt by Germany alone and apart from the other free nations to solve the problem of German reunification would end with the complete loss of freedom for all Germany. I believe that the only concrete possibility of bringing about a relaxation of the conflict in Europe, and thus of achieving German reunification, lies in an attempt by the Western European Union and the Atlantic Community, acting jointly, to seek a solution of the pending problems with the Soviet Union sooner or later.

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On the day of the signing of the Paris Agreements the Soviet Union handed a note to the three Western Powers proposing new negotiations on the establishment of a European security system, the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. In my view, this note shows that the Soviet Union has not changed its main objectives. The Soviet aim continues to be to lessen the interest of the United States in European questions and to eliminate Atlantic influence from European affairs. Soviet Russia would like to establish a system of collective security in Europe in which she herself would play the dominant rôle.

The dangerous twilight in which Soviet policy operates is indicated by the Soviet assertion that there was no substance at all in the reference in the note of the Western Powers of September 10, 1954, to the existence of a heavily armed Soviet grouping in Eastern Europe because—to quote verbatim—"in reality no grouping of this kind exists." As for what the Soviets have in mind when they again speak in their new note of free elections, that was amply demonstrated, I think, by the latest so-called elections in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany.

Unity, patience and strength are the primary virtues which the free world requires if it wishes to secure and keep peace and freedom. As the new partner of the Western Community, Germany will show patience and moderation and will devote her energies to the strengthening of the free world.

The faith which the American people and their government have shown in the German people will inspire us to fulfill conscientiously the obligations which fall on us as a result of this partnership. After the sufferings of two wars, after the horrors of dictatorship, the German people long to live their lives in peace and freedom. They long for fraternal coöperation with people to whom they feel bound by common interests and ideals. It is my conviction that the German people, and especially German youth, fully realize that we can attain a better future only if we help to unite Europe, and if our actions are determined by a spirit of solidarity and coöperation. This realization has profoundly and lastingly changed our national life. It is my heartfelt desire that the community of free nations will provide the firm basis for the future development of our civilization and that within this community Germany will find an honorable place and a better future.

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A NEW LOOK AT THE SOVIET "NEW LOOK"

By Bertram D. Wolfe

THE men who have been ruling the Soviet Union since Stalin's death are *epigoni,* "sons," after-comers. They owe their power to an apostolic succession and style themselves disciples of Lenin and comrades-in-arms of Stalin. The structure and dynamics of their rule is dictated by the same philosophy, incorporated in the same single-party-police state; it continues to be totalitarian in scope and aim, it is engaged in the same unending war on its own people, the same drive to reshape and control the globe. Still, they are new men, younger men, men with different formative backgrounds, and their régime has a new look.

Lenin's Marxism was so different from that of the West European, nineteenth century Marx that one of Lenin's admirers dubbed it *marxisme à la tartare.* Lenin's associates, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Bukharin, ten to fifteen years younger than he, still belonged to the generation that had made the revolution. After a period of feigned subordination to a "collective leadership," Joseph Stalin established his claim to be "the best disciple of Comrade Lenin." He perfected Lenin's organization machine and monopoly of the organs of persuasion and force, suppressed some of Lenin's doctrines, dogmas and hopes, retained and enlarged others, propounded some of his own. He killed off all of Lenin's close associates, surrounding himself with new and younger men, none of whom had been in Lenin's inner circle. Thus he became at one and the same time father image and voice of the *epigoni*: his Leninism became different from Lenin's even as the latter's Marxism had been different from that of Marx.

The Malenkovs and Khrushchevs, and men younger still, who now form the post-Stalinist "collective leadership," are the men Stalin gathered around him in his rise to personal dictatorship. They never knew the wide dreams and humane ideals of the nineteenth century intelligentsia, the feverish disputation, hope and wretchedness of the Tsarist underground, prison and exile, nor the "heroic days" of the storming of the Winter Palace and the Kremlin. They were wholly formed in the Stalinist fight for a monopoly of power, and in the iron age of forced industrialization, forced collectivization and blood purge. They were brought

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up not as underground revolutionaries but under the new régime of bureaucratic totalitarianism.[1]

They do not even look like the men who were Lenin's close associates. As one contemplates their pictures lined up on Lenin's, now Stalin's tomb, one cannot but be struck by the fact that they are all fleshy, solid, square and squat—"fat boys," to borrow an old "wobbly" term against labor bureaucrats. Harrison Salisbury has called our attention to a curious detail that none of them is over 5 foot 4 (Stalin's police record gives his height as 5 foot 3 and 3/4 inches)—as if they had been chosen not merely with regard to faction loyalty and party in-fighting and administrative capacity, but also that their height, spiritual and physical, should not dwarf the non-too-tall leader who had perforce to excel in all things. Actually Stalin managed to look taller than they on Lenin's tomb by having a little raised platform built under him.

There is, to be sure, a remnant of Old Bolsheviks among the new "collective leadership." But these older men, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan, owe their places, indeed their very survival, to the fact that they were cronies of Joseph Stalin. Second-string figures in Lenin's day, from the outset faction adherents of Stalin rather than Lenin, they came out of the crucible of the purges refashioned, so to speak, as "new men."

What is collective about this collective leadership and will it continue to be a collective? What can the world expect will be new in the work and ways and aims of these new men who have taken over Stalin's power? And what of continuity? It is these questions that constitute the real problem of the "new look."

II

In theory it is conceivable that a committee-government, a *Directoire,* a duumvirate, triumvirate or decemvirate, can wield autocratic, dictatorial and total power. But the whole course of Soviet history, and the whole dynamic of autocracy, dictatorship and totalitarianism, are against it.

Lenin began by creating a party in which the Center selected the local committees, which in turn sent delegates to the conventions that confirmed the Center. He seized power by a minority conspiracy, drained democracy of authority by dispersing the

[1] Lenin was born in 1870, Stalin and Trotsky in 1879, Zinoviev in 1883, Bukharin in 1888. Khrushchev was born in 1894, but did not join the Communist Party until 1918, after it had taken power. Malenkov was born in 1902 and joined the Communist Party only in 1920.

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Constituent Assembly, drained the Soviets of authority by outlawing all other parties and deciding all things in the Communist Central Committee and its Fractions, drained the Party of authority by forbidding factional controversy, the Central Committee by setting up the Politburo, and the Politburo by settling matters by telephone, direct wire and personal conversation. Inside the Politburo he never altogether sloughed off the appearance of "collegial" power; at his death he left a will in which he sought in vain to preserve that one last redoubt of collectivity.

It took close to a decade before the "collective leadership," of which Stalin appeared but to be the faithful machine wheelhorse, was openly dissolved in favor of his personal power. With his death his lieutenants are faced with the problem that in a dictatorship there is no legitimacy and no legal succession. These men have been taught in a hard school to make many moves in their head before they touch one piece on the chessboard of power. The bloody list of their dead gives them every reason to combine forces against any man who moves too fast. That they would begin their orphaned rule with the proclamation of a "collective leadership" could have been predicted.

That first holding company included Beria who was nominated by Malenkov, and Malenkov who was nominated by Beria. Within a few weeks after Stalin's death, a newspaper buildup which seemed to portend Malenkov's rise to dominant power was put a stop to by some decision of his associates, and he was "relieved" of the post of Party Secretary "at his own request." That brought Khrushchev into a top ranking position as Party Secretary. Beria's undoing came from his too rapid moves to make the secret police independent of the Party and through it to strengthen his control of certain "republican governments" and the Party machine. This aroused the fears of so many of his associates that, suddenly, they combined against him and there was one "collective leader" less. At this writing, Malenkov would appear to be out in front.[2] But the fact that he has dropped the key organization post in which he was so long Stalin's chief assistant

[2] In the first issue of the American Communist journal, *Political Affairs,* published after Stalin's death, of the three funeral addresses of Malenkov, Molotov and Beria, only Malenkov's was printed, and with it an article by William Z. Foster entitled "Malenkov at the Helm." A month later Mr. Foster had repented of his rashness or been otherwise instructed, for his article on "Stalin and Coexistence" did not even find place for the appropriate quote from Malenkov's funeral oration. But when Mr. Foster returned to the theme of "coexistence" in the issue of August 1954 he once more felt that he could write that "the successive leaders of the Soviet people—Lenin, Stalin, and Malenkov" have all held the same position on this question.

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—the post through which Stalin himself rose to power—and that this post is now in Khrushchev's hands, suggests a temporary system of "checks and balances" on each other by the men who together hold unchecked and absolute power.

As long as the power question is not settled and the pyramid of power is without an apex, these men will jealously watch each other and make promises of reforms to their subjects. They will continue Stalin's policy of avoiding either all-out war or all-out peace. They cannot tolerate all-out peace, since the very excuse for the existence of their perpetual state-of-emergency régime is "capitalist encirclement." Like Stalin, they have two reasons for avoiding all-out war. The first is doctrinal: their central belief teaches them that they are the wave of the future, that the capitalist order is in decay, that time is on their side. The other is a readiness to risk war at the periphery, limited engagements, "calculated risks," for in their activist theory History helps only those who help Her, but not to jeopardize their power center, the loss of which in all-out war might change the course of history.

To Stalin's hesitancies they add one more: as long as the power question is not settled, they dare not put live ammunition and overwhelming force in the hands of the army, lest "Bonapartism" settle the problem of power in its own fashion. Thus we would do well to remember that their present minuscule concessions in foreign relations come not only from their calculation that they may divide the free world, isolate America, and cut off her support from some sector of Europe or Asia, but no less from recognition of their own internal weakness. "Collective leadership . . . the Party and the Government . . . the wise Central Committee"—so far they have cast about in vain for an overwhelming power symbol that can paralyze dissent, command obedience and worship in Union and Empire, such as was commanded by the Stalin cult and Stalin's word and name. The struggle may be muted and concealed, it may be long or short, it may be compromised and blunted again and again, but the whole dynamics of dictatorship cries out for a dictator, autocracy for an autocrat, militarized command and militarized life for a supreme commander, infallible government for an infallible leader, an authoritarian setup for an authority, a totalitarian state for a *duce, führer, vozhd.*

III

The Stalin cult, whose high priests these men were, has made

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the problem of the succession more difficult. By attributing to Stalin all successes, and to themselves and their subordinates all failures, shortcomings or unpleasant consequences, they enlarged his person until it filled the horizon, diminishing their own stature to the point of nullity.

In this swollen form, the Stalin myth was dead as soon as his body was cold. For what right did such dwarfed men have to be individual or collective dictators? Moreover, in the end they were irked by his arrogation to himself of credit for all they did, thought up, ghost-wrote for him, by the precariousness of their positions dependent entirely on the caprice of one man, by the need each day to kindle greater clouds of incense to his name. Their cold funeral addresses, concerned with programs and power, testified to the fact that he had exacted so much "posthumous tribute" while alive that there was no reserve to call on after his death. These historians of the pistol who had rewritten recent history so often and continuously in order to enlarge and glorify Stalin's works and name began immediately a fresh rewriting of history to cut him down to size—not to actual size, but to their own size, so that there could be some sense in their claim to individual or collective succession. Henceforth Lenin is the author of the great theories and the initiator of the great works, and Stalin is reduced to continuator, developer and disciple. They, for their part, are co-disciples of Lenin and comrades-in-arms of Stalin, and, by virtue of membership in the same leading body, co-authors of all the theories, policies and plans hitherto called Stalinist.

Many wrongly concluded that the process would not stop until Stalin's name had been extinguished and his policies abandoned. But his orphaned disciples had no intentions of doing one or the other. They cannot extinguish his name, for what other claim do they have to rule the Soviet land except association with Stalin and discipleship to Lenin in an unbroken apostolic succession? Nor do they wish to abandon his policies, for these are in fact their policies no less than his.

In Russia, the death of a despot has always awakened a lively expectation of change. The most unlikely princelings have been endowed with gentle attributes until their acts as Tsars dispelled illusion. The greater the despotism, the greater the expectation of change. But only when the death of a despot coincided with some defeat to his system has the expectation as a rule been realized.

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When Stalin died, the first reports of a nation all contracted in one brow of woe were soon replaced by more authentic reports of this general expectation of change. We now know that there was ill-concealed rejoicing, that men got drunk, that whole regiments celebrated in Germany, that even in far off Vorkuta concentration camps inmates turned their hopes into a strike for better conditions and were given concessions even as force was being used and ringleaders executed. Sweeping promises had to be made to the satellites; workingmen struck in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and stood up, unarmed, against Russian tanks. All this exerted powerful pressures upon men whose power position is unsettled and whose succession is based upon neither constitutional or hereditary legitimacy.

Nor was the free world exempt from illusion. One of Britain's leading authorities on Soviet history rushed out a book to prove that Stalin by barbarous methods had so civilized and transformed Russia that further Stalinist barbarism was impossible. Another stoutly declared that since all thinking was colored by emotion he preferred "wishful rather than despairing thinking." American writers who had once assured us that the "realist and nationalist" Stalin had put an end to Trotsky's dream of world revolution, then that "the wise old realist" was curbing the hotheads of the Politburo, now declared that Stalin had been more than a little mad and that soberer and more realistic heads were taking over power.

Even the wise and wary Churchill, two months after Stalin's death, spoke of a "new régime" and what he hoped was "a change of attitude." He who had alerted America to the Iron Curtain and the need of united defense against aggression now permitted himself to dream that the last great act of his declining years might be a fresh four-Power conference like those with Stalin and Roosevelt to settle unsettled things. On October 10 of this year he put it more soberly: "A year and a half ago, Stalin died, and ever since then I have nourished the hope that there is a new outlook in Russia, a new hope of peaceful coexistence with the Russian nation, and that it is our duty patiently and daringly to make sure whether there is such a chance or not."

In a land where secrecy and power are alike total, every smallest flutter of a leaf is likely to be magnified into the fall of forests. No longer badgered by his patron, Molotov proves a little gayer, makes fresh démarches and tries altering his formulae without

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stopping to call up the Kremlin—but without yielding an iota of his essential, stubbornly-held position; this is magnified into "concessions," a "new flexibility," evidence that there is real departmentalization and separation of powers. General Zhukov echoes Ambassador Bohlen's toast "to justice;" on the stubborn iteration is built an entire structure of fantasy: army independence, army paramountcy, open conflict between army and party. Khrushchev hangs back for a last word when his comrades are departing from a state banquet; this is reported as evidence that the Party Secretary is "an amiable chatter-box . . . garrulous . . . hail-fellow well met." Malenkov picks flowers for an English lady, clinks a lady's glass and toasts "the ladies," and the new Premier becomes a bashful fat boy, "full of old-fashioned grace and courtesy . . . a Little Lord Fauntleroy." Hence it becomes important to inquire how new these new men really are.

Khrushchev, the "amiable chatter-box" who now heads the party machine, began the really important part of his biography in 1929 with the great forced collectivization drive in the Ukraine and the mass liquidation of all who held back. Then in Moscow he took part in the *Yezhovshchina,* without garrulousness contributing his share to the organization of the great blood purge. During the war he directed partisan warfare behind the German occupier's lines, visiting punishment on waverers and collaborators. He is credited with having strengthened Russia's support among the masses by acts calculated to increase the cruelty of the Germans, and with giving orders to assassinate the gentler puppet mayors and spare the crueler ones, as the best way of inflaming opposition to the occupiers.[3] After the war Khrushchev returned to the Ukraine as liquidator of small private land holdings, collectivizer, industrializer, Russifier and avenger. This "chatter-box" worked quietly for a year and a half, then reported that "in the past 18 months more than 50 percent of all officials" had been removed from their posts. In 1950 he opened the war on the collective farm in favor of the development of "agro-cities." There were resistance, local criticisms by Aryutinyan in Armenia and Bagirov in Azerbaijan, partial retreat. But the number of collective farms was reduced from 250,000 in 1950 to 94,000 in 1953. And when Beria fell, Aryutinyan and Bagirov, Khrush-

[3] For many of the biographical details in this article I am indebted to the researches and reports of Lazar Pistrak, of the United States Information Library, and to Boris Nikolaevsky, who is at work on a study of Malenkov and his associates. Others come from wartime and postwar Russian refugees, and from Soviet documents.

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chev's critics of 1950, fell too. At the Nineteenth Congress, Khrushchev delivered the report on the revision of the party statutes which represented a further tightening of totalitarian controls. Since Stalin's death, he has become First Secretary of the Party, and heads the new drives in agriculture.

As for Premier Malenkov, he began his career as Secretary of the Communist cell of the Moscow Higher Technical School, where he gathered around him the Saburovs, Pervukhins and Malyshevs who switched like him from engineering to politics, becoming engineer-chekists, party commissars in technology and industry.[4] It is on the entrance of these engineer-chekist associates of Malenkov into the ruling circle that so many commentators have based the contention that party rule is now giving ground to the claims of the new technocracy. But these men are instruments of party penetration into and control of technology, just as Bulganin is not a military general who has gotten into the Politburo but an agent of the party and the police made Marshal and Minister of Defense to control the army.

In 1934 Malenkov became Chief of the Department of Leading Party Organs, which had charge of placements, removals, dossiers. In the bloody years of the *Yezhovshchina,* he was the chief organizer of the purges in so far as they had a planned, centralized and systematic party character. As Yezhov advanced, Malenkov was made his deputy in this department, supplying the dossiers and the indications as to chain reactions when any leading official fell. In December 1937, *Partiinoe Stroitelstvo,* which Malenkov edited, carried the following lead editorial:

> Under the leadership of the Stalinist People's Commissar, Comrade Yezhov, the Soviet Intelligence Service has inflicted merciless and devastating blows on the Fascist bandits. The Soviet people love their intelligence service . . . it is their flesh and blood. . . . The faithful guardians of Socialism, the men of the NKVD under the leadership of their Stalinist People's Commissar, Comrade Yezhov, will continue in the future to root out the enemies of the people, the vile Trotskyite-Bukharinite, bourgeois-nationalist, and other agents of Fascism. Let the spies and traitors tremble! The punitive hand of the Soviet people, and NKVD, will annihilate them! Our ardent Bolshevik greetings to the Stalinist Commissar of Internal Affairs, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov!

The *troika* that planned the purges under Joseph Stalin's personal direction was made up of Malenkov, keeper of the dossiers and supplier of leads, Vyshinsky, prosecutor and impresario of

[4] Saburov is now Deputy Premier and was selected this year to make the November 7 address from the Lenin-Stalin tomb.

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staged trials, and Yezhov, apprehender, inquisitor and executioner. When the fury had run its course, Yezhov was made expiatory goat, but Malenkov and Vyshinsky were promoted. The year Yezhov disappeared, Malenkov was made head of the new Administration of Party Cadres which "keeps a strict personal register of every party member and candidate" in some 2,500,000 dossiers on standing, public and private life, friends, talents, vulnerabilities, along with dossiers on perhaps 500,000 specialists in industry and agriculture. It is this key index which Malenkov has now surrendered, reluctantly I would imagine, to Party Secretary Khrushchev. In any case, Malenkov's connection with the *Yezhovshchina* should help us to keep our perspective on this "Little Lord Fauntleroy."

IV

Thanks to our penchant for personalizing and the impact even on us of the Stalin cult, we are prone to forget that Stalin did not work out his policies alone. When the informed think of the Stalinist agricultural policy, they think of Khrushchev. When they think of the Stalinist line in literature and intellectual life, they think of Zhdanov, and, after his death, of Malenkov. In short, the Stalinist leadership was also a "collective leadership," with the difference that there was one top man who must always be credited, could never be blamed, and who had the sometimes arbitrary and capricious and always decisive last word.

Finding all about them the general expectation of change, faced with uncertainty as to their own authority and structure of succession, anxious to prevent "confusion and panic" (as the funeral ceremonies declared), the henchmen of the dead dictator were glad to take advantage of the credit opened to them on the theory that they were "new" men from whom a "change" could be expected. Yet one of their prime motives in cutting Stalin down to their size was to emphasize that all of them ("the Party and the Central Committee"), not Stalin alone, were the authors of the "great" policies and doctrines. They even denied, and we know that they did so rightly, that Stalin was the author of "The Short Course," first published as the work of a collective and then arrogated to Stalin as his "Volume XVI." And we are compelled to admit that the liquidation of Beria and consorts was in the best "Stalinist" tradition.

The releasing of a few Soviet-born wives; gracious toasts at

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banquets; less surliness in conversation; repetition, as a rule in the self-same language, of the calculated utterances of Lenin and Stalin on "peaceful coexistence"—only on the background of Soviet truculence could this be taken as something significant. And then only if we permit ourselves to forget how many times this ebb and flow in the realization of an unchanging long-range aim has occurred before, either when internal weakness or too quick a build-up of resistance abroad, or the desire to cover an offensive with an umbrella of peace talk, has prompted Stalin to roar you gentle as any sucking dove.

This is not the place to go through the long history of "peaceful coexistence." We can trace various facets back to Lenin's declaration in October 1915 that if he got power he would propose an unacceptable peace and "prepare a revolutionary war;" to Trotsky's pronouncement two weeks after they took power ("We desire the speediest peace on the principles of honorable coexistence and coöperation of peoples; we desire the speediest overthrow of the rule of capital"); to Lenin's 1920 coexistence statement to a Hearst reporter followed the same year by a warning to the Moscow party cell leaders (kept secret till after his death) that "as long as capitalism and Socialism exist side by side we cannot live in peace;" to Litvinov's 1922 proposal of a "proportional reduction in arms" at a time when the Soviet Union was secretively arming with the aid of the Wehrmacht. The whole sequence of these utterances from the first down to Malenkov's amiable chat with Ambassador Bohlen and Congressman Wickersham while Migs were shooting down one of our planes boils down to this: divide and disarm your opponents while you work unceasingly for their destruction.

Nor is there anything these "new" men have so far done that would not accord with the last programmatic utterance on foreign policy by Joseph Stalin (in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," 1952) in which he urged that through the "peace fight" they could undermine "bellicose governments," perhaps develop it into "a movement for the overthrow of capitalism," make more likely war between capitalist countries than between the non-Soviet and the Soviet worlds, and isolate the United States. ("To think that Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Japan . . . will not try to smash U.S. domination and force their way to independent development is to believe in miracles.")

The main foreign policy proposals were summed up this year

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by Marshal Bulganin in his speech delivered on November 7:

(1) "A collective security system in Europe," *i.e.* Europe with Russia but without the United States.

(2) German unification by "peaceful means," *i.e.* the continued disarming of Germany and the holding of "elections" such as have been proposed in Korea, and practised so resourcefully in the "peaceful unification" of all postwar satellite coalition governments.

(3) Proportionate reduction of armaments, which would leave overwhelming superiority to the heavily armed Soviet Bloc; and "prohibition of weapons of mass extermination," which would eliminate the one weapon in which the free world has superiority, without the guarantees of a fool-proof control and inspection.

The only thing one can find that is new in this third of a century of juggling with "peaceful coexistence" is that leading spokesmen of the free world are beginning to employ the term without sufficient attempt to analyze it and purify it of the corruption which infects it. Since for the free world peace is a matter of principle and for the Kremlin a calculated manœuvre, surely our spokesmen should be able to express our desire for peace in some warmer and less tarnished language. It is up to us to remember that the Kremlin's tactical manœuvres can be most flexible because they are severely disciplined by an over-all strategy and unshakeable objective of world conquest. But we can get lost in these tactical zigzags if our over-all objective is lost sight of. I cannot believe that that objective is merely to survive while peace is steadily eroded and the more vulnerable parts of the free world picked off one by one. Our idea of peace is wrapped up with justice and with freedom, and is ultimately secure only to the extent that freedom can defend itself and that peoples everywhere gain control of their governmental policies. To take these corrupt words and artful manœuvres at face value is but to add to the confusion and moral disarming which is one of its objectives.

"Peaceful coexistence" has a long history now; in the words of Santayana, "those who will not learn from history are condemned to repeat it."

Of the new line in the arts and letters it is no longer necessary to speak. After the illusions nourished by Stalin's death and the first indecisions of the new men not yet sure of their power, a Second Congress of Soviet Writers is being called that promises

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to be more of a strait jacket than the First Congress held two decades ago. Furious attacks on Pomerantsev for saying the obvious thing that sincerity, honesty to the truth of his own vision, is the chief virtue of the artist have been followed by rebukes and expulsion for magazine editors, condemnation of critics, expulsion of Stalin-Prize writers from the fraternity of their craft, condemnation of all who thought there was a new "thaw." Such is the atmosphere in which is being prepared a Congress which will "systematically combat any deviations from the principle of Socialist Realism . . . any attempts to direct Soviet literature away from topical questions of the policy of the Party and Soviet State . . . any attempt to substitute a moral criterion unrelated to any specific society or time for the ideological, class-social judgments universally recognized in our literature . . . which can have no other interests but those of the people, the interest of the Soviet State."

V

In Stalin's last and most significant theoretical work, "The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," published late in 1952, he lays down the prerequisites for the transformation of the present "Socialist" Russia into "complete Communism." In this work is to be found literally the whole stock of formulae on which Malenkov, Khrushchev and Company are now proceeding. Here is to be found the proposal rapidly to increase the satisfaction of consumer demand on the basis of "primacy in the production of means of production." Here is the outline of the drive to increase labor discipline on the basis of "the control over the amount of labor and the amount of consumption" until labor discipline is transformed into spontaneous self-discipline, from an "obligation into a prime necessity of life." Here, too, is the line on isolating America and promoting differences in the capitalist camp which we have already examined. The work is scrappy and fragmentary, but bears internal evidence of summing up in algebraic formulae all the trains of thought that were then actuating Stalin and his close associates.

In it Stalin distinguishes between two kinds of property in the present-day Soviet Union: "State, or publicly-owned production, and collective-farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned." The main task of the transition to Communism which is now beginning is to "raise the level" of collective farm

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property to that of state or publicly owned property, and to create thus a "single and united" system. How "the formation of a single and united sector" is to be brought about "whether simply by the swallowing up of the collective-farm sector by the state sector . . . or by the setting up of a single national economic body," Stalin refuses to say. But he is emphatic that it can be done by the pressure of the "superstructure," the state, "upon the relations of production," that it can be done "without upheavals," that it represents a revolution from above, and that it must be undertaken gradually but without delay, that "it is of paramount importance for us," that in the process "the new" will not "simply destroy the old, but infiltrates into it, changes its nature and function without smashing its form." Until it is accomplished, the state has not as complete control of agriculture as of industry and is hampered in its precise planning and calculation. "It would be unpardonable not to see that these factors are already beginning to fetter the powerful development of our productive forces since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture . . . The task therefore is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public (state) property . . . ."

To this subject Stalin devotes more space and attention than to any other, and returns again and again. And in this, I think, we can find the theoretical foundation and the emotional force behind the latest Khrushchev-Malenkov drive for a revolution in agriculture. What was the drive to uproot the collective farms and combine them into agrogorods, begun in Stalin's lifetime, but an attempt to "raise collective-farm property to the level of public property . . . to infiltrate it, change its nature and function without smashing its form?" Does their opposition to what they thought only a personal project of Khrushchev explain why Beria fell into disfavor during Stalin's last days, and help explain why the agrogorod critics, Aryutunyan and Bagirov, fell with Beria? And what is the new plowing up of steppe, pasture, marginal and abandoned lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia and other distant parts of the Empire, with "volunteers" from the cities, but a new mass flank attack upon the recalcitrant collective farm?

Like any flanking movement, it has been presented with dissimulation as a fresh attempt to solve the problem of the shortage of grain and meat (cattle) created by the earlier revolution from

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above, the collectivization drive of the thirties. Like that drive it suffers from gigantism, recklessness and lack of preparation. Like the earlier drive its shock troops come not from the farmers but from the cities. These young men and women may have no preparation for farming, but neither have they any loyalty to the collective and the private parcel or any memory of the days of individual farming. What is this mass displacement of young men and women and tractors and seeds to virgin or untilled lands but a gigantic step on the road that bypasses the kolkhoz and presents it with a rival in a new congeries of giant sovkhozes or state farms?

Of the 32,000,000 acres of virgin soil to be brought under cultivation during 1954–5, 15,800,000 of acres are located in Kazakhstan. Without a word being said of it, the over 140,000 workers who have been "volunteered" into the new regions represent one more invasion in the long war against the Asiatic steppe, and its nomadic, cattle-raising, Turkic peoples. This war was not begun by the Bolsheviks but by the Tsars. But the drive for forced collectivization of the early thirties hit hardest in individual-farming Ukrainia and in cattle-raising Kazakhstan. In the latter, where the nomads follow the grass on the range, the wholesale slaughter of stock reached catastrophic proportions from which, as Khrushchev's reports show, Russia has not yet recovered in more than two decades. According to Khrushchev, the number of cattle in the Soviet Union in 1953 was below that of 1916 (last year of the Tsars and in the midst of world war), and less than 1928 (before the collectivization drive began). But since 1928 there has been an enormous increase in population and in area so that the amount of meat, butter, milk, hides, as well as grain, per capita has frightfully diminished.

There is already a serious labor shortage on the old collective farms and a serious shortage of machines, but as in the earlier experiments in gigantism and revolution from above, everything is being thrown into the battle so that the old areas are being stripped of machines, and seed, and technicians, and hands, while the new lack drinking water, irrigation, housing, sanitation, food, tractors and seed. Lands are being plowed up that are marginal. If the rains are good—this year they have been good—the lands will yield. When bad years come—and it is their semi-aridity that make them range rather than farm areas—they are likely to become dustbowls. There are deep inconsistencies in the prom-

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ise of more meat on the one hand and the planned figures for increased cattle breeding on the other, and between both of these and the plowing up of the range. But as in the collectivization drive of the early thirties, Khrushchev and Malenkov in the best Stalinist tradition are counting that there is "no fortress that Bolshevik determination cannot conquer," that the "superstructure" (the state) can "without upheavals" force changes in "productive relations." While they are at it, they hope to solve the nationalities problem in the Turkic areas by mass Russification, and present the incompletely calculable and incompletely plannable kolkhoz sector with a completely controlled sector of new state farms.

To sum up. The "new men" who have succeeded to Stalin's power are not so new as they look to the uninquisitive eye, for they are Stalin's men. And a good look at the "new look" suggests that it is not so new either, for more than Stalin would admit or they dared to claim, while he was alive, they worked out the Stalinist policies with him. Now that he is dead they have been able to cut the losses of some of the minor errors with which his stubbornness or prestige had become involved, but all their major policies from "peaceful coexistence" to the sensational plowing up of the virgin lands are in accord with plans elaborated and drives initiated while Stalin was alive. They do but give "arithmetical values" to "algebraic formulae" already worked out in the decisions of the Nineteenth Congress and in Stalin's so-called testament: "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." What the "new" men bring to their drives is the fresh vigor of younger men and a fresh flexibility in manœuvre. But they are manifestly continuing the war on their own people—"the revolution from above"—and the war for the control of the world.

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THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

By Gamal Abdel Nasser

FOR a century and a half the Arab world has been following a negative policy. It has known what it wanted to do away with, but it has not known what it wanted to build. The Western conquest of the Middle East was mental no less than physical. Overwhelmed and unsettled, Eastern minds lost almost all national values, yet could not absorb Western values. Misapplication of Western patterns of government brought a confused mixture of political systems and philosophies. Democracy was only a veil for dictatorship. Constitutions framed in the interest of the people of the Middle East became instruments for their exploitation and domination.

Egypt's story in these years centers upon the effort to free the country from a foreign yoke and to find a policy capable of eradicating the evils accumulated by feudalism and compounded by misuse of governmental power. It was a long and painful search. Egyptians hoped for leaders to champion their cause and defend their interests, but politicians and factions for the most part made themselves subservient to the forces that were ravaging the country—British rulers, corrupt monarchs, feudal overlords, a non-Egyptian ruling class and its Egyptian satellites.

The British had occupied Egypt with the tacit consent of Khedive Tewfik, great uncle of ex-King Farouk, following the patriotic revolt led by General Arabi. The Khedive, who had concentrated all power in his own hands and used it to benefit himself and his family, feigned acceptance of the reforms demanded by Arabi, while opening the doors to the British who sought a pretext to justify an occupation of Egypt. In 1882 naval units of the British Fleet bombarded Alexandria, Egypt's second capital and the biggest port of the Mediterranean, and landed troops. These troops met stubborn resistance. The entire garrison of General Arabi's men in the Alexandria forts defended their positions to the last man; but in the battles that ensued, Arabi's army was defeated with the Khedive's connivance, and the British occupation began.

There were indignant protests, international as well as Egyptian, and the British, sensing that their status was not legitimate, soon announced that the occupation was only a temporary meas-

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ure to achieve a particular objective—the reinstatement of the Khedive. In point of fact they intended to stay indefinitely, and did so. They always said they were on the point of leaving, and always found an excuse to stay. At first they claimed they were in Egypt to protect the foreigners against the Egyptians, although the foreigners never asked for their protection; then they claimed they had to stay to protect the Christian and Jewish minorities against the Moslems, overlooking the fact that the Christians and the Jews had joined the Moslems in demanding the withdrawal of the British forces from Egypt. The defense of the Suez Canal and the maintenance of their lines of communication with India and their Far Eastern Empire were further pretexts. When World War II came they said they could not go because the Suez Canal was an important base, and after World War II they explained that they had to stay to safeguard the interests of the free world.

From the outset, the British sapped the strength and the moral energies of Egypt. They disbanded the Egyptian Army and created a token force commanded by British officers. British advisers were installed in every department of government and vested with power to exercise full control. Education, at that time developing on a national basis, was disestablished. It became the function of the educational machinery to produce government officials divorced from the claims of national experience. Projects for higher education were also discarded. Financial policy impoverished the country. The Egyptians had to pay the cost of occupation and open the country to British companies and foreign agencies. Chartered monopolies dominated the Egyptian market.

This system of foreign rule was built on the corrupt monarchy and the feudal system that had been instituted under Mohammed Ali, who reigned from 1805 to 1849. He had taken for himself an absolute monopoly of land and resources, treated farmers as slaves, and created a new feudal class formed by his own family and his clique composed mainly of aliens. Those were granted large allotments of land and exempted from taxation. This monopolistic system was extended to commerce and industry (with the entire destruction of free enterprise as a result), and the money thus collected was not used for the national welfare but spent lavishly on wars serving Mohammed Ali's own ambition. Hence the cleavage between the ruling family and the enslaved masses, and the seeds of hatred that germinated and flowered

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throughout the reigns of his successors, Ibrahim, Ismail and Tewfik. And it was this corrupt and rapacious system that was fastened upon the Egyptian people when the British intervened to keep Tewfik in power.

Though the absolute state monopoly of land and commerce was later dissolved and private ownership and free enterprise were permitted, crushing taxation withheld from the Egyptian farmer the fruits of his labor. Foreign business, which under the system of privileges known as the Capitulations operated free from all taxation, easily dominated the emerging Egyptian commercial class. The banking system that had been established at the time of Khedive Ismail was designed to serve only the interests of the vested class. Farmers were compelled to deal with jobbers who strained their scanty resources.

With the end of the First World War, however, there came a remarkable rise in the prices of agricultural products, and this enabled the farmers to repay part of their debts and cultivate different sorts of crops which could be disposed of more easily. Nonetheless, with the coming of the next world war, 1,751,587 Egyptian farmers owned less than one acre, and 571,133 farmers owned from one to five acres. A great mass of the agricultural population owned nothing. Nor did this state of things improve noticeably in the next ten years. In 1950 there were 618,860 owners of parcels of land from one to five acres in size, an increase of only some 47,000.

Nowhere did the rulers of Mohammed Ali's family discharge their obligation to their people. Human activity operates between the two poles of right and obligation—a principle which applies ultimately to governor and governed. It is admitted that a man's duty corresponds to a right for another. The governor, then, is subject to rights and duties. His failure in fulfilling his duties—which are rights from the standpoint of the people—entails resistance on the part of the nation to secure these rights.

The problems confronting the Egyptian nation have thus for a long period seemed to fall into two parts: a struggle between the nation and its rulers on one hand, and a struggle between the nation and foreign intervention on the other. National struggle against foreign influence relates primarily to the sovereignty of the state, and derivatively to liberating the financial and economic resources of the state and administering them in the interest of national reconstruction.

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And so the Egyptian nation carried on the battle to find constitutional stability, along with a second battle for sovereignty and self-government. One aspect of this was the struggle for autonomy in financial matters, and beyond that for an increase in individual and national incomes and a lifting of cultural and social standards. The problem was to restore human dignity in Egypt.

Throughout the period national struggle assumed different forms, some pacific and some revolutionary. The first was based on argument and logic, giving rise to the formation of political parties and the founding of newspapers and magazines to enlighten public opinion. But whenever the nation understood that peaceful methods would not avail, recourse was had to force. So Egypt had to pass through three revolutions: the Arabi revotion, the revolution of 1919 and the revolution of July 1952. Any revolution which fails to realize its basic objectives inevitably lays the seeds for a subsequent uprising. Our national struggle was therefore one continual and unremitting battle, despite intermittent weaknesses. Always there were the two great objectives—to check despotism and make the nation itself the source of powers, and to put an end to foreign intervention and the usurpation of Egypt's resources.

In 1936, a treaty provided for the ending of British occupation, but it also required a permanent agreement between Egypt and Britain—a provision very likely to mean permanent occupation. After 1936 the British took the opportunity of party frictions to renew their intervention in Egyptian affairs. The thirst of party leaders after power was also utilized by King Farouk to realize personal ambitions at the expense of the vital interests of the people. He claimed exemptions from taxation and got control of thousands of acres of state property and entailed land. Merit was no criterion for rewards, nor was there any equality of opportunity; privileges were reserved for relatives and favorites of ministers in power. The results were nepotism and corruption. Egypt had a working constitution, but it veiled arbitrary rule.

When Arab countries felt the enthusiasm to rescue Palestine, the Egyptian Goverment was ill-prepared for the task. Mismanagement and corruption by the King's clique, which included trading in defective arms, rendered fruitless the bitter sacrifices made by the Egyptian Army which would otherwise have secured victory. The war revealed the extent of evils which pervaded the

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court and government, and stirred the nation to protest. An attempt was made to divert the attention of the masses to external issues—the key to the abolition of the 1936 treaty. Its abolition was certainly consonant with the national desire, and would have been a genuinely national achievement had the government taken the necessary measures of reform afterward. It did not. Hence the formation of "liberation commando squads." But while these operated in the Canal Zone, there came the shamelessly contrived burning of Cairo on January 26, 1952. The commandos were paralyzed and the gap between the government and the governed widened.

II

Revolution was the only way out. And it came in 1952, led by the army and backed by the nation. In the pre-revolutionary period the army was an instrument in the hand of despotic rulers who used it against the nationalist movements. Now it understood its position and joined the ranks of the people to head the movement for national liberation.

This revolution, it will be understood, has been markedly bloodless in character because it is in essence the expression of a sentiment long suppressed but harbored in the heart of the nation. It was purely national with no international intervention. Conscious of the trend of events to follow, it realized its objectives within a shorter time than expected. The nation had sworn allegiance to Mohammed Ali in the attempt to overthrow the rule of the Mamelukes, but Mohammed Ali and his descendants unfortunately forfeited this loyalty, embarking on despotic enterprises and usurping the rights of the people. Thus it was an unconditional imperative that the revolution should overthrow the ruling dynasty, reclaim its birthright and restore the lost national prestige. So it deposed the Monarch, abolished monarchy, and established the Egyptian Republic.

As the pre-revolutionary public life had grown corrupt and effete through tampering with the constitution, and as the political parties had joined in the despotic rule contrary to the interest of the nation, it was necessary that the revolution should suspend the constitution, dissolve political parties and frame a new constitution consonant with the new national aspirations. And because the government machinery was corrupt, it had to be cleansed and reformed.

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Since national wealth was inequitably distributed and predominantly feudalistic, the revolution enacted the Agrarian Reform Bill which set a ceiling on land ownership and rent, and provided against the breaking up of holdings not exceeding five acres. It also regulated the relation between landlord and tenant, by legalizing certain tenant rights. The Agrarian Reform Board is distributing the surplus areas, together with the land confiscated from Mohammed Ali's family, among the bulk of poor peasants. This Land Reform Bill was, in the main, designed to liberate the bulk of peasants from the feudalism which was a corollary of the system of land tenure.

As the major concern of the revolution was the realization of state sovereignty, it was imperative that the British forces should be evacuated entirely.

The revolution also had a definite program for reconstruction. It began to develop the potential resources of the country, setting up the national Board of Production charged with planning national productivity and outlining the new policy of large-scale industrialization. It reëstablished the Industrial Bank, the main objectives of which are to aid emerging industries, consolidate those already existing and provide technical aid.

The pre-revolutionary balance of trade was unfavorable to Egypt. The internal market, and to a larger extent the external one, were dominated by British influence. The revolution had to liberate the Egyptian economy from British control. Economic missions were dispatched to foreign countries to find new markets for Egyptian produce, and the government adopted a barter policy of exchanging cotton for machinery, equipment and other needed commodities.

III

The new régime in Egypt has a clear-cut policy for rebuilding the country on new foundations—an integrated, three-pronged development, now on the way to execution. Some of its activities may be mentioned here, not in an attempt to set forth the program in full, but only to offer examples.

The principal project is the Sadd el 'Ali (High Dam) scheme, designed mainly to increase agricultural output by almost 50 percent. Egypt's present agricultural land totals 6,000,000 acres. The High Dam will reclaim 2,000,000 more and will supply water for the permanent rice plantation of 700,000 acres, and convert

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another 700,000 acres of one-crop land in Upper Egypt to perennial irrigation. Built about four miles south of Aswan Dam, 200 miles north of the Sudan border, the giant dam will be constructed not as a conventional stone wall but a pyramidal granite rock-field almost half-a-kilometer thick. It will be 150 meters high, and its reservoir will cover 3,000 square kilometers—the highest dam and the largest reservoir in the world. Construction is expected to begin early in 1955, and the scheme will take ten years to complete. It will cost $516,000,000. The Sadd el 'Ali will increase national production by $450,000,000 a year, and will add an annual government revenue of $60,000,000.

Pending construction of the High Dam, we have drafted short-range plans for the expansion of cultivated land. The chief item is a four-year plan, from 1952 to 1956, to reclaim 311,680 acres in Upper and Lower Egypt. This included a 10,000-acre nucleus for the new Tahrir (Liberation) Province, situated in the Western Desert alongside the western delta branch, between Cairo and Alexandria. The total plan covers an area of 600,000 acres in all, and future expansion may well double this area.

There is a second plan to reclaim 50,000 acres in the northwest tip of the Sinai peninsula for the benefit of the Palestine refugees. Water would be tunnelled underneath the Suez Canal to irrigate this area. The plan would be financed by the United Nations. In a third plan, still under survey, it is hoped to reclaim 100,000 acres by means of artesian wells. The project would be undertaken through the joint efforts of the Egyptian Government and the United States Point Four program.

Apart from increasing the extent of cultivated land, we are also stepping up agricultural production per acre. The Agrarian Reform Program has already increased the yield of affected areas. As the peasants become owners of their land, they produce more per acre; for example, the yield in the sugar-cane belt in Upper Egypt increased from 733 to 908 kantars per acre. Rural coöperative societies have been created which provide the new small landowner with water, fertilizers, pure seed, livestock, technical advice and other facilities. And the Ministry of Agriculture has taken measures to combat pests, increase livestock, supply seeds, and step up dairying and other agricultural industries.

In our integrated reform policy, various agricultural projects will contribute toward industrial development, and industrial projects will contribute toward agricultural expansion. For in-

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stance, the Sadd el 'Ali scheme will provide hydroelectric power for industry, while the fertilizer factories will add to the fertility of the soil. The 16 turbines will generate ten billion kilowatt-hours every year, and the neighboring Aswan Dam will shortly be producing another two billion kilowatt hours annually.

Besides hydroelectric power, we are also expanding the exploitation of our oil resources to the maximum. The first move was to revise the Mining Law which had restricted the operation of foreign companies in Egypt at a time when local capacities for the work were extremely limited. The restrictions have been removed and the transfer abroad of the companies' profits and capital is now permitted. Concessions are being granted to foreign oil companies. The largest, given to the Egyptian-American Oil Company, covers 75,000 square miles in the Western Desert. Other concessions have been given in the Eastern Desert and the Sinai Peninsula. Moreover, while existing oil wells at the Red Sea coast have increased their output, the capacity of the government oil refinery at Suez has been raised from 300,000 to 1,300,000 tons annually. We are also building a Suez-Cairo pipeline to reduce oil transportation costs.

The largest plant in our blueprints is a fertilizer factory, to be worked on the Aswan Dam hydroelectric power which will be available in 1958. It will cost $72,000,000, and will produce 375,000 tons of calcium nitrates annually. When the Sadd el 'Ali scheme starts producing hydroelectric power, output will be increased to 500,000 tons a year. The second biggest plant is an iron and steel works, already being constructed at Helwan, near Cairo, by the German firm of Demag. This plant, costing $45,000,000, marks Egypt's entry into the field of heavy industry; it will take four years to complete, and will turn out 240,000 tons of steel products every year. The iron-ore deposits at Aswan are rich—sufficient, it is estimated, to supply Egypt's steel industry for 500 years.

A few other projects may be mentioned: a paper plant with an annual output of 20,000 tons of writing and printing paper, other than newsprint, to use sugar-cane bagasse and rice straw (available locally in large quantities) and to start production in 1957; a beet-sugar factory with an annual capacity of 50,000 tons, costing $15,000,000 and starting production at the end of 1955; a factory, now under construction, to turn out 200,000 tires a year at the beginning, with later increases to meet local requirements

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and permit some export; and a jute plant with a capacity of 20,000 tons a year, to cost about $6,000,000. In addition to bolstering the Industrial Bank, the government has adopted other measures to help private industry, such as the improvement of internal communications, temporary protective tariffs, reduced customs on imported machinery, and the encouragement of foreign capital. It is expected that the agrarian reform program will also switch a major part of the nation's capital from agriculture to industry, as big landowners are given compensation for their estates in the form of bonds which can be invested in industrial projects.

The increase of agricultural and industrial output will require new outlets in foreign markets. Egypt suffered a foreign trade deficit of $225,000,000 in 1952, and a total deficit in the ten years before the revolution of more than 1.5 billion dollars. The revolutionary government was able to overcome this chronic foreign trade deficit, and to show a profit of $43,000,000 by the first quarter of 1954, and of $61,000,000 by the second quarter of the same year.

This achievement took strenuous efforts at home and abroad. At home, corrupt government interference with cotton prices, which had resulted in the medium-staple cotton fetching higher prices than the long-staple categories, was eliminated. The Cotton Futures Market, through which the prices had been manipulated, was closed, and Egyptian cotton prices tied up with those of the United States. The elimination of illicit practices restored confidence abroad in Egypt's cotton trade. Trade policies were based on the principle that politics should be kept separate from economics. We made no distinction between West and East in selling cotton, and trade and payments agreements were concluded with Eastern and Western countries alike. Cotton is the backbone of Egypt's economy. We were able to dispose of the huge carryovers of crops.

To improve the trade balance we also had to cut down nonessential imports, and to restrict imports from countries with which we had not concluded trade agreements. With the completion of plans for agriculture and industrial expansion, we shall be able to reduce our imports of foodstuffs and manufactured goods. These will include chiefly wheat, oil and household articles. These savings will not only improve Egypt's trade balance, but also preserve precious earnings in hard currency.

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IV

The three-pronged policy to rebuild Egypt's economy on solid foundations has one object in view: to raise the standard of living among the masses of the people. The Egyptian peasant is no longer the virtual serf of big landowners, but his own master. The agrarian reform program has resulted in a substantial increase in his real income. The Egyptian worker is also getting a new deal. In many cases his wages are determined by joint committees including representatives of management, labor and government. Wages vary according to many factors, including the kind of work, the workers' family status, and the area in which he works, but in all cases his wages are made as high as the interests of industrial expansion allow.

To promote the welfare of the masses, the government undertook a vast program of social services. About $200,000,000 is allocated in the current budget for projects for social reform. Social welfare units are being established in the rural areas, each unit to serve 15,000 inhabitants, and to include a school, a health center and a social-agricultural extension section. Our effort is to provide all rural districts with social services in the next five years; 200 centers were opened in 1954. By the end of the ten years required for completion of our most ambitious scheme, Sadd el 'Ali, we believe we shall have more than doubled Egypt's national income, with a corresponding increase in the nation's standard of living. Incidentally, in one step to help remedy the social stratification which has split Egyptian society into hostile camps, titles and honors—princes, pashas and beys, marks of a privileged class—were abolished.

These, then, are the aims of the revolution: to end the exploitation of people, to realize national aspirations and to develop the mature political consciousness that is an indispensable preliminary for a sound democracy. The revolution seeks to bridge the gulf between social classes and to foster the spirit of altruism which marks a cultivated individual and a cohesive group. Our ultimate aim is to provide Egypt with a truly democratic and representative government, not the type of parliamentary dictatorship which the Palace and a corrupt "pasha" class imposed on the people. In the past, parliament was a body for blocking social improvement. We want to make sure that in the future the senators and deputies will serve all the Egyptians rather than a few.

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To achieve these aims, the standard of living of the masses must be raised, education expanded and social consciousness developed throughout the land so that the people will understand the duties and privileges of citizenship. The nation must also be provided with a constitution that safeguards the interests of all groups. During the past year a commission composed of leaders in different fields of life in Egypt, and representative of the different faiths—Christianity, Judaism and Islam—has been drafting our new constitution.

As we plan for the future, we have also had to clean out the corrupt past, especially the subversive or reactionary groups which have spread their tentacles wide in the land. The greatest internal enemies of the people are the Communists who serve foreign rulers, the Moslem Brotherhood which still seeks rule by assassination in an era that has outlived such practices, and the old-time politicians who would like to reëstablish exploitation.

Reactionary religious groups such as the Moslem Brotherhood are neither genuinely political nor genuinely religious. Their ultimate aim is power and to realize it they adopt methods contrary to the spirit of Islam and the spirit of the age. Islam derives from a comprehensive philosophy which never fails to accommodate various human feelings and aspirations. In this sense it is not only humanitarian but elastic and tolerant. It has its ubiquitous principles—applicable to time and place and mindful of the rights of man. It condemns intolerance, terrorism, prejudice and organized hatred. Its teachings form the core of true democracy.

We are proud that our revolution has been bloodless. We have rid ourselves of corrupt politicians, a corrupt king and an outmoded monarchy without loss of life. We have had to impose restrictions to prevent enemies of the people from exploiting the people and poisoning their minds. But if we have had to exercise our authority, it has been in order to pave the way for a better life for the men and women of our country. We want to lift these restrictions as soon as we feel the people are no longer in danger from such groups—and the sooner that time comes the better so far as we are concerned.

V

A closing word about Egypt's foreign relations: despite all reports to the contrary by enemies of the Arab world, the Arab League is a reality. There are social and economic differences be-

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tween one Arab nation and another, just as there are, for example, among the nations of the Western European Union, but by the same token we have more in common than the various European nations which hope to work together. The nations of the Arab League believe that they can unite in a force that contributes to the cause of world peace.

Efforts to unite have been blocked, to some extent, by local differences and dynastic rivalries, and to a greater extent by outside forces conspiring against us. But the League can be made the instrument through which a greater unity can be achieved among the Arab nations in every field of activity. Its member states can form an effective force for the defense of this area. Throughout the negotiations for the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal, the Government of Egypt has pointed out that this evacuation will not create a military "vacuum" in the Middle East but will pave the way for strengthening the area's defenses.

The defense of the Middle East must rest primarily with the inhabitants of the area. No outside forces can defend this soil as effectively as the people who live here. That is why Egypt has made every effort to strengthen the Arab League's Collective Security Pact. It is the best possible system to defend our part of the world against any possible aggression.

Over a century ago, Egypt, with less than half her present population, had an army of more than 200,000. There is no reason why the 70,000,000 Arabs could not build up an army of several divisions for the defense of their lands. Our countries possess great potential wealth, not to speak of the oil for which our deserts are famous. Those of our Arab brethren who have been given the chance of education have proved to be no less capable than any other people in the world. We still lack development, but industrialization will increase our capabilities.

In the meantime, we believe that all those more developed Powers who believe in peace should and will help us to strengthen ourselves against aggression. Starting with the Collective Security Pact as the basis for our own defense, we can consider—once it has been adequately implemented—coördinating our defense plans with those of any other nation interested in defense against aggression in this area.

The objection has often been made that if the Arabs were to receive military assistance they would immediately attack Israel. Egyptians feel that a great injustice was committed against the

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Arabs generally, and especially against the million or more Palestinian Arabs who are now refugees. Israel's policy is aggressive and expansionist, and Israel will continue her attempts to prevent any strengthening of the area. However, we do not want to start any conflict. War has no place in the constructive policy which we have designed to improve the lot of our people. We have much to do in Egypt, and the rest of the Arab world has much to do. A war would cause us to lose, rather than gain, much of what we seek to achieve.

In other quarters there has been talk of "Communist infiltration" in the various Arab and African nationalist movements. It would be unwise for the United States to take that view of nationalist activities, led by sincere patriots whose only desire is to see their nations free from foreign domination. Americans recognize this to be the inalienable right of every man, yet balk at supporting these nationalists for fear of annoying some colonial Power that has refused to move with the times. It is this procrastination that gives the Communists the chance to take over what usually start as genuinely patriotic movements. Such was the case of Indo-China.

There would not be any Communist infiltration in any part of the Middle East and Africa if the United States could develop a courageous policy—and the only morally correct one—of supporting those who are anxious to get rid of foreign domination and exploitation. Real independence would be the greatest defense against Communist—or any other type—of infiltration or aggression. Free men are the most fanatical defenders of their liberty, nor do they lightly forget those who have championed their struggle for independence.

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FOLKLORE AND FACT ABOUT UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

By Stacy May

SINCE the end of World War II the literature of international politics and economics in America and Western Europe has concerned itself more and more with the problems of the world's underdeveloped areas. Although the definition of what constitutes underdevelopment is far from precise, the term generally has been applied to most of the political entities of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia —with their combined populations of well over a billion people, or about two-thirds of the inhabitants of the free world.

There is little doubt that one important reason why Western interest has thus focussed on the problems of the underdeveloped areas has been the obvious turn of Soviet strategy, which singles out the areas of relatively low industrial activity and appalling low per capita incomes as the vulnerable point of attack. The engulfment of China, and successively of North Korea and Northern Vietnam, conjured up for the West the specter of the possible alienation of other great areas in which there exist similar disparities between low economic standards and high national aspirations. The undercurrent of unrest in a major part of the underdeveloped areas, and the overt political upheavals in a large number of the nations or dependencies of these regions, have given such fears a reality that cannot be ignored. Although history provides no assurance that economic progress promotes political stability and international concord, there has been a growing conviction in the industrialized West that opportunity for the satisfaction of the aspirations of the peoples of the underdeveloped areas for economic growth had better be provided within the orbit of the free world. Frustration of their hopes, it is believed, strengthens the Soviet drive to alienate them.

Quite apart from such imperatives of Western defensive strategy there has arisen in addition an increasing awareness that the economic dynamism of the highly industrialized nations of the free world is genuinely dependent upon the achievement of a comparable dynamism in the underdeveloped economies. In 1952, one-third of the combined exports of the United States, Western Europe and Canada found outlets in the markets of underdevel-

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oped countries. Something like 40 percent of their total exports of manufactured goods were also marketed in these areas. No business interest can afford to be complacent about future prospects in such an important segment of its markets.

The degree of interdependence is shown even more conclusively by the amount of supplies the industrialized nations draw from these regions. The records show (also as of 1952) that the United States, Western Europe and Canada are dependent upon the underdeveloped areas for 50 percent of their combined imports of industrial raw materials and 48 percent of crude foodstuffs. Since these import needs of the industrialized nations have been steadily expanding, and promise to increase at an accelerated pace, growth in the underdeveloped economies is obviously to the interest of the West.

These three imperatives—the strategic considerations, the quest for access to expanding export markets, and the need to assure an increasing source of primary products—impel the industrialized West to forward the development in the backward sectors of the free world.

Clearly there are non-material motivations as well—humanitarian and moral—which have an important weight in the traditional American attitude toward other peoples. One of the major impediments to the development of a coherent and effective United States policy in this field has been the tendency here and abroad to regard the various motives as necessarily in conflict with one another, so that those who are influenced by one kind must regard the others as spurious, or ignoble or "soft-minded."

In particular, programs which give weight to factors of defense or trade have been vociferously attacked by those to whom another motivation carries the greater appeal, and these criticisms seem often to be based more on folklore than fact. The resultant discord has engendered suspicions and fears in the underdeveloped areas, many of which are newly emerged from colonial status or are striving to emerge from it. And such misgivings have, of course, been skillfully abetted by those whose major aim is to convince the peoples of the underdeveloped areas that their aspirations for economic betterment can be achieved only if they detach themselves from the political procedures and the economic orbit of the Western democracies. In the babel of conflicting counsel, the fundamental consideration is lost sight of. It is simply that the fulfillment of each of the different objec-

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tives, and of all of them combined, depends upon forwarding the same end—the prompt achievement of economic growth in the underdeveloped areas.

The analysis presented here will be restricted to the implications of only one of the three material motivations listed above —the necessity of promoting growth in the underdeveloped economies to assure an adequate supply of primary products for growth in the economy of the free world. The emphasis needs to be placed on that factor because the rôle of the underdeveloped areas as producers and exporters of crude foodstuffs and, particularly, of industrial raw materials, has been so consistently misinterpreted. The misunderstanding threatens seriously to impair the economic advancement that can take place in such areas if their potential as producers of primary products is properly used.

There has been a voluminous literature in recent years illustrating the prevailing misconceptions about the rôle of primary products in economic development. One quotation—and a relatively moderate one—from a recent book[1] dealing with development problems must suffice to establish the flavor of existing sentiment:

> While extractive industries provide a fine source of employment, of local expenditures, and of royalties to the government, they cannot and do not contribute as much to over-all development as do manufacturing, service and distributive industries. As the local people are very well aware, the oil and mining companies are after all primarily engaged in taking wealth out, not in bringing it in.

This observation, offered in a context that discounts the importance of the contribution to development of direct foreign investments in petroleum and mining activities, would not be entitled to serious consideration if it did not mirror a viewpoint widely prevalent in the underdeveloped areas themselves. Their understandable rejection of the rôle of "hewers of wood and drawers of water" for the industrialized world has in a number of cases been carried to the point of actively discouraging the further expansion of primary products. At least one nation which through agricultural exports had achieved a per capita income level comparable to that of many industrialized nations adopted a policy in the postwar period which seemed deliberately designed to make agricultural enterprise unattractive. The step was taken as a means of promoting industrialization, but the result was that

[1] Jonathan B. Bingham, "Shirt Sleeve Diplomacy." New York: John Day, 1954, p. 149.

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a healthy growth was effectively arrested: agriculture was depressed, and sufficient industrial activity to compensate for this loss was not achieved.

The jaundiced view held by most underdeveloped areas toward the part which primary production can play in their economic development is mainly the result of outside influences. To be explicit, it is based largely on the findings of research carried out in America, in Europe, and by United Nations agencies. There are indeed huge gaps in our knowledge of the field, particularly with respect to industrial raw materials, where we have not even a reasonably accurate summation of the over-all production in recent years or of how it is divided geographically. But there has been a veritable flood of analyses tending to make raw materials the whipping boy of underdevelopment. The popular folklore which has been developed as a result is held with a tenacity almost in inverse ratio to the amount of convincing supporting evidence. The preconceptions now current as "common knowledge" may be summarized as follows:

1. The so-called underdeveloped, or primary-producing areas, are the major producers and exporters of primary products, including industrial raw materials.

2. In their exchange of primary products for the manufactures of the highly industrialized nations, the underdeveloped countries have been seriously handicapped by the exceptionally erratic demand and pattern of prices for their exports, in comparison to the comparatively stable prices and demand for manufactured goods in international trade.

3. Because of the comparatively violent fluctuations of the foreign exchange earnings of the primary producing areas, and of doubt that future prices of primary products will hold their own with manufacturing prices, there is a strong case for the establishment of intergovernmental controls to stabilize the relationship between the prices of primary products and manufactures in international trade and to regularize the demand for the former.

4. Since manufacturing demonstrably brings higher per capita income returns than does primary production considered as a whole, and since there are other undoubted advantages in a broad rather than an overly specialized pattern of national production, underdeveloped areas should focus their efforts on developing manufacturing enterprise. Available domestic capital

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and additional foreign capital should be channeled to that purpose; foreign capital investment in further raw materials production should be discouraged since it is "exploitative" rather than "constructive" and tends to perpetuate a colonial pattern.

The stakes at issue for the entire free world are of sufficient importance to warrant a careful winnowing of these preconceptions to separate the fact from the folklore.

II

First, let us examine the common belief that the underdeveloped areas are the major producers and exporters of primary products, as the description "primary producing areas" suggests.[2] The free world production of primary products in 1950 was of the general dimension of 120 billion dollars, of which industrial raw materials accounted for about 46 billion dollars. The so-called industrialized areas, with about one-third of the free world's population, produced well over two-thirds of its industrial raw materials, and their industries processed more than 90 percent of the free world total. Estimates of the incidence of production and consumption of crude foodstuffs are less adequate, but from the known fact that the great bulk of this category of primary products is consumed in the areas where it is produced, and from estimates that establish per capita calory consumption in the underdeveloped areas at about two-thirds that of the industrialized countries, it may be inferred that the production of crude foodstuffs is more or less equally divided between the two.

When trade in primary products between the industrialized and the underdeveloped countries is examined on the basis of a representative sample, it is found that, through trade among themselves, the nations of the industrialized areas supplied each other with 50 percent of their combined industrial raw material imports and with a slightly higher percentage of their combined food imports. Furthermore, they exported to the underdeveloped areas primary products valued at more than one-fourth the value of the primary products they drew from these areas.

The term "primary producing nations," as applied to the underdeveloped economies, needs careful interpretation. The indus-

[2] The conclusions summarized here are based on estimates set forth in a paper, "The Outlook for Industrial Raw Materials Demand in 1980 and Its Relation to International Development," presented by the author of this article at the World Population Conference, Rome, September 1954. Other conclusions drawn in later sections of this article are documented in the same paper.

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trialized nations actually produce more primary products than the underdeveloped nations do, and their total exports of such products bulk somewhat larger in international trade. It is true, however, that their manufactures are overwhelmingly larger, both with respect to production and exports. The underdeveloped economies may properly be referred to as "the primary producers" only in the sense that a disproportionately large share of their total economic effort is devoted to the production of foods and industrial raw materials. And they may be called "the primary exporters" only in the sense that something like 90 percent of their foreign exchange earnings from Western Europe, the United States and Canada are derived from exports of primary products, while only 35 percent of the combined foreign exchange earnings of those industrialized countries are earned by shipments of food and industrial raw materials.

Thus, clearly, if the long-term record of international trade showed that foreign exchange earnings derived from exports of crude foodstuffs and raw materials suffered much more severe yearly declines than the export revenue from manufactures and semi-manufactures, this would be evidence that the underdeveloped areas were suffering disproportionate hardship.

However, this is not the case, as becomes plain when we examine another preconception. This is the preconception, fostered by a variety of recent studies,[3] that short-term fluctuations in the pattern of demand and price of internationally-traded primary products, as compared with fluctuations in the price of manufactures, have worked a particular disadvantage to exporters of primary products. The case made out for this appears formidable. But its weaknesses stem from the fact that most of the documentation is based on a limited list of selected commodities; that fluctuations *upward* are weighed along with *downward* fluctuations to establish a record of instability; and, generally, that the documentation fails to examine in detail the record of either individual manufactured articles or of the category as a whole in terms of price and volume fluctuations and foreign exchange earnings.

From another recent study, "International Trade—1952," published by GATT, a quite different picture is derived. This study has the advantage of being much more comprehensive, in that

[3] See particularly the studies of the United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs: "Instability in Export Markets of Under-Developed Countries," New York, 1952, and "Commodity Trade and Economic Development," New York, 1953.

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its indexes cover production, trade and prices for all primary products and manufactures. Its principal limitation is that it presents data for only 18 years; it begins with 1925 and runs to 1951, but the war and immediate postwar years 1939–1947 are omitted. The chief finding from this study is that neither in the case of production nor trade was the record of *values* for primary products (*i.e.* volumes multiplied by prices) more volatile than that for manufactures. For the period 1925–1938, the values of the two moved in essentially the same pattern. For the postwar years, the curves again were similar, with manufactures moving to slightly higher levels than primary products in terms of production, and primary products moving ahead somewhat in trade.

Thus, on the crucial question of the comparative exchange earnings from international trade, it may be stated flatly that for the period covered there is no evidence that the realized exchange earnings from primary product exports were characterized by greater downswings than those realized from manufactured exports. On the score of prices alone, primary products did fall off somewhat more sharply than manufactures in the first four years of the depression thirties, but recovered much more dramatically in the postwar years.

Fortunately, it is possible to make a comparison over a far longer period of the dollar exchange provided by the United States market through its imports of crude materials and crude foodstuffs on the one hand, and its imports of finished manufactures, semi-manufactures, and manufactured foodstuffs on the other. Here the record has been examined from 1900 through 1953, which provides a 53-year experience of annual fluctuations. It is relevant to note that the U.N. studies, mentioned above, cite the United States market as a particularly flagrant contributer to exchange instability in the underdeveloped areas. The evidence is to the contrary. United States imports of primary products afforded their suppliers a greater return than was realized in the previous year in 35 years, a lesser return in 18 years. Imports of manufactured goods yielded the suppliers a greater return in 37 years, less in 15 years; in one year there was no measurable change. For both categories the percentage of decline in the years of lesser profits was 16 percent. In the case of primary products, the average increase in the years of advance was almost 20 percent, as against 16.5 percent for manufactures.

If crude materials alone are compared with finished manufac-

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tures alone, the former show a somewhat greater instability—19 years with an average decline of 19 percent, against 16 with an average decline of 13 percent. The difference was not very great; and the average advance in the favorable years was 23 percent for crude materials against 14 percent for manufactures.

It may be worth while, as a further check, to compare the relative stability of United States exports of manufactured goods as an earner, rather than a provider, of foreign exchange. There were increases in 37 out of 53 years, and decreases in 16, with the averages of the former 26 percent and of the latter 21 percent. For cotton manufactures alone, there were 20 years of lowered earnings, averaging 22 percent in magnitude; in the case of iron and steel mill products (from 1900 to 1952), there were 22 years in which exchange earnings fell by an average 23 percent; and in the category of machinery of all classes there were 14 years of decline also averaging 23 percent.

The conclusion from the evidence, which could be amplified, is that there has been considerable instability in foreign trade markets, but that the earnings from exports of primary products have not been subject to declines markedly more extreme than those from manufacturing exports. Contemporary scholarship has done a disservice by describing one side of the coin and neglecting an adequate examination of the other. This has had at least two unfortunate results. The first is a set of solutions which have gained wide advocacy, but which, if workable at all, would promise to benefit the major *importers* of primary products, rather than the underdeveloped areas in whose name the proposals were put forth. The second misfortune is that the underdeveloped nations have been encouraged to neglect their possibilities as producers and exporters of primary products—possibilities that may well hold the key to the achievement of a rounded economy and the realization of all their aspirations. These proposals, so uncritically taken up by many men of good will, need examination in some detail.

III

In 1952, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution urging national governments to coöperate "in establishing multilateral as well as bilateral agreements or arrangements relating to individual primary commodities as well as groups of primary commodities and manufactured goods, for the purpose of:

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(a) Ensuring the stability of the prices of the said commodities in keeping with an adequate, just and equitable relationship between these prices and those of capital goods and other manufactured articles;

(b) Safeguarding the continuity of the economic and social progress of all countries, those producing as well as those consuming raw materials."

The United States did not support this resolution, which passed by a vote of 36 to 4, with 20 nations abstaining. There is certain to be continuing agitation for programs to put this recommendation into force.

International control over commodity allocation has been practised in times of emergency—during World War II, and again after Korea, when an International Materials Conference was organized, on a voluntary basis, to allocate scarce materials in an equitable fashion. But the control of primary products trade upon a broad scale and under other than emergency conditions presents many problems. Three variant types of procedure are generally considered possible, and there is a record of experience with at least two of them in limited application, though with less than conclusive results.

The first procedure calls for the use of restrictive quota agreements. Prices are controlled by means of agreed limitations on the production and export of a commodity on a quota basis, varied to equate supply with demand. The international sugar agreement of 1953 is of this type. The second device, the use of long-term contracts, is typified by the international wheat agreement under which exporting countries agree to supply a fixed minimum amount at a given ceiling price, and importing countries agree to purchase a fixed minimum amount at a given floor price. When the free market is functioning between the floor and ceiling prices the guaranties are inoperative. The third procedure, which calls for control over commodity markets through the operation of international buffer stocks, has never been tried. Purchases and sales from such buffer stocks would be depended upon to regulate prices.

There are cogent reasons to question the workability of any of these devices, particularly if an attempt were made to apply them to a broad list of commodities. One unsolved problem that is basic to all is that of finding a way to make them effective in modifying short-term price fluctuations of undue severity without

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interfering with the longer term trends that are depended upon to adjust supply to demand, eliminate inefficient producers and allocate resources between alternate uses. Another difficulty is how to obtain managing personnel sufficiently wise and objective to operate the controls in the common interest, and as effectively as through the workings of the free market.

Each device raises a number of special problems; but there is one more general question that is fundamental. Who would benefit if any of these expedients were adopted and could be made to work? The Assembly resolution mentions the interests of both producers and consumers of raw materials; but its case was documented and supported largely as a measure to remove the alleged disabilities of the underdeveloped countries which concentrate upon primary production and trade. The same resolution suggests that the control should operate to preserve "an adequate, just and equitable relationship" between the prices of primary and manufactured goods, presumably in international trade.

The record of price movements for various categories of goods in international trade shows that the postwar level of raw materials prices as a whole has an entirely different and much higher relationship to the prices of manufactured goods than in the prewar period. The much longer record of U.S. prices shows the same phenomenon. If the proposed program had been in existence over a 25-year period, would the earlier relationship have been considered "adequate, just and equitable?" Is the relationship now existing, after a relatively deeper fall of raw materials prices in 1952 and 1953 and a subsequent movement toward rebalancing, the best that the market is likely to afford to raw materials in the years ahead? The United Nations economic studies find no persuasive evidence to suggest a further improvement in the relative prices of primary products, but other economists do. Before discussing that, however, I would like to register my own conviction that to peg prices of primary product prices to the prices of manufactured goods would be more likely to benefit the net purchasing areas for these products than the underdeveloped areas which are net exporters.

IV

The last of the preconceptions deals with the widespread conviction that underdeveloped areas should turn away from the production of raw materials in order to develop economies based

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on manufacturing. To keep the record straight, let us start with an unqualified endorsement of heroic efforts to broaden the base of underdeveloped economies. Certainly this calls for an expansion of domestic manufacturing, as fast as capital, equipment, labor and managerial skills, materials and market outlets can be mobilized. It calls, too, in most underdeveloped areas, for a vast improvement in agricultural production, which means at the least a greater degree of mechanization and increased use of fertilizers and chemical weed and insect controls. It calls for improved transport and power facilities, which again means more equipment.

The "value added" to the gross national product by manufacturing is generally greater per person employed than that in the case of agriculture (though not more than is contributed by the extractive industries). This is another reason for developing manufactures. A third reason is that a broad economic activity based on a domestic market can help to cushion the shock of declines in export demand, which, as we have shown, are of considerable dimension for primary products and manufactures alike.

But to start manufacturing activities, to mechanize agriculture, to establish transport and power facilities in underdeveloped areas—all these require equipment. Most such equipment has to come from abroad; it is necessarily the product of an established and complex industrial economy. There are only three ways in which it can be acquired in substantial quantity. It can be purchased for cash—and that requires foreign exchange as well as locally mobilized capital. It may be purchased on credit or through loans—but repayment calls for foreign exchange. It may be brought in as a capital contribution by foreign investors—but such investment will not be made unless there is prospect of both business profit and sufficient foreign exchange from some source to cover the remittance of earnings and amortization. Equipment is an essential key to industrialization, and foreign exchange is an essential key to equipment.

How can the underdeveloped countries get the requisite foreign exchange of the major industrial countries? In the past, they have earned the great bulk of their foreign exchange by exports—54 percent from exported industrial raw materials and 34 per cent from exported foods. Primary products are likely to be their main source of earning power for some time, although increased local processing of export products at least to the semi-manufactured stage is desirable and should be progressively feasible.

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Since it can be stated with assurance that an increase of the tempo of industrialization calls for an increase in exports in its early stages, it is relevant to appraise the outlook of the underdeveloped countries for increased exports in the field of their greatest opportunity—industrial raw materials. Future projections are always hazardous, but development planning necessarily calls for a long view and must be based upon a reading of prospects.

Upon a reasonable estimate from past trends, we can say that the free world consumption of industrial raw materials may increase from about 46 billion dollars in 1950 to about 80 billion (at 1950 price levels) by 1975–80. The international trade in these commodities may increase from 27 billion dollars to about 50 billion in the same period. Such an increase in consumption should afford presently underdeveloped areas an opportunity to increase their combined production of industrial raw materials from the 14.5 billion dollars of 1950 to something like 31.5 billion within 25 years, and their exports in this field from 13.5 billion dollars to about 28.5 billion. Increases of this magnitude, almost double the expected population increases, would exert a markedly stimulating effect upon the underdeveloped economies. It is quite possible that if a sufficiently vigorous and enlightened effort were made, the share of the underdeveloped areas in both the production and the export of industrial raw materials might increase by even more than the amounts indicated. To date they have made far less drastic inroads upon their known and potential stores of such resources than have the industrialized countries, especially on resources that can be produced at low costs.

The opportunities for increased exchange revenues from larger food exports are also considerable and should be fostered. though they are by no means correspondingly large. There is equal urgency for expanded agricultural output, but chiefly to improve the woefully inadequate nutritional levels that prevail in most underdeveloped countries, and to save the exchange now spent on imported foodstuffs.

In summary, there is need for a reorientation of current thinking about the rôle of primary products, and particularly of industrial raw materials, in the economic planning of underdeveloped areas. It is much to the advantage of the underdeveloped areas to take vigorous advantage of the opportunities for increased production and trade in raw materials offered by an ex-

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ceptionally favorable outlook in demand and price. They possess the most economic stores of supply. They should exploit these advantages to increase the initial processing stages of raw materials in their own countries, and thus promote industrial development in the field where they have the clearest competitive advantage. They should employ the need of manufacturing nations for raw materials imports as a lever to pry from them a major part of the capital funds upon which increased output depends, and thus conserve their limited local capital for developments of less appeal to foreign investors. Above all, they should use the increased foreign exchange earnings obtainable in this field to buy the equipment needed to broaden their domestic industrial base.

Finally, I think it is justifiable to suggest a thorough overhauling of the scholarship that, in recent analyses of the problems of underdevelopment, has so consistently disparaged the rôle that raw materials can play. The production and export of raw materials should not be regarded by underdeveloped nations as the terminus of their economic aspirations; nevertheless, it is a way station that cannot be bypassed. To seek to persuade the peoples who possess these resources that they should make less than the maximum feasible use of them is absurd in theory and disastrous in practice. If this counsel is followed, it will deprive the underdeveloped areas of their single most promising opportunity for attaining the broad, sound and vigorous economic growth that is central to their own objectives and essential to the strength and security of the entire free world.

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FRANCE'S NEW HOPE

By Jean Hoffmann

AFTER many years of frustration and cynicism there is hope again in France. The first 120 days of government by Pierre Mendès-France have produced a new climate and sweeping changes. A great part of French public opinion, including especially very many young Frenchmen, support the new Premier and take a more active interest in the nation's affairs than at any moment since the Liberation. The purpose of this writer, an ordinary young French citizen who holds no official or unofficial position of any kind, is to try to show how deeply every essential aspect of French politics has been changed by Mendès-France and why so many of us believe that these changes are the best that can be hoped for in the interest of France and of her allies.

In 1944 it seemed that France stood united and purified by the ordeal of defeat and occupation. Dozens of reforms were undertaken by her new leaders. But none was carried out. The outcome of confusion was immobility. Endless quarrels split the French people into numerous clans, united only by their common inability to escape from the old dilemmas. In the spring of 1954 our economy was stagnant; our European policy was in deadlock; disaster impended in Indo-China, in the North African protectorates, and, less apparently but just as surely, in our domestic social situation.

Why had so many roadblocks everywhere stopped advance? First, because no government had applied a global and coherent policy: each problem might be dealt with brilliantly for a while, since some of the statesmen in power were able and dedicated men, but the failure to find a general constructive approach wrecked the efforts undertaken at any single point. Secondly, because this fundamental deficiency was perpetuated—some say caused, but that is an oversimplification—by the constitutional régime and party system, which subordinated the executive to a timid legislature that was sovereign yet divided. It was a vicious circle. The merit of Mendès-France is to have broken it. He believes that all important French problems form a whole and that there is a single answer. And, in order to produce that answer, he has performed a revolution in the French political system. On

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both counts he has proved, as he wrote a few months ago, that "salvation lies only in a march forward."[1] The great expectations of 1944 are alive again.

II

The single answer being given by Mendès-France stems from his whole approach to politics: the approach of an economist to French and world affairs. It may not sound very original in America; it does in France, where the teaching of economics is poor and where no such approach ever secured precedence in government. The fundamental reason for France's decline, he believes, is her economic inefficiency. French capitalism has refused to obey the imperatives of expansion and has generally preferred security to risks. Competition and the other "automatic mechanisms" of a laissez-faire economy have been discarded in favor of restrictive cartel agreements and protection by the state. But the postwar attempt to create a state-run economy was not a success either. The state tried to do too much: to pay for reconstruction and rearmament, to run useful but unprofitable nationalized enterprises or social schemes, to develop large investments. We had the worst of both systems: slack Socialism and unreformed capitalism. When the conservative governments of 1951–3 finally made a choice, they made the wrong one: they cut investments. As a result, the French economy could be defined as a paradox—the coexistence of persistent inflationary trends and of an incipient depression; and as a vicious circle—high prices, low productivity, general rigidity, a mediocre standard of living and class antagonisms.

That this failure dominated the entire French policy was not unnoticed by many American observers. The whole mental outlook of the French had become defensive, unable to break away from now unjustified traditions and hierarchies. French economic policy remained torn between the beliefs of narrow conservatives and doctrinaire Socialists. French foreign policy was paralyzed by fear of the economic superiority and greater dynamism of other nations. Obviously a weak and declining nation does not count in international affairs, and no ideal can be realized, no interest preserved, if the man who is trying to promote them does not have material strength with which to fight. Why was not

[1] "Gouverner c'est prévoir, discours d'investiture et réponses aux interpellateurs. Assemblée Nationale, 3 et 4 juin 1953." Paris: Juilliard, 1953, p. 145.

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Robert Schuman's ideal of a united Europe implemented between 1950 and 1954, if not because France's weakness made her wary of ambitious and risky moves? There is no doubt about the rightness of Mendès-France's answer, that France can overcome her contradictions only if she becomes a modern economic Power. The keyword is expansion. In France, it should open up new opportunities for the young generation. It also determines a new policy in the French Union: "If we want to preserve our standard of life, our independence, our special forms of civilization, metropolitan France is not a sufficient basis."[2] French industry and agriculture could not prosper if the resources and the markets of French Africa were lost, and a close economic union and joint expansion are indispensable. Finally, as "there will be no diplomatic recovery . . . as long as our internal affairs are unsettled," "the foreign policy of France is, first of all, her economic recovery."[3]

Now, if economic recovery commands everything, there was one problem which commanded economic recovery: Indo-China. Americans who have been precipitated from their hopes in the Navarre plan into the distress of the Geneva Agreement should understand that the political and military disintegration before and after Dien Bien Phu forced France to choose between disaster and a truce. If she had decided to go on fighting and had not taken massive military measures, all would have been lost. If she had chosen to send the rest of her army, including draftees, she would have been able to hold what was left of free Indo-China only at the cost of further economic and financial trouble at home and in North Africa, and of more political indecision in Europe. The fear of German domination on a continent where the French Army would have been reduced to symbolic garrisons would have become overwhelming.

What was of most vital interest for the Western alliance? Was it the prospect of an inconclusive fight in Asia which would weaken the West more than the Communists and could provoke political convulsions that would throw France into the Soviet arms? Or was it an agreement on about the best terms that could be hoped for, followed, possibly, by a quick French recovery? The great majority of Frenchmen had already given the answer. The merit of Mendès-France was to draw from it the logical con-

[2] "Gouverner c'est prévoir," p. 42.
[3] *ibid.*, p. 131–2 and p. 55.

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sequence, *i.e.* to try to get the inevitable truce at once, instead of dragging out the negotiations, which might have assuaged allied feelings but would have risked getting even worse terms.

It has thus become possible to work on economic recovery, which is the fundamental problem of France's future. Mendès-France has found a way out of his predecessors' dilemmas. As French capitalism suffers from anemia, state intervention is necessary, but it should be fruitful and efficient instead of paralyzing and financially disastrous. This is the purpose of his two golden rules: to insure full employment (which must be preserved by heavy investments: Mendès-France is a disciple of Lord Keynes) and to make sure that in all sectors of the French economy the more useful activities are preferred to those that are less useful. His policy is as incompatible with laissez-faire liberalism, which does not survive anywhere anyhow, as with the welfare state. He has declared that the state should never make gifts to anybody, and he wants to use state power in order to enable French businessmen and farmers to stand on their feet again.[4]

His policy implies a series of vital and long-delayed economic reforms. In the private sector of the economy, all obstacles to free enterprise are to be removed in so far as a restoration of the "automatic mechanisms," *i.e.* the search for maximum profits, would be socially useful. The tax system is to be overhauled; free trade will be reëstablished gradually, in order to reintroduce competition on a large scale, and state-financed funds have been created in order to help those enterprises (especially marginal ones) that may wish to leave productive fields for more profitable and useful ones, as well as to help their workers. But whenever these mechanisms do not have the required results the state must drive private enterprises into usefulness. Selective credit, a systematic policy of state orders and price support, fiscal incentives, etc., should make businessmen see the light. Economic and social mobility should follow.

In the public sector of the economy, on the contrary, the state-owned enterprises should be made more independent of the government. Instead of controlling them to death, it should build "mecanismes réfléchis," artificial mechanisms in imitation of those which rule in competitive enterprises. The state should devote bigger sums to such vitally needed investments as housing

[4] See the book by P. Mendès-France and G. Ardant which has just been published under the significant title, "La science économique et l'action." Paris: Juilliard, 1954.

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projects and education. Mendès-France has emphasized that such an increase would lead to inflation if no economies were realized. For that reason the reform of state-owned enterprises and social security and the modernization, simplification and decentralization of bureaucracy are being undertaken.

III

Nor should the political implications of these measures be underrated. The end of the dilemma of "free enterprise or Socialism" makes meaningless the fight between those who claimed that the state itself should give the workers a bigger share of the national income (but who did not search for methods to increase the national income), and those who considered that the employers should handle the matter themselves and need not share purely nominal advantages which were unjustified by the level of production. Mendès-France establishes a firm link between production and wages; the workers are thereby interested in expansion and cannot complain that they alone are the victims of a productivity drive; the new policy forces sacrifices on the employers too. The government sets the minimum wage and for the rest leaves the wage scale to privately negotiated collective agreements. If the consequence of economic expansion is the more active participation of the workers in national affairs, a decline of Communist strength can be expected to follow. The Communist vote in France is largely a vote of despair.

Now does not such a policy try to achieve exactly what the Marshall Plan was aiming at?

With economic recovery under way, it becomes possible for France to break the deadlock in her foreign policy and make the choice too long postponed. It definitely is not a choice between the Atlantic alliance and neutralism. Mendès-France has proclaimed that the Atlantic alliance is the cornerstone of French policy. He has been much more cautious in advocating negotiations with the East than many French deputies; he has always referred to "carefully prepared negotiations at the right moment," exactly as Sir Winston Churchill has. He does not intend to subordinate ratification of the recent Paris agreements to new talks with the East. The misgivings which have been expressed about him in this connection can spring only from his statements on the nature of the Communist threat. He believes that it is not purely or even mainly military; that in Europe and in Asia the

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Communists could win without firing a shot if the standard of living should remain stationary while that in the Soviet Union increased. The Western World, whose defenses must of course be solidly organized, has an interest in concluding such economic agreements with the East as would bring more advantages to the West than to the East and could weaken Russia's hold on her allies or satellites by establishing Western relations with them. The West has also an interest in discussing Russia's eventual disarmament proposals as long as they do not serve pure propaganda purposes, if for no other reason than because the main Soviet challenge is economic and social and increasing expenditures on rearmament could bring about a Communist victory on the main nonmilitary front.

This is not neutralism: it is common sense. It was one of the fundamental ideas of the Marshall and Point Four programs, and Great Britain's present government has acted on it consistently. Indeed, Mendès-France has dealt a strong blow to neutralism. Many liberals have moved away from it because they trust him; they now agree to military schemes which formerly they had refused. He thus has brought back to reality some very influential and useful men. There is hope for a lessening of East-West tension. But no one really expects the cold war to end.

The real choice which had to be made at last was inside the framework of the Atlantic alliance and concerned European unity. Mendès-France has definitely not repudiated European integration; his recent actions and proposals in Strasbourg, London and Paris show that he never thought that it should be abandoned or postponed until France had fully recovered. His decision was only regarding method. There seem to be only two logical methods, the federal solution and a step-by-step process. Previous cabinets had selected the first. If they were unable to put it into effect mainly because of French fears, would it not be normal to try to realize the federalist ideal once the recovery program was under way? Did not that ideal have the advantage of offering a good framework for European defense and for the reconciliation of France and Germany?

In the past, it is true, many Frenchmen, including especially many of the younger generation like this writer, preferred the federal method. They were impatient—with Europe's feuds, which have been responsible for so many disasters; with the first attempts at gradual construction, which ended in weakness and

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failure; above all, with France's capacity for autonomous recovery. Anything seemed better than the status quo. The Europe they heralded was romantic; for many of them it became a way out of despair. But one should not forget that the establishment of federal institutions does not in itself abolish the wide economic, social and psychological differences between the member states. It does not mean a common market for all products immediately, or an effective equalization of the social burdens added to production costs. A complete merger of sovereignties therefore can be only a lie or a grave danger. A lie, if the underlying realities remain unchanged or if the changes are to be carried through gradually, with complicated institutional safeguards, built-in-brakes and vetoes for each member. A danger, if the supranational authorities could at once and freely unify the structure of the various nations. Such action would inevitably lead to a further weakening of the weaker partners and give hegemony to the member least handicapped at the outset by its own social legislation and its own political and economic conditions.

Since no policy should be built around a lie, the real choice lay between full integration at once and gradual construction. But recently more thought had been given to the practical effects of full integration; although limited in scope and containing safeguards for its members, the Steel and Coal Community has had some dangerous results for French industry. A European federation should not involve the ruin of some of its members. The first step is to create conditions which will later make possible the establishment of a federation that will not lead either to a French collapse or a French withdrawal. Only in those terms will it be acceptable to the French parliament. For the first time since 1950, a real alternative to immediate integration is offered. We no longer have to choose between federation now and full sovereignties forever.

In the first place, Mendès-France wants France to undertake the step-by-step construction under conditions which will make sure that during the next phases her weakness will not force her to wreck the whole project, exactly as she has paralyzed it in the past years. Hence not only the internal recovery policy but also the arrangement on the Saar, which should give France basic resources fairly equal to those which Germany brings into the new partnership. Franco-German coöperation should not be exposed to the risks of French recoil or German domination.

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Secondly, he proposes that on this basis the pre-federal conditions be established at once. Hence his proposals for economic and social equalization—an armaments pool, unification of social laws, and free trade. These preserve the main idea of the "Europeans," namely, that Europe will become a reality only if common tasks are accomplished, and that Franco-German reconciliation must take the form of positive and active coöperation. The settlement of the Saar question will open the way to this sort of coöperation. The future of France and Germany lies in joint economic and cultural enterprises of the ambitious nature described by Mendès-France.

His decision to break the deadlock has also improved the prospects for European defense. From a military point of view, E.D.C. was such a complicated and heavy organization that the majority of military commanders expressed (or concealed) strong doubts about it. From a political point of view, it was a mistake to make E.D.C. synonymous with European unity. Even in the federalist perspective it was absurd to create such thorough military integration before the establishment of federal political institutions. Nor did E.D.C. fit with gradualism; it was far too sweeping. Some of the E.D.C. provisions were incompatible with a principle common to both methods, that of confident coöperation; instead, it seemed that the drafters hoped to strangle Germany with oppressive controls and legal guarantees. The anti-German arguments used by many E.D.C. partisans ever since the treaty was rejected seem to confirm that analysis. The new scheme has the merits of military efficiency and political consistency. It is less sweeping but better defined. It provides a technical method for European defense—one element, among others, of the pre-federal construction. It includes both Great Britain and elements of supranationality, which Mendès-France considers indispensable even in the pre-federal phase.

Mendès-France's internal and foreign policies have thus removed the biggest obstacles to European unity: the E.D.C. abscess and French defeatism. Either European unity is to be workable or it is to remain a dream. In France, at least, the European idea has not withered: it has matured.

IV

Her policy for the French Union also brings a new contribution to a problem which is vital for the future of France and has been

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agonizing the conscience of every Frenchman. The new policy points toward gradual autonomy in internal affairs for French overseas areas, with close association in economic affairs. It repudiates, cautiously but unmistakably, the principle of political domination which has for so long been applied under the guise of the generous but equivocal ideal of assimilation. This ideal will now be tested in a field where its dangers are few, its benefits maximum. Mendès-France intends to apply his economic doctrine to the development of French Africa—to promote mining and industrial expansion by private enterprises, and to develop public investments. To increase demand as well as supply the minimum wage rate is being raised in Algeria and Morocco. His full employment policies find in North Africa tragically fertile ground.

Economic expansion cannot be separated, of course, from political developments. One of its purposes, indeed, is to help create a peaceful political climate. Then it should be possible at last to improve the constitutional status of the French Union. But two conditions must be fulfilled. First, no bold economic policy will succeed if the political situation deteriorates. Secondly, if only the French benefit from the economic development of Africa one of its main purposes will be defeated—to give new justification and solidity to the French presence. Against the first danger, which is strong in Tunisia and Morocco, the government has taken or is preparing measures; they must be judged in the light of the strong belief both in Parliament and in North Africa that to discontinue the past policy of coöperating with hand-picked partners and repressing nationalism means to destroy the French Union. The government intends to fight the second danger by giving young natives full technical training and access to local administration and government.

Final success is still in doubt. The French have been used to discussing those problems in purely legal terms and the change in point of view is therefore quite stunning. Dogmatic anti-colonialists should not forget that the price paid by some countries for total independence has been the perpetuation of underdevelopment, and that others have obtained political independence only at the cost of continued economic dependence without much expansion. A rich and orderly French commonwealth of free peoples would be a priceless contribution to the world's political unity and economic equality.

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V

These new policies, which run against so many interests, ideas and routines, could never have been applied if Mendès-France had not performed a revolution in the constitutional and political system. Indeed, what the French call his "style," something at once both an effect and a cause of the renovation of French politics, is at least as important as his actions. Many Frenchmen who disagree with some of those actions, or wait impatiently for others, support him enthusiastically because he has succeeded in getting fresh air into the stuffy political life of France.

He has brought about a complete change in the relations among government, Parliament and people. This is probably his biggest achievement so far, though the most fragile. To many Frenchmen it had become obvious that the combination of a parliamentary régime (in distinction to the presidential system in the United States) and a multi-party system was permanently crippling to the Executive. Also, there was no direct link between the government and the people. The voters cannot know after an election what kind of government they will have during the next five years: electoral coalitions seldom survive in Parliament. This explains why many, including the Gaullists, think that France needs a presidential system, or at least one in which Parliament could never overthrow a cabinet without risking being itself dissolved. Now Mendès-France has proved that the Constitution is not entirely responsible for these weaknesses. Its provisions may be interpreted differently, and he opposes the past interpretation. "Parliament has the right to withdraw its confidence from the government at any moment; the government must act as if it were sure to last twenty years."[5]

The Constitution provides that the Premier, selected by the President of the Republic, stands alone before the Assembly, whose approval he has to get, and explains his own program. Instead of submitting a hodgepodge of compromise proposals, Mendès-France has strictly applied the letter of the law. The Constitution empowers the Premier to choose his ministers; instead of making a weak coalition of the parties and groups represented in Parliament, and loading the cabinet with Very Important Politicians whose presence, weight and rivalries ruin the Premier's authority, he has selected a team of men who primarily

[5] "Gouverner c'est prévoir," p. 68.

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believe in his ideas, study the problems he wants to solve and leave the final decision to him. As a welcome consequence, pressure groups have had much less access to government than before and have had little part in making decisions. The Constitution wanted the question of confidence, put by the Premier, to be a means of strengthening his authority. In past years it had become a shrill alarm signal given by a threatened cabinet, and the votes were the outcome of frantic negotiations and promises. But the new Premier has used this procedure as a weapon which forces the Assembly to state, without further haggling, whether it approves his actions or not. If the vote is positive, he expects Parliament to let him work in peace.

However, he does not snub Parliament in any way. He gives to both houses some of the most detailed accounts their members ever received from a minister. He thus makes "contracts" with Parliament, but he refuses to tie himself to a program that would have to be too rigid if it were to please enough deputies or too vague to be serious. Like de Gaulle's former Rally, he has objectives and a doctrine rather than a code. In short, he carries separation of power—another Gaullist theme—as far as the Constitution allows him.

This gives him high prestige among the Gaullists. But it does not make him the most beloved man in Parliament. It increases the hostility of the M.R.P. It accounts for the reticence of many Socialists who favor the political predominance of parties and the legal preponderance of the assembly. But so far he has been successful because he has found apart from the provisions of the Constitution the force on which he can rely to compel reluctant deputies to support him.

This force is the people. Now direct contacts between the people and the Executive have traditionally been considered an anti-democratic trick of would-be Caesars. For almost the first time, a man who is a parliamentarian whom no one suspects of being a right-wing demagogue goes to the people. He lays emphasis on the young. The lack of social and political opportunities, the sclerosis in education, the housing shortage—these and other conditions had developed a spirit of nihilism in French youth which was one of the main assets of the Communists. Mendès-France's choice of young and new men for his government and for his private cabinet, the nature of his actions and even more of his projects (houses, schools, a body to deal specifically with the problems

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of youth) have had a strong attraction for young Frenchmen.

What he asks the people to do is unusual too. He does not try to rouse them against Parliament, but instead asks them to show that they approve the support which their representatives give him. This is a far more subtle method, the only one which can enhance true democracy in a country where parliamentary rule has often led to oligarchy and where plebiscites have led only to dictatorship. To reconcile democracy with authority in France is quite an achievement. Mendès-France knows (and the Gaullists insist) that the dilemma will be ended decisively by only a reform of the Constitution. But it is difficult to get Parliament to agree to any decline in its own prerogatives and too early to press the issue. In the meantime Parliament will support him as long as the people approve him, and the people will be with him as long as he succeeds.

This initiative has produced a second revolution in the French political system. His action, cutting across all party lines, has had an effect on the parties which is both destructive and unifying. The opposition between Left and Right, which had become meaningless and sterile, is again becoming valid. After talking of new revolutions in romantic terms, the Left had long ago stopped playing with that dream and now spoke only of reforms; but as it thought in political and not economic terms, and as it was unable to adapt its themes to the economic conditions of the twentieth century, its ideas on social reform remained muddled and inefficient. The Right, fearing revolution, has opposed reform.

Judged by the old standard, Mendès-France is neither Left nor Right (his ideas on constitutional and administrative reform, budgetary economies, production's precedence over distribution, as well as his indifference toward the age-old platform of anticlericalism, do not belong to the leftist tradition). By asking the really vital questions he has united behind him the dynamic sections of all parties (Gaullists as well as Socialists) and has united against him all those who, even if they sit on the Left, oppose the new stake: modern France.

Will not his enemies win and force a return to the old clichés and the old alignments? The danger exists. But in spite of their occasional reluctance to face a new situation, most of the democratic elements of the traditional Left know that no man nearer to their ideas has a chance of coming to power, since the Communist heresy partly paralyzes leftist strength. And some ele-

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ments of the traditional Right support him because they feel that he is a solid if unpleasant bulwark against the more unrealistic forms of Socialism and a revival of the popular front.

A third revolution in French politics is that he has upset traditional class divisions. A climate of class warfare has existed in France in the past 20 years. Recent French cabinets have bid for the support of the upper middle classes and have more or less deliberately left out the working groups and the lower middle classes. This represented another return to a traditional pattern which Mendès-France tries to break. He wants to abolish class warfare by increasing the standard of living, not by taking repressive measures or repeating soothing slogans.

At present he can count on a considerable part of every class. The failure of former economic policies has given food for thought to groups courted by his predecessors; never before have these been so well disposed toward change. And the underprivileged show him so much goodwill that the Communists themselves feel embarrassed; they have found out that the success of the Mendès-France government would be a terrible blow for them, and they are now warning the workers against the benefits of the new policy, which they cannot deny. As internal and external circumstances prevent them from carrying out a revolution, they too have a vested interest in immobility, in the preservation of the old class antagonisms.

In the future, Mendès-France's economic reforms may deprive him of some of his present support. But he will replace the old horizontal divisions with new ones that are highly unorthodox. In those sectors of the economy and of the civil service which he intends to develop he may well get the support of all; and in the sectors which will suffer from economic "reconversion" and budgetary "transfers" he could be opposed by all. New geographical divisions may appear, for new areas are to be developed. Generally speaking, the big and modern industrialists and bankers will probably be more favorably disposed than the small enterprises, which always are more cautious and afraid of competition and expansion. An alliance between what someone called "the intelligent bourgeoisie" and the less alienated sections of the workers would be interesting alignment—and again an original one.

There is a last element in this action which upsets the traditional conditions of the French political merry-go-round. It is the man himself, who possesses qualities that often are consid-

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ered mutually exclusive. He is an uncompromising man of principle, who makes no more promises than he can keep, and who keeps them; but he is also a masterly parliamentary tactician. Whereas the usual combination in French politics—a man of letters or lawyer and politician—often produces more heat than light and more words than actions, Mendès-France is both a social scientist and a fighter. He has the intelligentsia's sympathy, but enough common sense and earthiness to avoid "technocrat" attitudes.

Finally, he has both a knowledge of his own country's position and needs and understanding of the world at large. He has definite ideas for nearly every French problem (including physical training for the young) and the most far-reaching vision of French destiny that any French statesman has had since de Gaulle—but de Gaulle's was blurred whenever economic or social problems appeared, and his character is that of a moralist more than a politician. Many recent French statesmen, especially among those who emerged from the Resistance, had a very hazy notion of public opinion in other countries and of the character of their governments, and also of the main trends of postwar history (such as the growth of anti-colonialism). Older statesmen often were aware of the facts but refused to accept them. Mendès-France realizes that France can try to canalize trends which she deems dangerous but that stubborn resistance as such would be tantamount to capitulation of every external pressure. He knows how to use the narrow margin of liberty left to him in the circumstances. For the student of statesmanship, it is a fascinating fight to watch.

It is unusual to see Cassandra at the helm. In this particular case, the former lucid critic and dissenter produces ambitious and constructive policies and makes a new political start. If his leadership succeeds in restoring stability at the top and mobility at the bottom, if he is not defeated by the most stubborn force on earth, inertia, France should rapidly become an active and major partner for the other nations of the West. She has already stopped dragging her feet and begun moving in the direction that impartial American observers had so often advised her to take. Either the citizens of France will now be reconciled by their new tasks and united by the prospect of action or they will return to their past mistakes, to division by inaction, and to petrifaction.

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GERMANY'S GREAT OLD MAN

By Claus Jacobi

ON Sunday, November 28, 1943, during the Teheran Conference, Joseph Stalin, after dinner, raised a delicate subject. "Let us think for a moment," he said, "what would be the worst that could happen to us." And he himself gave the answer: "Germany's recovery." It was then that Churchill, sitting beside Stalin on the sofa, suggested for the first time that Germany should be divided. The division of Germany was to prevent Germany's recovery. It became Germany's fate.

"Deduct Prussia from Germany and what is left?" Walther Rathenau, later German Foreign Minister, had asked in 1919. "An enlarged Austria, a clerical republic: the Rhine Federation." Well, the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam deducted Prussia—and more—from Germany; and what established itself in 1949 as a Federal Republic in Western Germany, choosing the sleepy university town of Bonn as its residence on the left bank of the Rhine, seemed indeed "a clerical republic: the Rhine Federation." A dignified old gentleman who from 1917 to 1933 had been Mayor of the city of Cologne, who was known as a devout son of the Roman Catholic Church and whose name had been linked with separatist efforts to create a Rhineland Republic just after the First World War, was elected head of government of this occupied, defeated and synthetic state. The parliamentary majority by which he was elected was one. A poll conducted at that time found that his name, Konrad Adenauer, was known to not more than 8 percent of the population. That was five years ago.

Dr. Adenauer is just entering his 80th year (his birthday is January 5). In his capacity as Chancellor he has meanwhile presented the Federal Republic with the most stable and popular régime in Germany's democratic history. In his capacity as Foreign Minister of the present torso state he has effected what Stalin at Teheran said was "the worst that could happen." He has brought about Germany's recovery.

In 1953 Winston Churchill called him in the House of Commons the wisest German statesman since Bismarck. Other Western politicians have been even more generous in their appraisals. And his achievement is indeed a human and historic phenomenon.

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At a biblical age he has led a defeated country in the space of five years to become again almost a Great Power.

Behind so much glory must lurk some dark shadows.

II

The establishment of the Federal Republic was a move of the Western Powers in the cold war against the Soviet Union. Theoretically, the Federal Republic had two ways by which it might regain membership in the concert of Powers. It was possible either to try to reunite the divided country and thus automatically make it a Great Power sooner or later; or it was possible to try to merge it in Europe as a partner of the Western states and to play a dominant part there side by side with or ahead of France. The two ways were mutually exclusive, for the military, economic and political potential of a united Germany is so large that it is as inacceptable to the Soviet Union as it is to France within a European community.

In 1867 Bismarck stated before the Reichstag of the North German Federation: "There is without doubt something in our national character, gentlemen, which runs contrary to a unification of Germany." Eighty years later Germany's next great chancellor apparently confirmed this statement of the predecessor with whom he has since so often been compared. As Chancellor of West Germany he has given association with the Western World priority in his policy ahead of German reunification. It probably was not an easy choice for the Chancellor and it certainly cannot be explained by personal motives connected with his Rhenish origin and his Roman Catholic faith.[1] As a moderate Machiavellian, he was guided in his decision above all by the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the state and by the imminent threat from the East.

The way leading toward Europe, toward becoming a respected ally of the West, offered security, seemed feasible and promised to be immediately successful. The other way—leading toward reunification—was beset with dark uncertainties, seemed almost impracticable, and for long stretches promised nothing but dangers and risks. To pursue the phantom of national unity and the liberation of the 18,000,000 Germans in the Soviet Zone might

[1] The population of the Federal Republic is composed today of about equal parts of Protestants and Roman Catholics. In any united Germany the Protestants would have a clear majority.

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have been to risk the freedom of 50,000,000 West Germans and make reconciliation with France impossible. It would probably have limited Marshall aid, which was of vital importance for Germany's economy, and it would have tested the confidence of the Western Powers beyond endurance. Besides, it is by no means certain that the four occupying Powers would have consented to let such an experiment be started. Honorable as the attempt to reunite Germany might have been, then, it would very likely have been both dangerous and hopeless. The Chancellor acted accordingly.

Yet his policy is marred by one blemish. It is likely—indeed most likely—that a policy of reunification in peace and freedom would not have succeeded. But the possibility was never tested. Foreseeing certain failure, no one has even troubled to inquire from the Kremlin what would be the eventual price for the release of the Soviet Zone. All that became known in the ping-pong of notes between East and West was the unacceptable maximum claim of the Soviets. That is why the Federal Republic in its reunification policy lacks the alibi which it probably could have had quite easily. And since history is resentful, it will one day ask where this alibi is.

Thus the European course adopted by the Chancellor of half-Germany in 1949 meant at the moment the way of least resistance and maximum advantages—as well as contributing toward maintaining the division of the Reich. But in the long run even Konrad Adenauer no doubt dreamt of a Reich—a Reich, though, as remote from that of Bismarck or of Hitler as the planet Sirius is from our earth. The faces of the élite of German nationalism do not look down from the walls of the Chancellor's office in the Schaumburg Palace in Bonn. Maria Theresa and her father, the last male Hapsburg Emperor, Charles VI, decorate the room where the cabinet meets. With two other Catholic statesmen, De Gasperi and Robert Schuman—who, unlike him, once served in the armies of German-speaking monarchs—Adenauer set out to realize the Carolingian vision of a Christian empire reaching from the Pyrenees to the Elbe. The steps toward overcoming nationalism, toward the political unification of Europe and thus toward the rebirth of the Reich of Charles V were to be the Coal and Steel Plan in the economic field and E.D.C. in the military field. If this grandiose concept had succeeded it might even have justified in German history the abandonment

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of German reunification. But it failed. Nationalism, lightly pronounced dead, proved stronger. The bitter words used by Chancellor Adenauer during the London Conference about the "terrible month of August" showed how hard this mishap had hit him.

The Kremlin, meanwhile, having had to abandon temporarily its maximum hope of swallowing all Germany, seems not too unhappy about this development, despite the fact of West German rearmament. Article 3 of the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed by France and the Soviet Union during the Second World War decrees: "The high contracting parties undertake also, after the termination of the present war with Germany, to take jointly all necessary measures for the elimination of any new threat coming from Germany, and to obstruct such actions as would make possible any new attempt at aggression on her part." That is precisely what has been achieved now. For the moment, Paris controls West German rearmament while Moscow guarantees the division of Germany. The real unification of Europe and the reunification of Germany are thus postponed to equally distant futures.

III

At first glance all this does not as yet seem any reason for being depressed. Rome was not built in a day. Why should the building of Europe move faster, or the reunification of Germany?

Germany has risen in world affairs from being an almost colonial object to being an almost sovereign subject. Our protection against the Eastern moloch is as substantial as any border province of the free world could desire. We are undeservedly well off economically. Much, very much has been achieved. People talk about the "German miracle." The fact remains that the development of democracy in Germany has not kept up with the snowballing success of German foreign policy, with the economic boom and now with the impending rearmament. Here is the flaw. Today almost invisible, tomorrow it may become the pole around which everything turns.

The trouble with Germany is that she has never had a real revolution. Lenin is supposed to have said once that a German revolutionary assigned to seize a railroad station would first of all buy himself a platform ticket. The reappraisal of German values has always been carried out by official ordinance. In 1933 it was Hitler who seized power legally and who determined what from

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then on would be the proper thing for every German to do. In 1945 it was the Allies. Always the capacities of the authority-conscious Germans were hopelessly overtaxed. Since 1933, for instance, they have alternately been urged to regard the Communists as bad (1933), good (1939), bad (1941), good (1945), bad (1948). And the wheel of history spins faster and faster. Without firm points of orientation, lacking unimpeachable values and symbols, they are given less and less time to grow into some new genuine order. Political events leave their psychological development miles behind. Still numbed by the crash ending of one war they see themselves at the beginning of another. In a flash they have risen from being a despised, starving, demilitarized nation to one that is more or less respected, pampered and remilitarized. What was white the day before yesterday became black the day after and is again white today. The result is political neuroses.

The first typical neurotic reaction was escape, and the symptom of this is a lack of new blood not only in politics but in all public life, from the political parties, parliament, the civil service and the courts to journalism and the trade unions. German private industry has none of these troubles. It is flooded with the young talent graduating from German colleges and universities.

The material misery which reigned in Germany after the collapse encouraged this tendency to escape into another sector of the national life. Who had time to bother about the abstract values for which millions of people had died twice in one generation when one's own naked life was at stake? Personal livelihood and family existence moved into the foreground. In the beginning it was the dry corn bread issued on ration cards, later it was the motor-bike that could be paid for in installments. When German trade unions try today to organize strikes their greatest difficulty is the fear of their members that they may get behind in their payments for their iceboxes and radios. Here, also, is the key to the lack of success of all extremist political organizations. The German people, who never in their entire history have climbed the barricades, have no radical parties today that might call their followers out into the streets. At first glance this seems to reflect simply wise political moderation and disgust for political adventures. On closer study, however, it turns out to be due to something less pleasant—political indifference. Political inertia and weariness, the longing for material security, were accompa-

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nied by what Max Scheler once described as the German "cheerless passion for work." The postwar reconstruction of Germany could begin almost undisturbed by political strife. The "economic miracle" was born. In German eyes it is so far the greatest attraction offered by democracy.

The conflict between East and West which began after the war saved the citizens of West Germany from having to make the hard decision between freedom and social security. Where the sweet bread of the satellite was offered, freedom reigned; where the slaveholder lashed his knout, people were starving. The importance of West Germany's deliberate decision against Bolshevism should not be minimized. But it was made easy. The heroism manifested in the Soviet Zone during the uprising of June 17, 1953, was not required. The choice was between the good rich uncle from America and Stalin the Terrible, whose armies had expelled 11,000,000 Germans from their homes, raped German women, kept German soldiers in slavery and who had nothing to offer but poverty and the lash. It was the choice between life and suicide, between heaven and hell. And it remains the only political decision which the West German people have so far taken.

Apart from this anti-Communist conviction, which still holds, there is no public opinion in Germany. Anyone who doubts this should try just once to get some sort of an answer to two of the central questions influencing Germany's political fate. Do a majority of people in the Federal Republic prefer a life of plenty in Europe to a meager life in a united Germany? Would a majority of the German youth rather have a national army, a European army or no army at all? The inquiring reporter will not be able to secure a valid answer to these questions. The elections of September 6, 1953, which gave the governing Christian Democratic Union an absolute majority in parliament, did not represent a decision in favor of Europe any more than the decision against rearmament made by the trade union congress in Frankfurt in 1954 represented the vote of German labor against an army. One was an election of "full stomachs" and gave a personal message to the great Chancellor that he should "go on the way he had done." The other was an arranged vote among delegates of a sterile Socialist opposition without a leader and without a program.

Over this people who have pushed politics back into the subconscious because they could not cope with it, and who have made social progress their chief concern, there is now established

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a ruling political class that has something of the aura of an Early Victorian restoration. It is composed of politicians and parties that had already failed in 1933 but that nevertheless were blithely granted a political monopoly of the German political scene by the Allied Powers in 1945. Granting that some of its individual members may have real attractions, this class is ill-suited to rouse the latent political interests of the German people in favor of democracy. Probably popular participation in politics is not much more pronounced in West Germany than it is in most other democracies. But there the bastion of democracy has to be held under normal conditions, whereas in Germany it still remains to be conquered against enemies both within and without, and this is a task requiring much more exertion.

West Germany today possesses no values for which the people would be prepared to sacrifice themselves, no symbols that inspire their reverence. For 12 years the Germans had a surplus of false ideals; today they have too few genuine ones. No state consciousness has formed. In its place there is the German "economic miracle" and a great old man. That is all.

Such are the foundations of the German state which by its stability and moderation has gained the confidence of the free world and become its partner. How long will they last?

IV

In Dr. Adenauer the citizens of West Germany found a Chancellor whose personality has overshadowed that of all other politicians. The provisional constitution of the Federal Republic helped him grow to these towering proportions. In order to avoid the fatal mistakes of the weak Weimar institutions, the basic law gives the Federal Chancellor an exceptionally strong position. He cannot be overthrown by simply failing to obtain a vote of confidence in the House, but only if the majority agrees on a rival candidate to supplant him. Article 65 of the Constitution reads: "The Federal Chancellor determines the principles of policy and is responsible for them." No law in this world is followed more closely to the letter than this one.

The leader of the Social Democratic Party, Kurt Schumacher, who died in 1951, once during a dramatic night session of Parliament called Adenauer the "Chancellor of the Allies." This, like many of Schumacher's other attacks, went way beyond the mark. It is true that the Western Allies could not wish for a better Chan-

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cellor than he; but the same, I think, is true for Germany also. Of course I can speak only for myself; but I believe I belong to a trend of thought which is slowly increasing in my generation and which is pronouncedly skeptical and pronouncedly pro-Western.

Machiavelli once said that of two victors the one which knows how to draw the vanquished onto his side will be the more powerful. Konrad Adenauer was quick to realize the advantages which this fact gives the vanquished. Chancellor Bülow once spoke about "the bear and the whale" (Russia and England) who could never get along together. Chancellor Adenauer knew how to make use of this antagonism even in his rôle as chief of the defeated nation without yielding to the temptation to indulge in a "swing policy." For that the free world has paid him high honor.

Success is the safest guarantee for further success, but beyond that Adenauer had qualities that the German people love—authority, hardness, Old Testament dignity and simplicity. His vocabulary is small but it gives the impression of statesmanlike restraint, far from any demagoguery. He has the capacity for formulating simple ideas clearly. His reputation in Germany grew in the measure that he gained confidence abroad. Soon he controlled the Lower House of Parliament with the same virtuosity that he had once shown in managing his city assembly while Mayor of Cologne. After the First World War he pushed through a park project and the construction of a suspension bridge against the opposition of the city councillors. After the Second World War in his capacity as Federal Chancellor he offered German divisions to the Allied High Commission in a memorandum of August 29, 1950, and informed the Lower House of this document, almost as if by chance, on February 8, 1952. Adenauer had only changed over to a higher level of operations; his knowledge of the tricks of the trade remained the same.

In 1950 General Lucius D. Clay wrote about him as follows in his book, "Decision in Germany:" "His extensive knowledge of government and of parliamentary procedure combine with ability and intelligence to make an effective leader. His shrewdness enables him to create conditions favorable to his party. . . . When he rises above party politics he has the intelligence and character to act as a statesman. He exhibited this quality of statesmanship at critical periods in the life of the Council." Knowledge of these qualities is now the common property of the Western World.

After the Nazis removed him in 1933 from his position as

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Mayor of Cologne, and after he had twice been arrested in the Third Reich even though he had not taken any active part in the resistance, Adenauer was put back as head of the Rhine metropolis in 1945 by the Americans. A few months later the English showed him the door for what they termed "inefficiency." He thereupon became party leader of the Christian Democratic Union. Without any preparation he appeared on the stage of world politics after he was past the biblical age limit. Though he is a Roman Catholic he is not a clerical. When the West German legislature was debating a certain paragraph of a bill and several deputies voiced concern as to whether or not the Church would give or refuse its consent, Adenauer ended the debate with these words: "The Church can say neither yes nor no in this matter. At the most it can say Amen." Konrad Adenauer has no backstage supporters. He does not live on his party; his party lives on him. He is the West German Chancellor and nothing else.

In one respect the oft-quoted parallel between the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic and the first Chancellor of the Wilhelminian Reich cannot, unfortunately, be ignored. There is no successor. After Bismarck's death there was nobody to be found who could keep on spinning the intricate diplomatic net that had been extended in all directions; after Adenauer it will be difficult to keep on extending the one-way street of German foreign policy which points in a straight line toward the free world. The only consolation is that there are, on the other hand, no dangerous successors in sight, such as Schleicher and Papen were after Stresemann and Bruening. But it is true that this type of politician often flourishes in Germany.

Here is the point at which the overwhelming figure of the Chancellor meets the political indifference shown so far by most of the population—and which creates the German problem of the near future.

V

If one day there is a gap where now the Chancellor guarantees stability, and if in addition there is a setback in economic prosperity, then all the political passions, sentiments and neuroses which are now asleep under the cover of political and economic security may easily break forth. Nobody knows what decisions the citizens of West Germany might then make, nobody knows which way the pendulum might then swing. Would it be in the

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direction of political lethargy or toward a political adventure? Toward the European community or toward German nationalism? West or East? The Chancellor is fully aware of this danger. With moving intensity he implored his partners in the recent conference at London to make use of the limited time that was still at his disposal: "The danger of German nationalism is much greater than people think."

Nationalism would not be a rebirth of Nazism. It almost certainly would differ from Nazism as much as Napoleon III's idea of the state differed from Napoleon I's. So far it is not clearly recognizable in the Federal Republic. It has neither leaders nor an organization nor a program. But we cannot ignore the signals which betray its existence under cover of the official European policy of the Federal Republic. Often it even seeks to use this cover deliberately. As General Guderian, Hitler's chief of staff, wrote in his introduction to the book, "Waffen SS in Action," "Let us not forget that the European idea was for the first time realized in this troop." And some of the former high army officers who worked on the plans of E.D.C. or favored it may have thought to bring about a German hegemony in Europe by this means. To win tactical successes even the Chancellor has at times had to make concessions to the nationalistic subconscience. He admitted three former members of the SA and SS to his second cabinet, received Nazi generals who had been released and sent a telegram of congratulations to former Foreign Minister von Neurath when he was prematurely discharged from prison after sentence by a military court. The failure of E.D.C. has no doubt given new strength to the nationalistic forces. More and more frequently *curricula vitae* of democratic politicians omit any reference to the "resistance deeds" they once boasted of in favor of the military decorations which formerly they kept secret. The formation of a German national army may finally decide the inevitable conflict between sleeping nationalism and feeble democracy. Ten years after the defeat of German militarism a German army represents a threat to democracy in our domestic political life which can hardly be overestimated. German militarists from Yorck to Seeckt have again and again turned their eyes toward the East for strategical and traditional reasons.

How German nationalism might operate may be determined by Moscow. Even if someday the setbacks to the European policy or the absence of the Chancellor or a possible decline of the eco-

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nomic boom were none of them sufficient to create confusion in West Germany, Moscow will nevertheless try to tear down the dams behind which the national resentments of the German people have been held in check during recent years. Since Stalin is dead and Malenkov picks flowers for Miss Edith Summerskill, since Red trade again is tempting and since the first veil of forgetfulness is being drawn over the horrible invasion of the barbarians in 1945, Russia in West German eyes moves more and more into the rôle of a neighbor—a threatening neighbor, but one with which a bearable relationship must be developed some way, some time. With the trump card of the Soviet Zone in its hand the Soviet Union can heavily influence this relationship. How is sovereign West Germany, without Konrad Adenauer but with 11,000,000 refugees from the East and with a national army, going to react a few years hence if the Kremlin offers it reunification, perhaps the lifting of the Oder-Neisse line or even a new partition of Poland? The Germans have been called the "politically most untalented people" of the Continent. What a temptation for them that one would be!

From the very beginning the Chancellor has seen one chance of rendering such fateful situations harmless or even of making them impossible. He wanted to conquer nationalism once for all while it was down and apparently dead. He wanted to integrate West Germany so firmly into the European Community that it would no longer be able to leave it to follow risky national illusions. As a result, reunification would have been extremely difficult for a long time, and if it could have happened at all it would have been in only one way—adding the Soviet Zone to the European Community, by then a firmly established structure. This policy has failed. It was not the Chancellor's fault.

In this situation there is only one German alternative: to wrest the initiative in the reunification policy from the hands of the Soviets. The Chancellor seems to have recognized this second historical task that now falls to him. So far he has realized more of the hopes for Germany than could fairly have been staked on him when he came into office. The hardest test, however, lies before him and those who will have to take over his legacy. The fight for the unity of the nation must not be left to the nationalists. Germany's division is Germany's fate. Whoever removes the division determines Germany's future. This the Western Powers should never forget.

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ISRAEL'S BORDER AND SECURITY PROBLEMS

By Major-General Moshe Dayan

SEVEN years after its war of independence the State of Israel still faces a security problem of unusual complexity. The area of the country is only 8,100 square miles. But owing to the configuration of its territory there are 400 miles of frontier. Three-quarters of the population of Israel lives in the coastal plain, running from north of Haifa to south of Tel Aviv, with a slender salient branching off to Jerusalem. This densely settled area has an average width of no more than twelve miles between the Mediterranean and the Jordanian border. From the Israel Parliament buildings in Jerusalem the armed sentries of the Jordanian Arab Legion can be seen a few hundred yards away. The headquarters of the Israel General Staff in the coastal plain are within clear view from the hills which mark the Jordan frontier. The country's main roads and railways are exposed to swift and easy incursion. Scarcely anywhere in Israel can a man live or work beyond the easy range of enemy fire. Indeed, except in the Negev, no settlement is at a distance of more than 20 miles from an Arab frontier.

Thus the term "frontier security" has little meaning in the context of Israel's geography. The entire country is a frontier, and the whole rhythm of national life is affected by any hostile activity from the territory of neighboring states. On the other hand, the Arab states are in no such position. Border tensions affect a narrow fringe of their territories, beyond which stretch deep hinterlands entirely remote from the hazards and strains of frontier life. An American citizen who can cross a vast continent without seeing a foreign, let alone a hostile, face may require an unusual measure of imagination and humility to understand the unique vulnerability which geography imposes upon the people of Israel.

The effects of geographical vulnerability are aggravated by the fierce antagonism directed against Israel across her embattled frontiers. There is no other state in the world community whose very right to existence is so persistently challenged by all its contiguous neighbors. This is not the classic pattern of international conflict in which neighboring peoples recognize each other's statehood but are divided by specific disputes which they have failed

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to reconcile. The hostility of the Arab Governments towards Israel is more fundamental. It has passed through three phases: first, before 1948, there was a determination to prevent the establishment of an independent Israel; second, in 1948, there was an unsuccessful attempt to destroy Israel's independence at its birth by armed assault; and third, in the period 1948–1954, there has been an attitude of inveterate revenge based on non-recognition and the undying hope of Israel's extinction. The elementary duty of members of the United Nations to recognize each other's right to sovereignty and integrity has never found any reflection in the relations of the Arab world with Israel.

More than fifteen years ago a British Royal Commission had recorded the official Arab view presented by the Mufti of Jerusalem that the Jewish population of Palestine was "too large" and should be reduced by military action. In November 1947 the United Nations' recommendation for the establishment of a sovereign Jewish State in Palestine was the signal for a purposeful attempt to put this doctrine into effect. In the General Assembly, Arab spokesmen frankly asserted their refusal to acquiesce in the new international policy or even to abstain from using force against it. Six delegates mounted the rostrum of the world peace organization to announce their intention of violently destroying the community whose right to independence had just received international confirmation. On November 30, 1947, this assault began with the slaughter of 36 Jews in the first week of hostilities commenced by Palestinian Arab guerrillas. A "Liberation Army" organized by Arab Governments moved into Palestine to continue the carnage. Finally, on May 15, 1948, when the British Mandate expired, the armies of all the Arab states invaded Israel with the avowed aim of destroying her independence. Iraqi and Jordanian battalions took over the Arab half of Palestine, then pressed on toward the coastal plain while Israel stood with her back against the sea. Syrian tanks crashed into farming villages in the Upper Jordan valley. Lebanese regulars and irregulars from Syria converged upon Galilee. Egyptian forces began what was intended as a triumphal march on Tel Aviv, coming within nine miles of the city's suburbs. Aircraft bombed Israel's undefended cities. A ring of fire encircled Jerusalem and exposed its population to the horrors of bombardment, famine and siege.

There has never been any serious dispute about the origins of this assault or its aggressive character. In the spring of 1948 a

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United Nations Commission reported: "Powerful Arab forces are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and attempting to overthrow by force the recommendations contained therein." The authoritative international view was further expressed in the United Nations by Ambassador Warren Austin, speaking for the United States, in the Security Council, on May 22, 1948:

> . . . Probably the most important and the best evidence we have on that subject is contained in the admissions of the countries whose five armies have invaded Palestine that they are carrying on a war.
>
> Their statements are the best evidence we have of the international character of this aggression. . . . They tell us quite frankly that their business in Palestine is political and that they are there to establish a unitary State. Of course, the statement that they are there to make peace is rather remarkable in view of the fact that they are waging war.[1]

The American representative then invited his colleagues to determine that this "aggression of international character" constituted a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. The fighting between May 15 and June 13, when a 30-day truce was concluded, had involved the Arab Governments in the open rejection of the Security Council's three cease-fire orders.

When the 30-day truce expired, the United Nations ordered its renewal. The Arab states refused to accede, arguing with frankness that if there were no fighting it would be impossible to prevent the State of Israel from continuing to exist. In a resolution adopted on July 15, 1948, the Security Council renewed its verdict of Arab responsibility by resolving that the Arab refusal to prolong the truce constituted a breach of international peace and security. This was the first time that such a determination under Chapter VII of the Charter had been made by the United Nations on any issue.

The repulse by ill-equipped defenders of this assault was Israel's first achievement, and it won her high renown. But both the army and the civilian population sustained cruel loss of life. Some of the patient rewards of five decades of pioneering had been ravaged. The state of Israel had come into existence in the shadow of imminent destruction, and the memories of escape from fearful dangers have attended the people of Israel from the very dawn of their independence. These memories abide with us

[1] Security Council Official Records, 3rd year, No. 72, 301st and 302nd meetings.

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still, and go far to explain the depth of our preoccupation with security. Nor have the Israel people ever forgotten that in their supreme ordeal they received no direct assistance from outside, although waves of sympathy flowed in from free peoples everywhere and provided a valued consolation.

The acceptance of a permanent truce in July 1948 did not signify the end of the war. Contrary to the terms of the truce and to the rulings of the United Nations Truce Supervision Board, the Egyptian Army blocked the supply road to the Jewish villages in the south and renewed the attack on Israel positions in the Negev. A convoy was sent to supply the Negev villages. It was heavily attacked by the Egyptian forces from positions secured after the truce. Seven days' more fighting ensued, which gave to the Israel forces control of Beersheba, center of the Negev, as well as of the northern Negev with the exception of the Gaza strip and the Faluja pocket. In a statement made on October 25, 1948, by the United Nations Chief of the Truce Supervision Board to the Egyptian Commander-in-chief in Gaza, he attributed the renewal of the fighting in the Negev primarily to the failure of the Egyptians to comply with Ruling No. 13 of the Truce Supervision Board regarding the passage of convoys to the Jewish villages in the south. In March 1949 the Israel forces occupied the Wadi Araba up to the Gulf of Elath and thus gained control of the Negev—a desert area which had been part of Israel since her establishment but had been unoccupied by any forces up to that time. Neither the Egyptians nor the Jordanians had ever possessed international sanction to occupy this part of Israel in the first place, and if their patrols had ever crossed or scantily supervised it prior to its occupation by Israel —a claim that was never substantiated—their expulsion was a blow against aggressive conquest.

The purpose of the Arab invasion had been the destruction of the state of Israel and the ejection of the Jewish population from the soil of Palestine. In a statement made by Azzam Pasha, then Secretary General of the Arab League, on May 15, 1948, the eve of the invasion of the Arab armies, the Arab war aim was formulated in unambiguous terms: "This," he said, "will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacre and the crusades." Indeed, the Arab attack, especially in its first guerrilla stage, did not lack cases of disregard of the rules of war.

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There are at present more than 180,000 Arabs living in the state of Israel, but not a single Jew survives in any part of Palestine that came to be occupied by the invading Arab armies. The Jewish quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, with its ancient synagogues and monuments, was completely destroyed; even the Jewish Cemetery of the Mount of Olives was desecrated and laid waste.

II

In 1949 a series of armistice agreements were concluded under United Nations auspices between Israel and each of the Arab states which had participated in the war, with the exception of Iraq. It was assumed that this step marked the conclusion of the war and that the armistice would herald the early advent of a lasting peace. Indeed, in their preambles, the Armistice Agreements were described as designed "to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine." They provided that no aggressive action should be undertaken or threatened by either party against the other and that the right of each party to "its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other" was to be "fully respected." The conclusion of the armistice was described as "an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine."

The events of the past five years have belied these hopeful expectations. No sooner had the Arab states recovered from the shock of Israel's successful resistance than they began to question the character of the Armistice Agreements as a phase in the progress towards a final settlement. So far from regarding them as an arrangement "to facilitate the transition to permanent peace," the Arab signatories, in a joint statement issued on April 1, 1950, pledged themselves not to conduct peace negotiations with Israel and declared that any Arab state doing so would be treated as a traitor and an outcast. Subsequent policy has been in full accord with that declaration. Instead of abstaining, as required by the terms of the armistice, from all threats of aggressive action, their spokesmen in parliament, press and radio have incessantly warned Israel of a coming "second round."

This concept of Israel as a temporary bridgehead to be eliminated by war or blockade still dominates Arab official utterances. "In demanding the restoration of the refugees to Palestine,"

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wrote Muhammad Salah-ad-Din, a former Foreign Minister of Egypt, ". . . the Arabs intend to annihilate the State of Israel."[2] No less outspoken was King Saud in a statement made in Riadh soon after his accession to the throne: "The only way which the Arab states must go is to draw Israel up by her roots. Why should we not sacrifice 10,000,000 out of 50,000,000 Arabs so that we may live in greatness and honor?"[3] Against this mood of war and revenge, reason has little chance of prevailing. "The Jews are our enemies," Baghdad Radio told its listeners on June 28, 1949, "and it does not matter how peace-loving they may be. We shall never cease to prepare for the day of reckoning, for the second round, when the Jews will be driven off our soil."

In this matter, the new régime in Egypt, contrary to early expectations, has not diverged from the traditional slogans. In his opening address to the Arab Armistice Delegations, made in Cairo on April 18, 1953. Mohammed Naguib, then President of Egypt, said: "The existence of Israel is a cancer in the body of the Arab nation." Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, Prime Minister of Egypt, was equally frank: "Israel is an artificial state which must disappear," he said on May 8, 1954, to a representative of the Greek newspaper *Kathimerini.* During his visit at the Lebanese Parliament on July 1, 1954, the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Major Salah Salem stated: "The evacuation of the occupation forces from our country will free essential forces of ours. We shall then be able to raise our voice and to liberate Palestine. We shall prepare the forces that will liberate Palestine. And, with the help of God, there will be a great revival."[4]

It has been a habit of Arab propaganda to assert that their refusal to make peace is justified by the prior demand to have the original recommendation of the United Nations fulfilled. There is no juridical or moral force in the contention that Israel has a duty to set aside its rights under existing treaties in favor of the recommendations which Arab governments themselves destroyed by force. Indeed, it was because of Arab opposition that the United Nations abandoned its 1947 resolution and called upon the parties to reach their own binding agreements. This they have done; and nothing in the armistice system may now be changed without consent. In December 1952 the General Assem-

[2] *Al-Misri,* August 24, 1953.
[3] *Al-Ahram,* January 10, 1954.
[4] *Al-Ahram,* July 2, 1954.

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bly of the United Nations rejected by vote the Arab thesis that fulfilment of old recommendations was a prior condition of a negotiated peace. But in any case, this argument belongs to the tactics of controversy, not to the reality of the Arab position. Mohammed Salah-ad-Din said recently: "The Arabs will not be satisfied with the implementation of United Nations resolutions. We shall only have complete satisfaction when Israel is finally blotted out from the map of the Middle East. The Arabs will find no rest until this cancer has been removed from their heart."[5] While on November 3, 1954, the Syrian Prime Minister, Faris Al Khoury, declared in Parliament:

> Certain Arab leaders say that there can be no peace with Israel before the implementation of the U.N. resolutions. . . . They link peace with Israel with these terms. I denounce such a statement, and I say that there is no connection between peace with Israel and the return of the refugees and the U.N. resolutions. . . . Whether they return the refugees or not, peace must not be concluded with Israel in any form. I do not believe that the Arabs would approve peace so long as the Jews remain settled in that spot—the heart of the Arab states—threatening all those around them, and spreading corruption and evil. . . . How can we possibly make peace with them while they remain there? This was the first round and, unfortunately, it was not successful. The Arabs—we included—should prepare for a second round and do their utmost. . . .[6]

In such an atmosphere, the idea of progress towards peace with Israel is regarded as a form of treason: "Whoever thinks of making peace with the enemy signs the death warrant of all the Arab nations," said Dr. Fadhil Jamali, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, on his way to Washington to negotiate for the receipt of weapons for the Iraq Army.[7]

Such statements cannot be lightly regarded in any discussion of Israel's security problem. No other state has Israel's experience of being constantly threatened with violent destruction by hostile neighbors a few miles away.

Nor has Arab hostility been confined to warlike propaganda. From the very inception of the state of Israel, an economic boycott has been enforced against it by the Arab states, of which the most significant aspect is the closing of the Suez Canal to all Israel shipping and the interference with the passage of ships of other nations carrying cargoes to Israel. This action of the Egyptian Government is a violation of the Constantinople Conven-

[5] *Al-Misri*, April 12, 1954.
[6] Radio Damascus, November 3, 1954 (from a verbatim recording).
[7] *Filastin*, June 24, 1951.

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tion of 1888 under which the power contiguous to the Suez Canal is bound to keep the Canal "always . . . free and open in time of war as in time of peace to every vessel of commerce or of war without distinction of flag." The Security Council of the United Nations on September 1, 1951, ruled that under the Armistice Agreement neither party could assert that it was actively a belligerent or entitled to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure. The Council found that Egyptian interference with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel was "inconsistent with the purpose of the Armistice Agreement" and "an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure." It called upon Egypt to terminate all such restrictions. No heed has been paid to this decision and the Egyptian blockade has recently taken the form of the flagrant seizure of an unarmed Israel ship in the international waterway.

A widely ramified boycott machinery has been set up with headquarters in Cairo to prevent trade between the Arab states and Israel, indeed between Israel and other countries. International firms trading with Israel are blacklisted, airlines and shipping companies are denied servicing in Arab airports and harbors if they maintain contact with Israel. A conspicuous example of this policy was the campaign of intimidation conducted by the Arab states against the German Federal Republic which had signed a reparations agreement with Israel. Danger to international air traffic has been caused by the refusal of Arab airports to provide flight information to aircraft proceeding to or from Israel. The boycott of the Arab states against Israel extends even to the denial of information on the movement of infectious diseases or locusts. Neither considerations of humanity nor the common ills of nature have prevailed against this intense hostility.

III

The facts already enumerated would themselves be sufficient to give a disquieting picture of the threat to Israel's security. No state is as vulnerable as Israel in the configuration of its frontiers; none has such memories of recent aggression; none is beset by the nerve-racking experience of hearing the renewal of aggression repeatedly threatened; none is assailed even now by every form of hostility short of regular warfare. But the picture is still not complete without reference to the wider international con-

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text, which subjects Israel's fragile security to additional strains.

Israel, while subjected to regional hostility, is not immune from any of the dangers which might ensue from a world conflict reaching into the Middle East. Indeed, a Great Power conflict in the Middle East would face Israel with a double peril—attack by an invading Great Power and a simultaneous assault by neighboring Arab states.

Moreover, Israel faces these manifold dangers with no sure prospect of assistance from any quarter. Israel is not integrated into any system of defense pacts or security guarantees. The Arab League Collective Security Pact, the British treaties with Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, the defense association growing up around Turkey and Pakistan, and American arms and agreements in the Middle East are all oriented exclusively towards the Arab states and are based on Israel's exclusion. There is thus not a single country in the world which has contracted a firm unequivocal obligation to help defend Israel by armed force in the event of aggression. Recourse to the United Nations Charter which in 1948 had some effect in limiting the duration of the war and localizing its effects is now a dubious safeguard. In the present conflict between the Great Powers and in the light of the veto provision twice exercised in the Arab-Israel context by the Soviet Union, it may be doubted whether Israel, if attacked, could even obtain a cease-fire resolution from the Security Council. Six years ago the Security Council was able to adopt five such resolutions, two of which the Arab states obeyed and three of which they defied. Thus, not only does Israel face formidable dangers; she also faces them in unusual solitude.

The effect of Great Power policies in the present international situation has been to increase this already grave disadvantage. For, while the Soviet Union has twice prevented any action in the Security Council favorable to Israel's security, the Western Powers have embarked upon a policy of unilateral Arab rearmament. The British treaties with Jordan, Iraq and Egypt constitute guarantees of Arab security of a kind which Israel entirely lacks. But now, in addition, Egypt under the new treaty with Britain is about to inherit one of the greatest military bases in the world, with its airfields, installations and factories. Iraq has signed an agreement for military aid from the United States, and a similar agreement has been offered to Egypt. In thus increasing the strength of Israel's neighbors, the Western Powers

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have so far failed to maintain the principle of equality by offering similar arrangements to Israel. Nor have they sought from Arab governments any relaxation of their hostility to Israel as a condition of Western assistance. This policy of one-sided reinforcement of Israel's neighbors appears to the Israel people as a deviation from the best standards of international morality or prudence. It also implies a retreat by the Western Powers from the undertakings contained in the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, under which they pledged themselves to maintain the military balance between the Arab states and Israel and to enable "Israel and the Arab states" (not the Arab states alone) to contribute to the defense of the area against aggression.

These policies increase the existing advantage which the Arabs possess as a result of their geographic and demographic preponderance. They have vast expanses of territory and vital strategic strongpoints. They have huge resources of oil. They have enormous reserves of manpower. Their financial and economic resources are vastly superior to those of Israel. These advantages may or may not be reflected in their current military posture. But this is of small moment. In discussing a regional security problem the criterion is one of basic potential, not of current military strength; and in such terms the Arab states possess an advantage even without the treaties and arms agreements showered on them and withheld from Israel by the United States and Britain. In recent years, all the Arab states have been strengthening their armies, their military industry and their equipment. Huge military budgets, that cannot be matched by Israel's struggling economy, have enabled them to purchase modern Western equipment such as jet planes, artillery, tanks and armored war machines. The military budgets of the Arab states in the current year exceed the total of Israel's entire budget for all purposes, civil and military.

It is against this background that the specific problem of border insecurity, of marauding and infiltration, should be viewed. An intermittent guerrilla war on Israel's borders, especially those with Jordan and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza-strip, is the spearhead of comprehensive hostility. It is difficult to imagine that a quiet border could coexist with the political and emotional attitudes of the Arab leaders which I have described. An improvement of relations between governments is a prerequisite of a more peaceful frontier life. Yet specific consideration is needed

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for the movement of Arab "infiltration" which is acknowledged by both parties and by the United Naitons to be the primary specific cause of recent outbreaks.

The process of "infiltration" began in the period immediately following the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements. It was at first a sporadic trickle of illegal crossings actuated in part by motives of family reunion. Efforts made by Israel to regulate this movement by agreement with the Arab states failed owing to the Arab refusal to legalize any transit of persons between their respective territories and Israel. As a result, these illegal crossings became a regular practice, which after a time degenerated into wholesale infiltration accompanied by theft and smuggling. The Government of Israel first took no steps to suppress this movement, regarding it as a temporary phase. It also put into operation an official scheme of its own for the reunion of Arab families separated by the war, and as a result several thousand Arabs have rejoined their kinsfolk in Israel. Contrary to expectations, however, the movement showed no sign of abating. Thefts, robbery, hold-ups and eventually murder and sabotage became of frequent occurrence. As the border region became more tense with constant violence, the Israeli villagers in the area were authorized to organize their own defense against invaders.

It has been asserted quite wrongly that this infiltration is conducted primarily by refugees. The nightly incursions into Israel territory, which in most cases show careful planning, are not the work of destitute refugees but of highly trained gunmen acting on paramilitary lines. They openly sell their booty in the markets of the Arab border towns, not infrequently sharing their gains with the appointed organs of security. In a number of cases, where the Israel authorities supplied to the Arab Governments data on the identity and the crimes of the infiltrators, these were not brought to trial, and only rarely have the stolen goods been returned.

There can be little doubt that much of this guerrilla war is of a military character. The targets chosen, the form of attack, the types of arms used and the methods employed indicate that many of these raids are planned on military lines. The setting of mines, the ambushing of watchmen and firing at guards are clearly not the work of hapless refugees. In more than one case the raids have been well synchronized and carefully planned military op-

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erations executed with a high degree of precision. This campaign affords first class opportunities for instructing men in guerrilla tactics, gathering military information and making the raiders familiar with the territory in which the "second round" may one day be fought.

The dimensions which the guerrilla war against Israel has assumed in recent years may be gathered from the following data. From 1949 to the middle of 1954 there have been an average of 1,000 cases of infiltration per month along the several frontiers, the majority of them on the Israel-Jordan border. The number of clashes with armed marauders on the latter border alone amounted during the last four years to 1,069, the incidents of theft, burglary and armed robbery to 3,573. Livestock, seed, fertilizers, agricultural implements and irrigation pipes have been among the principal booty of these marauding expeditions. Miles of telephone wires have been stolen and telephone poles destroyed, while the cutting of electric wires has seriously interfered with agricultural and industrial activities. All this material damage, however, is overshadowed by the fearful toll of human life. On the Jordan border alone 513 Israelis were killed and wounded during the past four years. The Commander of the Arab Legion proclaims the innocence of a process which, unless checked, may bring ruin to the whole Armistice régime.

A summary of incidents within a brief period of time and along a single sector of the Jordan frontier was presented by the Israel Representative at the United Nations to the Security Council on November 12, 1953. The nightly attacks there recorded, with their ever-increasing toll of lives, have created nervous tension in the Israel border villages which militates against the self-restraint maintained during the early phases of this war. It is not the first time that the Jews of Palestine have been exposed to this trying ordeal. In 1920, 1921 and 1929 there were serious Arab attacks in Jerusalem, Jaffa, the coastal plain, Hebron and Safad, in which hundreds of Jews were massacred and a number of Jewish villages destroyed. In 1936, country-wide disturbances began which lasted intermittently until the outbreak of the Second World War. In these conflicts it was the policy of the Jewish authorities, upheld by the bulk of the community, to abstain from retaliation. The same restraint was maintained when after the establishment of the state of Israel, the old guerrilla attacks and marauding expeditions were resumed. Tension in the border

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areas, however, has of late become so acute as sometimes to result in a breakdown of that traditional attitude.

Many of the attacks have occurred not along the "frontier" but deep inside Israel territory. The innumerable wadis and tracks covered by sand make it easy for raiders to enter and escape undetected. Not infrequently Israel watchmen and border police wounded by shots have been dragged across the frontier and cruelly done to death, their mutilated bodies then being presented as evidence of Israel aggression against Jordan. The Jordan Government has distributed arms and ammunition to village youths in the border areas, labelling them "National Guards," without effective control or training. Its agreement has not yet been received for any radical measures to stop guerrilla activities along the border, such as the regular policing of the area, the division of no man's land or the marking of the armistice line. According to a report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General of the U.N., dated October 30, 1952, no effective system of frontier demarcation could be set up "since the Jordan authorities have been unwilling to agree to any 'permanent' scheme for the marking of the demarcation line." According to the same report, "an Israel survey team engaged in the marking of the border was fired on from Jordan-controlled territory," and the "officer in charge of the surveying team was seriously wounded." This has happened in many instances. The case of the Lebanese frontier, which is clearly marked by cairns placed every few hundred yards and where the local gendarmerie maintains order, indicates that where there is a will, an end can be put to violence across the border. In articles and interviews[8] the Commander of the Arab Legion has said that "in international practice every nation is responsible for the prevention of illegal entry into its frontiers" and that "the Israelis must deal with such incidents in their country and not expect the military command in Jordan to do so"—the implication clearly being that notwithstanding the terms of the Armistice Agreement, the Jordan military authorities do not feel obliged to stop the evil at its source. In July 1954 the United States, Britain and France proposed the demarcation of the frontier and the erection of barriers as a measure to prevent infiltration and reprisals. This suggestion was accepted by Israel and

[8] General J. B. Glubb in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1954, and in an interview in *The New York Times*, July 17, 1954.

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again rejected by Jordan. It is hard to see how refusal to mark the border and consolidate its defenses can be reconciled with peaceful intention or purpose.

A serious situation, second in gravity only to that on the Jordan frontier, has developed in recent months on the Egyptian border. Though the constant raids into Israel territory across the Egyptian armistice line do not, like those from Jordan, operate in populous areas, they have created in the wide expanses of the Negev a state of insecurity necessitating exceptional measures of vigilance to safeguard the lives and property of the rural population. Many of these raids reveal paramilitary training and careful reconnaissance of the ground and of the local farmers' habits. Flocks numbering many hundred heads of sheep have been driven off, plantations uprooted and vital communications mined. A special problem is presented by the Bedouin in the area. The Egyptian authorities frequently employ their own Bedouin for attacks on the Israeli Bedouin, particularly at times of political tension.

IV

The prospects of removing such a profound tension by palliative measures are not hopeful. A development of the Armistice agreement into a peace settlement is the only radical cure. But if there were a desire to move progressively towards peace, many effective steps could be taken. The first would be to stop the campaign of incitement in the Arabic press and radio, and the public statements of political leaders. A second step would be the elimination of the economic boycott against Israel which is doing the Arab countries no less, if not indeed more harm than Israel. Third, a number of specific measures could be adopted for improving conditions on the border. A series of such proposals was submitted by Israel to Jordan in March 1953, but met with categorical rejection. The most important measure to prevent trouble in the border region would be the demarcation of the present lines by clearly visible signs on the ground. A further preventive measure would be the partitioning of the "no man's land" areas on the border which considerably hamper the effective policing of the frontier region. To remove the incentive of booty, searches should be carried out to discover goods stolen by marauders in Israel. At the same time, the responsibility of the local authorities to prevent the infiltration of marauders into Israel territory should be enforced by disciplinary measures. Firearms should be

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carefully registered and licensed and all unauthorized explosives and their detonating agents should be confiscated by the competent authorities in Jordan.

Another measure intended to stop infiltration was the Agreement reached on March 5, 1951, between Israel and Jordan for the holding of regular meetings of local commanders for settling border problems, exchanging information on marauders, arranging for the return of stolen property and providing for the return of persons who had inadvertently strayed across the unmarked line. After a year's trial it became clear, however, that the Jordanian authorities had no intention of coöperating effectively in the prevention of marauding. Stolen property was for the most part sold openly in Jordan market places and was returned only in very exceptional cases. On January 8, 1953, Israel informed the Jordanians that it saw no purpose in continuing this Agreement. In June 1953 Israel took the initiative in proposing a new Local Commanders' Agreement, following a suggestion made by Secretary of State Dulles. The Jordanians were reluctant, but in the end grudgingly signed it. The new Agreement, too, remained a dead letter. Very little was done by the Jordan police to return stolen property and apprehend marauders even when their names were officially communicated to them by the Israel authorities. Israel also proposed the setting up of telephone lines in exposed districts, such as the area of Al-Kubeibe-Latrun, to facilitate a speedy exchange of information. This proposal, too, was first held up and then rejected. The Israel authorities also suggested that in certain areas the armistice line be redrawn, so as to enable villagers to work on their fields without crossing the border. In this matter, too, the Jordanians have maintained their negative attitude.

Israel would welcome any measure, however temporary and palliative, that might help in some measure to reduce tension. In recent weeks, especially since the appointment of General Burns to lead the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization, there has been a promising reduction of tension. Israel has no aggressive designs against her neighbors. If she had, she could have had many opportunities in recent years, when Arab states were weakened by internal disturbances and coups d'état. There has been a scrupulous abstention by Israel from exploiting these instabilities. Nor would an aggressive Israel support American and British proposals for reinforcing the armistice demarcation line as a tan-

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gible barrier to movement from either side. Israel urgently needs peace for economic development and for accomplishing the great task of absorbing the 700,000 Jewish refugees who have come from all parts of the world—including 350,000 immigrants driven by intolerance from Arab lands. Some Arab leaders must be aware that peace with Israel would benefit the Middle East and open out a new horizon of regional progress; but such moderation, if it exists, has not yet found tangible expression in official policy, the Arab leaders having become slaves of their own bellicose slogans which they cannot now recant.

Despite this negative attitude Israel has from time to time outlined concrete peace proposals. In the Seventh General Assembly of the United Nations in 1952 the Israel Government submitted an elaborate blueprint for a peace settlement and regional cooperation between Israel and the Arab states. These proposals were categorically rejected by the Arab spokesmen. In November 1953 the Government of Israel made another effort to seek an agreed settlement of outstanding issues with Jordan by requesting the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in conformity with Article XII of the Armistice Agreement, to convoke a conference of both parties for the purpose of revising and improving the Armistice Agreement in the light of past experience. Although the terms of the Armistice Agreement make attendance at such a conference obligatory, the request of the Secretary General, supported by the Western Powers, was rejected by the Government of Jordan. In October 1954, the Israel Government released the blocked accounts of Arab refugees and proposed the conclusion of non-aggression pacts as an intermediate stage between the armistice and a peace settlement.

At the time of writing, despite a comparative lull on the Jordan border, no long-term solution is in sight. It does not appear likely that local border incidents will develop into a general collapse of the armistice frontier; but the air is heavy on both sides of the frontier, and peace hangs on a tenuous thread.

No international question has been so much discussed and so little solved. The discussions have at least defined the three avenues of progress. The first and best alternative would be a negotiation between Israel and each Arab state with the object of making a transition from the armistice to permanent peace. There is nothing revolutionary or unreasonable in this suggestion. It expresses the duty of all civilized states to live together in

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neighborliness and tranquillity. It does not involve the Arabs in any new commitment; for the Armistice Agreements are defined in their own terms as acts of "transition to permanent peace." There is an impressive volume of world opinion in favor of the doctrine that the armistice system, with its many improvised and impermanent features, has lasted too long and should be succeeded by a more stable system of international relationships. The Great Powers and the United Nations would do well continually to articulate this as the determined will of the international community. Six years ago Mr. John Foster Dulles, addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations, clearly expressed the view that it would be perilous to allow a provisional military relationship to endure too long. He said: "Fighting must give way to truce, truce to armistice, and armistice to final peace." There can be no assurance that negotiations between Israel and her neighbors would lead to swift agreement; but a stubborn refusal even to negotiate is surely out of accord with any doctrine of international duty.

A second alternative, which might bring relief until a peace negotiation takes place, would be to utilize the opportunities of review and revision inherent in the Armistice Agreements themselves. Article VIII of the Armistice Agreement with Jordan provides for a Special Committee for settling many dangerous problems, especially in the Jerusalem area. In 1952 the United Nations Chief of Staff reported that Jordan refused to meet Israel in that Committee. This refusal still persists. There are articles in each Armistice Agreement which oblige either party to accept the U.N. Secretary-General's invitation to attend a conference, convoked at the request of the other party, for the purpose of reviewing, modifying or suspending any or each article of the Armistice Agreement. Here, too, Jordan has refused to honor its signature obliging her to meet Israel under the procedures laid down in the Armistice Agreement. It is extraordinary for a government to proclaim fidelity to an international agreement while declining to meet the central provision of that very agreement for revision or review. Recently, the policy of ostracism has been carried to even more extreme lengths by Jordan's refusal to attend meetings of the United Nations Security Council because the Charter makes such attendance conditional upon the acceptance of an obligation of pacific settlement.

A third and more modest line of possible improvement has re-

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cently been tried in the form of proposals for marking the border and erecting obstacles at suitable points. This too has been rejected on the Arab side.

The Israel Government and its Defense Forces will not neglect any idea or opportunity which seems likely to offer hope of a remedy. In these circumstances the basic question is clearly not one of procedure but of policy. Does there exist any international influence which can overcome the comprehensive negation which the Arab Governments have chosen to adopt? Refusal to discuss peace; refusal to develop the Armistice Agreement into more lasting accords; refusal to review the Armistice Agreement under Article XII; refusal to confer with Israel under Article VIII of the Armistice; refusal by Jordan to attend the Security Council's meetings under Article 35 of the Charter; refusal to mark the frontier; refusal to erect barriers to infiltration; refusal to restrain the eruption of marauding bands across the frontier; refusal to desist from inflammatory propaganda and incitement; refusal by Egypt to abandon an illicit blockade—all this together adds up to a political attitude which will surely have to be modified if the tension in the Middle East is to be relieved. Until then the Israel Defense Forces will face a heavy task, and face it virtually alone as the solitary effective means for safeguarding Israel's physical integrity.

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GROWING FOOD BY DECREE IN SOVIET RUSSIA

By Chauncy D. Harris

IN a significant address on August 8, 1953, Soviet Premier Georgi M. Malenkov gave the planners of the Soviet economy the task of achieving within two or three years an abundance of food for the population and of raw material for industry. The gap between present production and "agricultural abundance" in the Soviet Union is so tremendous that literal attainment of this goal within such a short period seems extremely unlikely. Nevertheless Soviet agricultural output could be increased substantially, given favorable economic conditions, improved farm management and increased supplies to agriculture of such materials as machinery, fertilizer, technical help, building materials, and insecticides and pesticides. In an attempt to achieve the grand goal announced by Malenkov the party and the government have promulgated two great series of sweeping but contrasted decrees.[1]

The first set of decrees began to be issued in September 1953. Their aim was to increase production of meat, vegetables, fruits and industrial crops on existing farmland, partly by raising the prices paid.

The second set, embodied particularly in the decree of March 2, 1954, attempted to expand radically the area under cultivation, in order to achieve a cheap and quick increase in grain production. Within the two years 1954 and 1955, 32,000,000 acres of idle and virgin land were to be plowed up and put into crops. This ambitious plan was revised upward on August 17, 1954, to the fantastic figure of 70,000,000 additional acres to be cultivated within three years, 1954–1956. Thus within the brief compass of three years the Soviet Union aspires to add new cultivated land equal to the total harvested acreage of wheat in the United States. This would amount to a 20 percent expansion in the total Soviet sown area. Naturally one wonders whether the Soviet Union contains that much good land not currently cropped but utilizable so suddenly.

Before considering in turn the two sets of decrees, we need to review briefly past Soviet efforts to increase agricultural produc-

[1] Texts of the various speeches, reports and decrees were published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. English translations are given in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* published by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, from which most quotations in this paper have been made.

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tion and to consider the physical conditions affecting Soviet farming and its limits.

II

In the past Soviet agricultural production has fallen far short of announced plans. Soviet agriculture has stagnated in comparison with Soviet heavy industry, which has increased its production tenfold during the last quarter century, and also in comparison with American farm output which has increased 40 percent in the last 15 years. The estimated per capita output of edible animal products (such as meat and milk) in the Soviet Union has declined by about 30 percent in the last 25 years. The grain has fluctuated but is now at about the per capita level of 1928. Industrialized countries usually have better diets than agrarian countries, but the Soviet Union has a poorer diet than the underdeveloped nonindustrial countries of eastern and southern Europe.

Faced by persisting food shortages over the last quarter century, the Soviet Government has undertaken various stringent measures to increase agricultural production, or rather, more particularly, to increase the amount of food available to the urban industrial workers. Pressures for increased Soviet food production have been and will continue to be intense. The annual population growth is 3,000,000 (1.5 percent). The demand for improved diets is especially strong among the growing urban population, who hope for more meat, vegetables and fruit—a diet that makes heavier demands on agricultural resources than the traditional Russian grain.

The first great measure was the collectivization of agriculture. This transformation increased the proportion of agricultural output diverted to urban consumers but apparently did not raise total production. The initial impact of this revolutionary change, and its apparent main purpose, was to insure larger deliveries of grain to the state. By eliminating individual peasant farms and by giving a monopoly of draft power and agricultural machinery to its own machinery and tractor stations (M.T.S.), the government was able to force larger compulsory grain deliveries to the state; thus it secured the food supplies considered necessary to make possible a rapid increase in the number of urban laborers, and thus industrialization. The total agricultural production, however, dropped catastrophically during the early years of collectivization; the residual food supply remaining for the farmers

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fell below starvation levels in some areas in some years. The rural population suffered bitterly as a result of collectivization and it is not certain whether the rural standards of living have yet risen to the pre-collectivization level of 1928.

The mechanization of agriculture in the Soviet Union as in other countries has increased net farm output available for human food. The most important aspect of mechanization is the replacement of the horse by the tractor. But according to W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, the Soviet Union lags behind such countries as Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay, Ireland and Italy in number of tractors per acre of arable land.[2] Nevertheless, much land formerly needed to feed draft horses has become available for the production of food.

During the first Five Year Plan (1928–1932) an attempt was made to raise agricultural production by increasing the amount of land under cultivation, particularly by expanding farmland farther into the dry steppes. The program suffered serious failures at that time and was largely abandoned in 1932.

The agricultural goals of the second, third and fourth Five Year Plans were not achieved. The second Five Year Plan (1933–1937) called for very large and unattainable increases in yields per acre. Nevertheless, an appearance of fulfillment was maintained by changing the method of reporting crop yields from actual harvests to an inflated "biological yield." Favorable weather conditions in 1937, the last year of the second Five Year Plan, resulted in above average yields in that year and in a rash of optimism about the possibilities for increasing yields much further in the third Five Year Plan (1938–1942). Grain yields per acre, for example, were to be increased 30 percent over the planned 1937 output. World War II broke into this program and instead of an increase there was a precipitous decline in yields and in acreage of cropped land. The postwar fourth Five Year Plan (1946–1950) had more modest goals than the interrupted third Five Year Plan, but production seems to have fallen short of even these goals by 15 percent or more. The agricultural goals of the fifth Five Year Plan (1951–1955) also seem unlikely to be realized.

Drought has ever plagued Soviet agriculture with low yields and recurring crop failures. On October 23, 1948, "Stalin's Plan for the Transformation of Nature" was publicized. It projected the planting of gigantic shelter belts in the drought-ridden lower

[2] "World Population and Production, Trends and Outlook," by W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953, p. 516–517.

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and middle Volga and nearby areas; these constitute most of the semi-arid agricultural land in the European part of the Soviet Union. Early publicists glowingly hinted that the climatic problem of the area might thereby be solved. Recent accounts, however, speak modestly of small windbreaks and of strips to help conserve soil on steep slopes.

In 1950 a series of grandiose irrigation projects was announced. A member of the Academy of Sciences boldly prophesied that within six or seven years the Soviet Union would get enough food from irrigated lands to feed 100,000,000 people. Even the actual plans, though of far smaller dimensions, called for nearly doubling the irrigated acreage by adding 15,000,000 acres of newly irrigated land. Much of this land was already in cultivation. But even these plans, involving stupendous capital investments, are no longer intact. The Turkmen Canal project clearly has been abandoned. Irrigation projects along the Volga and in the Ukraine have been disappointing and the plans appear to have been curtailed.

On the basis of past failures to fulfill plans for increasing agricultural production, one is permitted a generous measure of skepticism about the likelihood of attaining the present goals.

III

Attempts to increase Soviet agricultural production face obstinate physical obstacles. Much of the country simply is too cold or too dry for cultivation. Even within the agricultural heart, major areas suffer from low and variable yields because of inadequate and uncertain rainfall.

A comparison of the Soviet Union with North America may help clarify the picture. Both have about the same area (8,500,000 square miles) and both have about the same population (200,000,000). In each there is an agricultural heart. In North America this heart stretches from the Atlantic seaboard westward to approximately the 100th meridian and northward to the southern fringe of Canada. The agricultural core of the Soviet Union, the Fertile Triangle, has corners at Leningrad on the Baltic Sea, Odessa on the Black Sea, and in Western Siberia somewhat east of the Urals. Both agricultural centers are bordered on the north by vast expanses too cool for farming and on the interior by dry regions too arid for non-irrigated crops.

But this heart of agricultural production lies much further north in the Soviet Union. The southern boundary lies at about

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the fortieth parallel of north latitude in the western part of the country and near the fiftieth parallel in the eastern part. Thus the entire eastern portion of the Soviet Union lies north of the northern limit of the continental United States (the forty-ninth parallel) and only a small segment in the west lies as far south as any section of the United States. The coniferous forests, tundra and icecaps that cover much of Alaska, northern Canada and Greenland find their counterpart in the taiga (coniferous forest) and the treeless Arctic tundra of the Soviet Union. Some 5,500,000 square miles, or nearly two-thirds of the Soviet Union, lie in these bleak regions that offer scant hope for normal agriculture.

Whereas North America extends in a north-south direction, the Soviet Union attains its greatest dimension along an east-west line. It extends from 20 degrees east longitude eastward for 170 degrees (to 170 degrees west longitude). This is the same distance that separates the western tip of Alaska from the coast of Norway. This east-west orientation means that much of the Soviet Union is thousands of miles from its western margin and thus from the sea, a moderating influence on temperature and a source of moisture. As a result, the eastern part of the Soviet Union is the most continental area on the face of the globe and is characterized by an extreme of temperatures between summer and winter, and by low rainfall. Furthermore, extremes both of cold and of aridity are accompanied by great variability from year to year with risks of unseasonable frosts or periodic droughts. East of the Caspian Sea the uncultivated dry steppes and arid deserts of Soviet Central Asia cover about 1,000,000 square miles.

Thus, more than three-fourths of the Soviet Union is condemned by coldness or dryness (often in combination with other factors such as poorness of soil or drainage) to offer little promise for crop production. Less than half the remaining land, climatically suited to cultivation, is considered arable. Thus the total arable land constitutes only 10 percent of the Soviet Union (compared with 4 percent for Canada and 25 percent for the U.S.).

The amount of arable land in the Soviet Union is about 10 percent less than in North America (550,000,000 acres compared with 610,000,000). Not all is planted in crops, particularly in any one year. In 1952 the area of sown crops was 386,000,000 acres, somewhat less than North America (440,000,000 acres) but a little more than the United States alone (355,000,000 acres).

Expanding the agricultural area either to the cool north or to

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the dry southeast is difficult. The northern frontier is one of cool summers, a short and irregular growing season with occasional frosts in very late spring and very early autumn, of infertile podsol soils, of widespread areas of poor drainage, and in places of permafrost (permanently frozen subsoil). The climate is cold and raw and crop failures are frequent. Grain-drying kilns or machinery on collective farms near the northern edge of present farming indicate that the seasons often are too short for the grain to ripen or that the harvest time is too moist for the grain to dry properly. Permafrost covers nearly half the Soviet Union. The soils are mostly podsols, low in plant foods, low in colloids, poor in structure and highly acidic. Heavy manuring and liming are necessary to improve the soil; such expenditures are justifiable only if other conditions are reasonably favorable. The southeastern frontier is arid. Here is a combination of low total rainfall, extremely variable from year to year, and occasional desiccating winds, called *sukhovey*; these may destroy a crop in a single day.

Even in the main agricultural areas crop yields are lower than in the United States. In the Soviet Union the yields of wheat have been estimated to average about 12 bushels per acre compared with 17 in the United States, and the yields of corn 17 bushels per acre compared with nearly 40 in the United States. Climatic, technological, economic and cultural factors—some permanent, some probably temporary—all play a rôle in low Soviet yields. The most important long-range factor is doubtless climate.

The Fertile Triangle, which includes most of the farmland of the Soviet Union, is to be compared to the spring wheat belt of the Dakotas and the Prairie Provinces of Canada, where agricultural yields per acre are relatively low and irregular from year to year, where the variety of crops that can be grown is not great, and where measures for increasing intensity of agriculture through fertilization or more labor are less rewarding than in areas of higher rainfall or longer growing season. The Soviet Union does not contain any substantial agricultural areas comparable with the humid eastern half of the United States; it lacks the American Corn Belt and the American Cotton Belt, both of which are favored by a precious combination of relatively long growing season and adequate rainfall. Odessa at the warm southern margin of the Fertile Triangle lies in the latitude of Duluth, Minnesota. Its temperatures, however, are more like those of Omaha, Nebraska. But its annual rainfall is about ten inches less. Because

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of a short growing season and relatively low precipitation, Soviet agriculture, like that of corresponding parts of the American prairies, is given mostly to grains. As a result of lower yields per acre for the staple grain crops, the lesser development of intensive fruit and vegetable crops, and the low production and low productivity of livestock, total Soviet agricultural production is considerably less than that of the United States.

The Soviet Union may also be compared with North America in the historical development of its expanding agricultural frontier, except that the new lands lay not to the west but to the east.

The ultimate physical limits have not been reached in Soviet agriculture, either in yields per acre, or in areas on which crops can be grown. But the economic limits of agriculture both on the cool and dry margins doubtless have been attained in many areas and have been overstepped in some. Much of the land now cultivated in the Soviet Union is as poor as the abandoned farmland of New England, the Appalachians, or the Dust Bowl of the United States.[3] Further expansion, though physically possible, typically entails low productivity per unit of manpower or capital investment.

IV

The 1953 decrees aimed to raise agricultural production of certain specific products (excluding grain) by the following measures: increased prices for livestock, potatoes, vegetables and some industrial crops; more liberal provisions with respect to the private plots of collective farmers; more farm machinery; more fertilizer; more construction materials for farm buildings; a change in the date of the livestock census; increased livestock feed; more agricultural specialists for farms or machine and tractor stations; seasonal prices for vegetables and fruits; and better harvesting.

An increase in average prices to be paid by the government for livestock and vegetables was probably the most important measure announced in September 1953. A major, and probably decisive, factor in the sickly state of Soviet agriculture in the last quarter century has been the lack of financial or other adequate incentives for farmers. The extremely low prices have had the same effect of discouraging efforts for increased agricultural out-

[3] "How Strong Is Russia? A Geographic Appraisal," by George B. Cressey. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1954, p. 26.

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put in the Soviet Union as they had during the depression in the United States. That this is so was frankly recognized by Soviet leaders. The justification given was that the government could not develop heavy industry and agriculture simultaneously and that it was more important to stimulate manufacturing. A high proportion of the agricultural output has been acquired by the government on compulsory deliveries at extremely low prices fixed by the state; these products have then been sold at relatively high prices through retail outlets. The difference between state procurement and sale prices represented a staggering tax, through which the government acquired the colossal sums needed to pay the capital costs of the construction of heavy industry.

The only branch of Soviet agriculture to exhibit spectacular growth during the Soviet period had been subsidized by high state prices. In industrial crops, such as cotton, the government paid high prices in order to encourage increased production. Workers on farms producing industrial crops had average incomes three and a half times as high as those on livestock farms. The idea of making farm work financially worthwhile, successful in industrial crops, was to be applied to certain other branches of agriculture beginning in September 1953.

Figures on the low income of farmers on livestock farms were revealed by Khrushchev. He reported that livestock farm receipts averaged only five rubles per workday unit for the entire Soviet Union. At the official rate of exchange five rubles amounts to $1.25, but in actual purchasing power it is more nearly 35 cents (at seven cents per ruble). Thirty-five cents is not much pay for a day's work! A laborer on a livestock farm must work three days to purchase a dozen eggs at Moscow prices. One could scarcely quarrel with Khrushchev's conclusion: "Present procurement and purchase prices for animal husbandry products are an inadequate incentive to the material self-interest of the collective farms and farmers in developing animal husbandry . . ."

Because of low prices and other factors the number of livestock declined in the 25-year period, 1928–1953. The number of cattle (on January 1 for comparable areas) fell from 66,800,000 to 56,600,000, of cows from 33,200,000 to 24,300,000, and of sheep and goats from 114,600,000 to 109,900,000. The number of hogs increased from 27,700,000 to 28,500,000. Because the farmers lacked a substantial stake in livestock production, much of the stock was poorly cared for. Thus in 1952 collective farms obtained

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significantly fewer calves, fewer lambs and fewer suckling pigs per unit of female breeding stock than had been obtained in 1940. The harvesting of hay degenerated. Milk production figures for collective farms have not averaged above 2,400 pounds per cow for a decade; in the United States the average milk production per cow is more than twice as high.

In analyzing Soviet farm prices one needs to distinguish sharply between procurement prices, paid for obligatory deliveries to the state, and purchase prices paid for products which the farms are permitted to sell after they have met their obligatory deliveries. Procurement prices generally are extremely low. Many farms have difficulty, however, meeting even the obligatory deliveries; they therefore have little surplus that can be sold at the somewhat higher purchase prices. In September 1953 it was announced that procurement prices on compulsory deliveries to the state were to be increased sharply—5.5 times for livestock and poultry (to approximately ten cents a pound for cattle and sheep), two times for butter and milk, 2.5 times for potatoes (to about 20 cents a bushel for late potatoes), and 25–40 percent for vegetables. These were the plans of September 1953, but on March 6, 1954, it was reported that "procurement prices of meat, milk, wool, potatoes and vegetables . . . have been raised . . . on the average by 11 percent." A lowering of the obligatory delivery norms of the farms was planned; this would permit more of the total production to be sold at the higher prices either for state purchases or for sales on collective farmers' markets. The purchase prices, like procurement prices, were to be increased, but much less: 30 percent for meat (to 30 cents a pound for cattle and sheep) and 50 percent for milk.

A second important measure concerned the small private plots of the collective farmers. These plots, dear to the hearts of the farmers but objectionable to party political leaders, suffered punitive taxation by the government in the postwar period. The Party Resolution of September 7, 1953, observed, "Raising the quotas for [compulsory low-price] delivery of products from the private plots, and defects in our policy of taxing the collective farmers' private holdings have led to a reduction in the number of cows, pigs, and sheep privately owned by the collective farmer." Finally in September 1953 back taxes were cancelled and on the average current taxes were to be halved. The norms for obligatory deliveries to the state from these holdings were reduced. The collective

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farmers were encouraged to acquire private livestock by the curious device of giving tax exemption for a year to collective farmers who did not own a cow on June 15, 1953. Collective farmers were to have access to pastures. But if the collective farmers failed to devote the required number of days of work to the collective farm, their taxes were to be increased 50 percent. Furthermore, on August 31, 1954, it was announced that the minimum number of days of such work was being raised on all farms.[4] Such an increase in obligatory collective farm work may more than offset the concessions on the individual plots of the collective farmers.

One interesting measure to stimulate production was a change in the system of obligatory deliveries. Formerly obligatory deliveries were higher for more productive farms, lower for less productive ones. When increased efficiency resulted in higher production, the state gobbled up the increase. Now to encourage increased production obligatory deliveries are to be fixed on a per acre basis; the more productive farms will be able to sell more of their produce at the higher purchase prices but poor farms will be hard pressed. The stake of the farmers in increased production is thus enhanced. The change is analogous to the substitution of a fixed property tax for an income tax.

Agriculture is to be provided with more machinery, especially tractors. A more generous supply of a wide variety of harvesting devices is also planned. The machine and tractor stations are to be reorganized with a permanent personnel of 1,250,000 rather than with seasonal personnel. Engineers and mechanics are to be sent out from the cities; those who transfer to the M.T.S. are to retain the same wages as in their former jobs in the city. More engineering students are to be channeled into rural areas. It was reported that 23,000 engineers and other technicians were shifted from industry and other activities to work in agriculture last year. Perhaps most important of all, greater attention is to be devoted to keeping the machinery in good repair; poor maintenance has been a notable Soviet weakness in the past.

Plans call for a sharp increase in the production and utilization of fertilizer. In 1953, 6,000,000 tons were supplied agriculture. (This is less than a third the amount used in the United States.) These are relatively long-range plans, which if actually carried out will make a major contribution to increased production. The

[4] N. Nazartsev, *Selskoe Khoziaistvo*, August 31, 1954, p. 2. Condensed text in English in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, October 13, 1954, p. 9.

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immediate effect is likely to be slight, however, because of the time lag needed for the erection of the necessary chemical plants.

One of the retarding factors in agriculture has been the lack of lumber or other building materials for farm dwellings, for livestock shelters, and for other farm structures. Such materials were diverted as much as possible to industry. The critical condition of agriculture has resulted in orders to government agencies to increase the flow of such materials to the farms. This is particularly important for livestock shelters, since many livestock have been suffering from inadequate protection in the cold Russian winters.

By changing the date of the livestock census from January 1 to October 1, it is hoped to reduce the demands for feed for livestock that must be kept until the census date in order to meet government delivery requirements. Livestock ready for marketing at the end of the summer can now be marketed then.

Because some collective and state farms were not providing adequate feed for livestock during the winter it was decreed that "all collective and state farm livestock to be kept through the winter will be fully provided with feed and shelter." A checkup is to be made in the fall on feed and shelter; livestock not adequately provided for are to be delivered to the state as an advance on the obligatory deliveries of the following year. Various measures are proposed to increase the feed available for livestock. Obviously the amount of livestock that can be maintained depends directly on the amount of feed. More hay is to be planted; more silage crops, root crops and feed melons grown; more concentrated grain feed made available. Yet simultaneous complaints are made of the past increase of fodder crops at the expense of grain. The state is to turn over concentrated feed to livestock farms in proportion to their meat deliveries.

It was planned that agricultural specialists embroiled in paper work were to be pushed into the rural areas. Of the 350,000 agricultural specialists in agricultural agencies, 100,000 were to be forced to move to machine and tractor stations; in March 1954, it was reported that this number had been sent. Furthermore, training schools are to be increased and more students diverted to M.T.S. or farms. On August 14, 1954, a decree changed the price system for potatoes, vegetables and fruits. Prices were made to vary slightly with the season in order to stimulate the production of off-season produce and to encourage the storing of produce for delivery during the off-season. Much emphasis is put on im-

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provement of harvesting procedures. The decree calls for more care; losses and spoilage have doubtless been high. A realistic touch is added by the directive to make extensive use of horse-drawn harvesting machines for hay and to organize hand mowing of grasses in forests and swampy areas. The emphasis on harvesting losses is an expression of the wide disparity between the inflated biological yield figures and actual harvests.

Two features need to be noted about these decrees. In the first place, grains, which account for 70 percent of all Soviet crop acreage, were ignored; all these decrees aimed at increasing the production of the more expensive auxiliary foods rather than the basic element in the diet. In the second place some of these measures, though fundamental to any long-range improvement in agriculture, would have relatively little immediate effect.

V

By 1954 the party recognized that "the satisfaction of the public's . . . demand for . . . food products depends above all upon growth in grain production. The present grain production level . . . does not meet the growing needs. . . . The quantity of grain remaining on the collective farms after the fulfillment of their obligations to the state does not cover all the needs of the collective farms" (decree of March 2, 1954). Increased grain production is needed both for human food and livestock feed. Grain not only dominates agriculture, it is also a major source of Soviet revenue. The government has been loath to give farmers a better price for grain because this would cut deeply into state income, far more deeply than higher prices for minor farm products.

One of the most characteristic features of Soviet planning has been its attraction for the spectacular to the neglect of equally important but more gradual measures. The 1954 plans called for the solving of the grain problem by a gigantic drive into the semi-arid margins of agriculture, similar to the tragedy-packed American Dust Bowl. The planners hope that great quantities of grain can be obtained here quickly and cheaply. The five main areas of the drive are western Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Urals, the Volga region and the North Caucasus. These agricultural frontiers are held to promise a cheap but dramatic upsurge in cereal production. There is a touch of desperation in the urgent call for a substantial immediate jump in grain output at little cost.

The decree of March 2, 1954, called for the planting of 32,000,-

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000 acres of virgin and idle land within two years (1954–55) and the obtaining therefrom of harvests of 600,000,000 to 700,000,000 bushels of grain, of which 500,000,000 bushels should be available for commercial sale.[5] (The total wheat production of the United States runs about 1 billion bushels a year.) The plans called for obtaining average yields of about 20 bushels per acre; expectations of such yields on any continuing basis are unrealistic for semi-arid lands. The very gigantism of the plans and the yield expectations augur poorly for their attainment.

Various devices were suggested to help in the achievement of this program. These lands were to receive 120,000 tractors in 1954 (in terms of 15 horsepower units). At least 100,000 volunteer machine operators were to be supplied by the Young Communist League. Experienced workers sent to the new lands were to get a bonus of three months' salary from their previous place of employment, plus cost of moving to the new land. A bonus of 15 percent was to be added to salaries during the years 1954 and 1955. Most of the workers will have to come from elsewhere since many of these areas are not farmed at present. Provisions will have to be made for water supply, for shelters, for transport of food, machinery and other supplies into the areas, for transport of the grain from the area, and for storage of grain. Yet capital expenditures are to be kept to a minimum. For each 100 rubles' worth of grain delivered for state purchases from these new farmlands, collective farms are to be permitted to buy at regular retail prices up to 50 rubles' worth of trucks, building materials, and other industrial and household goods, but only if they meet goals both for acreage and for yields!

The report of August 17, 1954, indicated that 150,000 skilled workers had been busy bringing new land into cultivation during 1954, that the plan had been over-fulfilled by the plowing (not planting) of 33,000,000 acres, and that the goal was to be raised to about 70,000,000 acres for the three-year period ending in 1956.

As though there were a certain skepticism about the long-range efficacy of the great drive for increased acreage, the decree of March 2, 1954, also mentioned the need for increasing yields of grain in the existing farm areas with the casual comment "in-

[5] Another series of decrees, not treated in this paper, laid down ambitious plans for increasing cotton production in Soviet Central Asia by expanding the amount of irrigated land: by 1,500,000 acres in the Uzbek Republic, by 280,000 acres in the Turkmen Republic, and by 395,000 acres in the Tadzhik Republic. Extensive resettlement is also projected for the lands for which irrigation is planned.

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creasing the yield [per acre] of grain crops . . . remains the chief means of increasing grain production." For increasing yields the traditional methods were proposed: increased fertilization, liming of the soils (in some areas), better seeds, better farming methods, better crop rotations, better use of machinery, reduced losses to pests and diseases, and changing the tax to a per acre basis. But none of the decrees in the fall of 1953 or the spring of 1954 made any substantial contribution toward improving the miserable financial condition of the great majority of the farmers, those engaged in grain production. The decree of June 27, 1954, inconspicuously notes that "beginning with the 1954 harvest, the present norms of compulsory deliveries of grain . . . crops will be lowered," but there is no indication of how much. Apparently the very low procurement prices for these compulsory deliveries of grain are to remain the same.

VI

It is too early to appraise specific results of the intensive campaign to increase agricultural output, especially since production figures have not been released. Past failures to meet plans, difficult physical conditions, and the grandiose nature of present plans all suggest that production will fall considerably short of hopes. The efforts to raise the yields of crops and the productivity of livestock hold the greatest promise over the long run. Favorable financial concessions have been made to producers of some farm products; similar concessions may need to be extended to grain farmers if a really notable increase in total agricultural output is to be achieved. The campaign to plow up new land is a gamble to obtain a rapid increase in grain output at low cost. The planned three-year expansion in planted acreage probably will not be achieved, but if achieved, almost certainly will not be permanently maintained nor produce the yields expected. Ultimately, the Soviet Union is likely to follow the same pattern as the United States, which in spite of a declining crop acreage during the last 20 years has achieved unprecedented increases in production by favorable prices and incentives and by concentrating productive effort on the better lands.

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EUROPE'S PROGRESS TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

By Willard L. Thorp

IN 1949 Paul Hoffman said to the Council of the O.E.E.C.: "The people and the Congress of the United States, and, I am sure, a great majority of the people of Europe have instinctively felt that economic integration is essential if there is to be an end to Europe's recurring economic crises." He was certainly right in stressing the "instinctive" source of the conclusion, for this put the matter in the realm of feeling, implying an unreasoned background and the absence of any strict definition. The various discussions of economic integration show a common agreement as to the general direction in which Europe should go but also provide an uncommon confusion of terminology (coöperation, coördination, integration, unification) and wide disagreement as to who is to go on which route, how far, and to what specific goal.

"Europe" did not become an important proper noun in American economic foreign policy until General Marshall on June 5, 1947, suggested that United States assistance would no longer be given on a piecemeal basis but rather in relation to a joint program, "agreed to by a number, if not all European nations." When the Marshall Plan was enacted, the preamble to the Act included these words: "Mindful of the advantages which the United States has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers," it shall be the policy to encourage "that economic coöperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity." This certainly was a comfortably vague statement.

The position of the European countries was equally unimpeachable and general. And the early reports of the Economic Coöperation Administration are full of phrases such as "maximum benefit for Europe as a whole," "total economic effort of the European nations" and "total European economy." The European Recovery Program therefore focused attention on Europe as such, but there is no evidence that it was to be more than a joint program and coöperative venture.

The advocates of a united Europe were not content to let the matter rest at this point. The effort to write something stronger

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into the original Marshall Plan legislation had been turned down as implying interference. However, in April 1949, the revised Act included a new declaration: "It is further declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe." (The House words "and federation" were deleted in conference.) When Senator Fulbright proposed as an amendment the insertion of "political" before "unification," Senator Connally summarily stated that "The committee considered this amendment very carefully, and was almost unanimously against either undertaking to coerce Europe or to pay Europe to achieve union," and the amendment was voted down, 67 to 15. As to the final result, a later report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was guilty of an understatement when it said, "There is some doubt as to the meaning, whether this language refers to political federation, economic federation, or both."

While the Congress was limiting itself to the encouragement of some sort of unification, a much more vigorous position was taken by the E.C.A. Administrator, Mr. Hoffman. On October 31, 1949, he addressed the Council for Economic Coöperation in Paris and outlined two tasks to be performed; first, to balance Europe's dollar accounts, and second,

> the building of an expanding economy in Western Europe through economic integration. The substance of such integration would be the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restrictions on the movements of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away. . . . The creation of a permanent, freely trading area, comprising 270,000,000 consumers in Western Europe, would have a multitude of helpful consequences. It would accelerate the development of large-scale, low-cost production industries. It would make the effective use of all resources easier, the stifling of healthy competition more difficult.

In developing the theme further, he stressed the need for a substantial measure of coördination of national fiscal and monetary policies, necessary adjustments of exchange rates, means of cushioning temporary disturbances, and the resolution of conflicting commercial policies and practices. At least, here is some real content, although the definition in terms of a specific program still is not very exact.

Another important statement on the subject was made by General Eisenhower on July 3, 1951, before the English-Speaking Union in London. There can be no doubt as to the direction of his argument, although again the concept is not entirely clear. The

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attack is on "patchwork territorial fences," which foster localized interest, pyramid costs, bar the efficient division of labor and resources, and promote distrust. The plea is for "unity," "a United Europe," "integration of Western Europe," "a workable European federation" and "a similar integration" to that of the British Commonwealth and the United States. "Once united, the farms and factories of France and Belgium, the foundries of Germany, the rich farmlands of Holland and Denmark, the skilled labor of Italy, will produce miracles for the common good."

This position was restated by President Eisenhower on January 20, 1953, in his inaugural address: "In Europe, we ask that enlightened and inspired leaders of the Western nations strive with renewed vigor to make the unity of their peoples a reality." Three weeks later, Secretary Dulles, returning from his first flying trip abroad as Secretary of State, said that, "It has been clear for some time that the biggest single postwar task would be to end the disunity in Europe which makes for weakness and war." Although not explicitly stated, his interest clearly lay in avoiding the division of Europe "into rival national camps." His report was concerned primarily with the European Defense Community, although he pointed to the Schuman Plan as an outstanding example of accomplishment.

There can be no doubt about the strong American interest in European integration, but it also has had European support. Many European statesmen have actively endorsed the notion, although they often put more emphasis on the obstacles. Many of the most enthusiastic supporters do so for political reasons, usually related to the problem of Germany and her relations with the West. On the other hand, many have stressed the economic importance of a unified Europe. Europe, they say, is cut up into small pieces and national boundaries create major obstacles to the flow back and forth of economic goods, labor and capital. The result is that resources are not used effectively, trade is restricted, competition is limited and economic growth is hampered. The structure of each little economy is forced into an unspecialized and inefficient pattern. In the absence of economic expansion, class conflicts are sharpened, and monetary policies are limited to the narrow base of each country's resources. Economic aggression, retaliation and international distrust result.

The confusion in terminology obscures the significance of recent developments. From the economist's point of view, it is not

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difficult to describe economic integration in terms of the ideal. The fundamental purpose of economic policy is to develop and utilize resources so that they will produce the maximum supply of goods and services, and to distribute the economic product so that the effective demand for it is best satisfied. The maximum satisfaction of wants can be achieved when there is the freest flow of resources and products, when arbitrary interference with economic forces is at a minimum. In a large country like the United States, this objective is fairly well achieved because there is a single market: labor and capital can move about freely, the economies of large-scale operation can be achieved, and products produced over a wide area can be marketed over a similarly wide area. There are no currency problems since the dollar is legal tender everywhere and commercial and legal procedures are fairly well standardized. The forces of competition can work over a whole continent and provide that dynamic element which leads to higher productivity.

The same state of affairs would certainly be achieved for Europe if a single government replaced the governments of the separate Western European countries, but few indeed have ever argued for such a drastic step. A much larger group of advocates talks of federation, but disagrees as to the essential area that should be federated and the amount of authority to be transferred to the central government. Neither single government nor federation has appeared. More than five years have passed since Congress stated the American position in one sentence and Paul Hoffman outlined the economic argument in more detail. In both cases, it was clear that the proponents believed that a substantial amount of economic integration could take place even without political unification. How much progress has been made since then?

II. THE FIRST TEST: THE FLOW OF TRADE

A phrase which recurs again and again in discussions of economic integration is that of "the common market." The first test of whether progress has been made, then, is the degree of the reduction of trade barriers in Europe and the expansion of trade. The immediate postwar period found the European countries not only impeding trade by tariff barriers but directly cutting down their imports by quota restrictions. They were all in difficulties over the balance of payments as the result of the heavy demand for imported goods, the shortage of goods for export, the

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reduction in invisible earnings, the loss of foreign assets and the increase in foreign liabilities. Imports had to be limited to the foreign purchasing power available (plus assistance) and this was done by import controls.

At first, efforts to resume trade took the form of bilateral agreements, with more or less equal commitments on each side to buy and sell in increased amounts, thus not adding to each other's trade deficit. Obviously, this was a very limited approach and only the establishment of the European Payments Union made possible multilateral settlements whereby a country might use its surpluses with one country to offset deficits with another. At the same time, the O.E.E.C. embarked on a program of trade liberalization whereby the various member countries simultaneously undertook to remove quota restrictions against each other. There have been times when countries felt their reserves were threatened and have backslid. But in June 1954, the average degree of liberalization achieved was about 80 percent; Austria and France had freed more than 50 percent of their trade, while Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland had freed more than 90 percent.

This is real progress, of course, but the quota restrictions that remain are important, and from time to time countries have had to suspend liberalization (the United Kingdom in November 1951 and France in February 1952). Also, it should be noted that liberalization of trade in agricultural produce lags behind that in raw materials and even manufactured goods. Furthermore, the liberalization program does not relate to trade on government account, and this has increased substantially since before the war.

Quotas are largely a postwar phenomenon. Although they were adopted originally for reasons of balance-of-payments, they also provide protection for domestic industries. The substantial residue still present is therefore net loss when compared with the earlier European trade picture; but the situation is decidedly better than it was in the immediate postwar years.

It is difficult to evaluate the argument sometimes heard that reduction of barriers to intra-European trade will increase competition within the area, that this will lead to increased productivity, and that this greater production will act to strengthen European sales in markets outside the European area. This seems to be a series of propositions containing many "leakages," so that the premise does not necessarily lead to the conclusion. It is

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not clear that increase in productivity requires such a large market, except for a few products involving very large-scale production. (The argument was first put forward by an automobile manufacturer.) Competition may come from outside, or may take place in the outside markets where a small country would certainly have to sell to obtain foreign exchange. And differences in productivity can be more than offset by the level of foreign exchange rates. In fact, it is easy to postulate that a preferred market within Europe might reduce some of the pressure to venture into other areas, or to argue that competition is a cultural habit and not much related to whether the area involved is large or small. Despite these caveats, most economists would agree that removing barriers will tend to lower rather than increase costs. It is clear that the E.P.U. and the program to liberalize trade made possible a considerable expansion in intra-European trade, and this is certainly to be desired.

The O.E.E.C. focused its attack on quantitative restrictions for four reasons. First, their economic effect is likely to be greater than that of a tariff. Tariffs add a fixed amount to the cost of delivering the goods to the importing customer, but there is no limit to the amount of goods which can flow over the barrier. Quotas, however, establish a limit in terms of quantities and the effect on price is limited only by the elasticity of the demand. Second, quotas may be used for discrimination among competing countries, while tariffs, at least so long as the most-favored-nation clause applies, do not inject an artificial selection among foreign producers. Third, quota restrictions are the latest in date of the various types of international barriers and have the least vested interest behind them. Finally, tariffs are more clearly in the domain of GATT—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—and international organizations have an undue respect for the "no trespassing" rule.

The measurement of tariff levels is certain to be an unsatisfactory undertaking. However, estimates published by GATT indicate that European tariffs rose substantially from 1925 to 1939 and that the trend has been downward since 1947 as a result of multilateral negotiations at Geneva, Annecy and Torquay. While Scandinavian tariffs were lower in 1952 than in 1925, those of the United Kingdom and other countries of Western Europe were higher. The prospect is not bright for further reductions by the method of reciprocal concessions, because some countries already

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have very low tariffs and therefore cannot reciprocate. GATT has been considering proportional reductions as a possible road to further progress, but no agreement on principle or method has yet been reached. Thus in regard to tariffs as well as quotas the situation is worse than in the inter-war period but better than during the early postwar years, with further improvement appearing to be increasingly difficult.

If one dares to draw generalizations from statistical aggregates, it may be noted that the records show that the value of export trade by the O.E.E.C. countries has increased each year since the war, and, with the exception of 1950, each year since 1948 has seen the value of their exports to each other expand more rapidly than exports to other areas. The percentage of intra-O.E.E.C. exports to total exports during the first six months of 1954 was slightly higher than the prewar level (50.6 compared with 50.4). Since imports from outside the area are related to the amount of external aid, and since this has been diminishing, imports from sources within the area have increased more rapidly since 1948 than imports from other countries. There does not appear to be any appreciable difference in price behavior for export trade within the area and to countries outside it, so the percentage changes in value of exports reflect changes in volume of trade. However, prices of goods from outside the area have risen relatively more from prewar levels than prices of goods traded within the area, so the increased ratio of imports within the organization to total imports (44.1 compared with 39.3) probably understates the changing source of imports.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this record. In the first place, since imports and exports in intra-O.E.E.C. trade must be approximately equal, imports from outside the area have not increased as rapidly as have exports to the outer area. Secondly, trade among the countries which are members of the organization has shown a substantial gain during the postwar period; and they have increased their trading with each other more than with the rest of the world. It might also be added that the volume of intra-O.E.E.C. trade has increased more rapidly than the rate of production, when measured either against the prewar situation or since 1948. These figures would tend to support the conclusion that the European countries constitute slightly more of a common market today than before the war, and substantially more than in the early postwar years.

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III. THE FLOW OF LABOR AND CAPITAL

But the notion of a common market does not relate solely to the purchase and sale of commodities. It also involves the flow of the mobile factors of production, labor and capital. In the days when there was substantial migration to the United States and other areas, this safety valve tended to equalize labor differences in Europe. During the inter-war period, restrictions on the international movement of peoples developed rapidly. Doors were closed overseas, and licensing requirements for permission to work, encouraged by labor unions and professional organizations, hampered the foreigner's opportunity in Europe.

Since the war, the situation has remained largely frozen because of the shortages of goods and houses, the fear of a flood of refugees, the implications of higher birth rates, and, finally, the commitment of governments to maintain full employment. To be sure, exceptions have been made—as in France, where it is estimated that there has been a total gross immigration of 500,000 between 1946 and 1952, and in the case of coal miners into Belgium and Great Britain and of foreign seasonal workers into Switzerland. One consequence of the establishment of Benelux is that workers can move freely among the three countries, although they do not seem to have done so in any appreciable numbers. Nevertheless, it is probably true that the boundaries are as tightly closed as before against intra-European migration as a means of achieving more efficient utilization of Europe's labor supply. Certainly, there has been no significant increase in labor mobility.

The entire international long-term capital market has been inactive since the early thirties. Furthermore, the postwar period has been one in which the need for capital within each country, plus the obligations of a number of them toward overseas territories, was so great as to make any redistribution of capital funds among the European countries quite unlikely. It is difficult to get a pooling if it merely means shifting capital from the country where the shortage is least severe to one where it is greater.

Actually, the O.E.E.C. was never able to develop a "plan for Europe." A limited attempt was made to achieve some rationalization in certain strategic areas by setting up technical committees in iron, steel and oil. The member countries informed the committees of projects for expansion, reconstruction or modernization in these sectors of industry. The committees reviewed the projects and in the light of the total European picture reported

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back to the country and to the E.C.A. It is said that in certain cases programs were revised or adjusted, and that the accumulated information made it possible to consider implications for raw materials, power and the like.

But the nearest to a coördination in the use of capital has come through United States aid. This flow was consciously directed to the different countries with an eye to their need for foreign finance. However, this element in the picture is sharply diminishing. In general, it can be said that the supply of capital in each country is related primarily to its own savings (including enforced savings through taxes) and that each country allocates its investment resources largely within its own boundaries. Thus separate national needs and planning tend to limit greatly the efficient allocation of capital in Western Europe as a whole.

Another element in the disintegration of Europe which reached back to the prewar era was the breakdown of the international monetary machinery. The thirties saw devaluations and related variations in foreign exchange levels. In the immediate postwar years nearly all currencies were inconvertible and international payments were largely on a bilateral basis. Short-term adjustments were made through limited inter-government credits.

Although American assistance improved the situation somewhat, the chief agency for putting intra-European settlements on a multilateral basis was the European Payments Union, established in 1950. Not only did this device provide for the clearing of surpluses and debits among its members but it also provided for the extension of credit within certain limits. Thus, each country could operate on the basis of its economic position toward all the others instead of being concerned over each bilateral balance. The E.P.U. is of course important beyond the European countries involved; it probably handles the settlements of some 50 percent of the payments arising from world trade.

The basic Payments Union agreement itself makes clear that it was not designed to be the first step toward a single currency for Europe, but rather that it would be a transitional system intended to facilitate a return to complete multilateralism in trade and to the general convertibility of currencies. It has achieved its initial purpose of bringing about a substantial degree of convertibility for the currencies of its member countries with each other. However, while convertibility within a regional system is helpful to the members, problems remain because of surpluses or deficits

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with countries outside the area. The monetary machinery will never work smoothly if the basic economic relationships do not permit general multilateral trade and, with it, the convertibility of currencies.

One of the most important contributions made by O.E.E.C. and E.P.U. is in convincing the members that they have an important interest in each other's business. Thus it has come to be accepted that the economic situation of any member of E.P.U. is subject to detailed examination by a competent group representing the organization. From time to time, the 18 member governments submit to an extremely detailed examination of their economic and financial positions and policies—once closely guarded secrets. These examinations often serve to bring to light repercussions which such policies may have on the economies of other countries. The international organization seems to have no inhibitions about making recommendations concerning the internal financial and economic policies of its members (except direct suggestions as to exchange rates). At this point, something new has been added—a real degree of coöperation among the countries of Western Europe in monetary and fiscal policy.

IV. FORMS OF PARTIAL INTEGRATION

In examining the progress which has been made toward European integration, one must also note certain forms of partial integration, the first being the effort to develop customs unions or other special forms of coöperation by smaller groups of countries. In his Paris speech, Mr. Hoffman had stressed the desirability of such arrangements, and in the renewal of the E.C.A. legislation in 1949 much was made of their promise. However, in spite of brave statements of intent, unstinting work by technical experts and frequent meetings by ministers, Benelux stands out as the only case where the negotiations have led to practical results. The French and Italian Governments signed a customs union treaty but it failed of ratification. The Scandinavian countries began the consideration of a customs union in 1947, but ended by listing the problems which could not be overcome. (To be sure, they did amalgamate their separate air lines.) A project involving both trade and payments to include the Benelux countries, France, Italy and possibly Germany (known by the charming name of Finebel or the less euphonious Fritalux), was dropped since its objectives largely duplicated those of E.P.U. Negotia-

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tions between Greece and Turkey appear to be in a stalemate.

The decision to establish an economic union of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg was made in 1943. Five years later, customs duties among them were abolished and a common tariff against fourth countries was adopted. (Benelux has negotiated in GATT as a unit.) The elimination of tariffs at the time was largely symbolic, since it was not until the middle of 1949 that internal quantitative restrictions on trade were abolished, with some very important exceptions. Benelux is of course a relative success in the absence of progress elsewhere, but it does suggest that substantial difficulties are inherent in economic union. The Benelux Governments have declared that their hope to achieve the free movement of goods and resources makes necessary a close coördination of internal financial, monetary and economic policies as well as joint external economic policies, and that they have not yet succeeded in bringing them into line, though this is their immediate objective.

Various less ambitious arrangements have been made among other nations, perhaps the most important of which involved the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries in the payments field (Uniscan). Signed early in 1950, this agreement provided for a limited freeing of some types of capital transfers and service items and the unlimited acceptability of sterling within the area. The recent announcement that France and Germany would endeavor to coöperate more closely on certain matters of common economic interest in trade and investment is as yet only an agreement between heads of governments. How it will be carried out remains to be seen.

There is little encouraging to report in the way of partial integration by geographical sub-groups, but the idea of putting sectors of the economies of several nations under a supranational authority—as in the European Coal and Steel Community—is a recent major experiment. Many supporters of the Coal and Steel Community—the Schuman Plan—feel that it suggests the route to be followed for real European integration. It is too early to be able to judge its effectiveness as an instrument of integration, but it has broken down many barriers within the area of the six countries involved; the intra-community trade in coal has already increased while coal imports into the area have fallen. No notable change in pattern for steel is yet visible. The fact that the Authority has substantial funds from its regular revenue and from a

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United States loan gives it the opportunity to apply new capital on the basis of over-all economic criteria rather than according to separate national compartments.

The Schuman Plan clearly is an integrating force in Europe. In fact, the chief problem of its future is whether or not it can operate on a common market basis alongside national behavior in other economic categories. If wage, tax or credit policies differ widely among the members, then the common market for coal and steel will be subject to tremendous strains. On the other hand, it will itself exert a pull toward compatible policies. Undoubtedly, the common defense effort will contribute to such a harmonization. Perhaps the single patent office as envisaged by the Council of Europe is also worthy of note as a development in a highly specialized area. At present, however, no other suggestion for sector integration, as, for example, that of a "green pool" to integrate European agriculture, seems to be under serious consideration.

V. CONDITIONS OF FURTHER PROGRESS

By the usual indicators, great economic progress has been made in Europe during the last five years. But progress in the direction of integration has not been so notable, despite apparent European enthusiasm and strong American support. Evidently there are many forces besides social and political inertia which give national boundaries persistent importance, many vested interests which prefer the security of a protected market to the strains of external competition.

It has always been recognized that one obstacle to integration would be the different levels of economic wealth and resources of the various countries. Other differences are also important. A quite complete economic integration would be much easier to achieve if all the countries involved either had totalitarian governments or a minimum of government intervention in their economies. But the fact that they vary so widely in the extent to which governments participate in economic life and take responsibility for it makes unification particularly difficult. Under these circumstances, it has been much easier to arrange joint adventures rather than an unlimited partnership.

As to the likelihood of further progress, three changing factors need examination. The first is that so much economic progress has been made. There is obviously a relationship between the eco-

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nomic pressures under which a country finds itself and its willingness to take revolutionary steps. When there are shortages of raw materials and capital and when the international machinery falters, a small country is likely to be in special trouble. The larger the country, the more its recovery is in its own hands, so to speak, and the less it is at the mercy of the external world. Under such circumstances, size looks very attractive.

Today the economic pressures have eased. The European economies have made a strong recovery. The index for industrial production for O.E.E.C. countries was at 80 in 1948, 100 in 1950, 116 in 1953, and 125 in the second quarter of 1954. Intra-European trade has expanded even more. Measured in volume, it rose from an index of 59 in 1948 to 100 in 1950, 120 in 1953, and 140 in the second quarter of 1954. Rearmament expenditure seems to have reached a plateau. Inflation has been brought under control and reserves are much greater. In other words, the painful postwar economic strains and stresses are relaxing. The countries of Western Europe have more leeway to coöperate in their programs and policies; but by the same token they are less likely to take revolutionary steps, such as a more formal unification of Europe would involve.

Nor is economic pressure the only force which has diminished. The Gray Report (November 1950) stated that rapid progress toward Western European integration was of great immediate significance as an essential element in improving national morale and fears for the future on the Continent. The last three years have seen this picture change also. To be sure, there is continued interest in the joint effort of common defense—an active force for integration. Since a strong defense must rest upon a strong economic base, the interest in economic progress will continue, but it no longer holds the center of the stage and the direct pressures for extraordinary measures of economic integration have somewhat subsided.

The second development of some importance is the growing awareness of the fact that there are limitations on the regional approach. The economist does not think in regional terms; to him, geography is important only as it affects shipping costs and creates a problem of the appropriate location of economic activity. The ideal economic goal is to have or approximate a common market for the world rather than merely for some region. The larger the unit, the better.

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The substantial economic progress which has been made in Europe since the end of the war has without doubt been the result of the efforts of the individual countries, plus United States aid, plus the coöperative effort created within the O.E.E.C. However, the problem of Europe is not merely one of its internal economy but of its relationship with the rest of the world. Trade, payments, investments, raw materials are all matters which reach beyond the borders of Europe. Intra-European convertibility still leaves the dollar problem unsolved. Lower trade barriers within Europe are no solution to the expansion of trade with other areas. To be sure, it can be argued that if economic integration of Europe improves its productivity, its competitive position in the United States and in third markets will be strengthened. But barriers outside Europe can also interfere with European progress.

One basic issue is whether or not such a regional preference system works against an even wider multilateralism. Obviously, a system which lowers barriers within the area but raises them against the rest of the world has just this effect. There clearly are economic gains in a system that lowers internal barriers while keeping the outside barriers unchanged. But even so, there are disadvantages if it diverts attention from the wider goal or means the establishment of new structural patterns which do not represent the best allocation of resources within a wider area.

Nor is the principle that barriers will not be raised against outside areas always easy to maintain. How can one judge the action of the United Kingdom in 1951 when it increased restrictions against both the United States and the E.P.U. area, maintaining the discrimination established under the European liberalization scheme? Particularly relevant is the case of Belgium when for some time it had been a persistent creditor in the Payments Union in excess of its quota. The program which was followed for several years over United States protest was that Belgium should place additional restrictions against the importation of United States goods as a means of encouraging purchasing power to be diverted to European suppliers, thus helping to correct her intra-European payments position. The good neighbor policy within the European economy came into direct conflict with that of a good neighbor in the world economy.

Many of the objectives of European integration can be accomplished by actions on a smaller scale than the European conti-

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nent, or require action on a greater scale. Premier Mendès-France is not waiting for the unification of Europe, but has said that he hopes to stimulate French industry by opening the doors to foreign competition. In the monetary field, interest is centered largely on a wider extension of convertibility. Perhaps the best source for further economic progress lies in the directions laid out by the early postwar planners. Regionalism provides only the next best solution.

The third special point to be noted is that many people supported economic integration chiefly as a means to political unification, and their interest has now turned to other areas of international coöperation. Senator Vandenberg said in 1949: "This drive for self-help and mutual aid is not only economic. Already it envisions coöperation for security, and it is political in its ultimate aspiration. Here stems the ultimate United States of Europe or its effective equivalent." Senator Fulbright said it more simply: "The E.R.P. will prove to have been a colossal failure, unless political unity is achieved in Europe."

Clearly, the economic objective has not proved sufficient to bring about actual unification, although considerable economic integration has been achieved. However, the desire for greater European unity now has another driving force in the new Western European Union. In fact, Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower in a joint statement declared that when the decisions taken at London and Paris become effective, "the road towards a strong and united Europe will have been paved." It is likely that, as distinct from the steps contemplated in 1949 when everything seemed to stem from economic interest, further progress toward actual unification will depend upon the strength of other unifying forces. It is likely that, as in the case of the O.E.E.C., the Western European Union and NATO will provide the unity of action needed in their particular fields. Again, the problem is dealt with by a joint adventure rather than a full partnership.

VI. A TREND ESTABLISHED

After this mixed report on European developments, how can one summarize the situation? If one uses the word "integration" in the dynamic sense of a process rather than a goal, then it is clear that many factors are contributing to the integration of Europe, although the goal of the common market and all the rest is still far away. The trend seems toward a gradual lowering of

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trade barriers. The monetary situation is less and less a positive obstacle. The Schuman Plan represents a major experiment. Some of the lesser geographical groupings have some promise of achieving closer economic relationships.

However, the decided improvement in the European economic situation has made economic necessity less a rallying-point for those who seek unification, and the reduced amount of American economic aid has weakened one strong centripetal force. But if the drive toward integration of the European economy itself seems less persistent, other integrating forces are at work. The defense community will represent an important factor, even though the machinery of supply in the new program does not appear to promise as much centralization as did the E.D.C. proposal. The political community seems to be gathering strength and the Council of Europe concerns itself from time to time with problems in the economic field. Finally, to the extent that the broader world economy achieves relaxation in trade barriers, increased currency convertibility and a more orderly capital market, this will contribute to the strength of the European economic community.

Perhaps the most important element of all is the fact that certain institutions and habits have been formed within the European community. Government representatives have come to realize that the actions of any one country may seriously affect others, and new forms of inter-governmental consultation have developed. In a world where economic life is so greatly affected by government actions of one kind or another, this new intimacy is of major importance. If European integration is still far away from the ideal goal which might be achieved under political unification, at least developments in the last five years have checked the disintegration of Western Europe into autarchic economic islands and set the trend firmly in the direction of a joint effort to deal with common problems.

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THE DJILAS AFFAIR AND JUGOSLAV COMMUNISM

By Thomas Taylor Hammond

EDUARD BENEŠ once described Milovan Djilas as the only Communist leader he knew who dared to think independently. Josef Korbel, former Czechoslovak Ambassador to Jugoslavia, to whom Beneš made this statement, added his own opinion that Djilas "does not like to conceal from himself the situation as it really is, which most Communists do."[1] Stalin is reported to have considered Djilas a very frank man, who said what he thought.[2] Djilas seemed to enjoy being something of an *enfant terrible*—a colorful and cocky individualist who treated everyone, even Tito, with an air of informality. In short, Djilas had many of the very characteristics which are incompatible with discipline in a Communist Party, and it is surprising that he lasted as long as he did. Despite these qualities, Djilas became one of the three or four top figures in Jugoslavia. Among other things he was President of the People's Assembly, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council, member of the Executive Committee (Politburo) of the Communist Party, and boss of the Jugoslav press and propaganda. He was regarded by some as Tito's most likely successor.

But last fall Djilas began publishing a series of articles analyzing the faults in various areas of Jugoslav life, and finally ending in an attack upon the Communist Party and the "caste" system of the new Communist "aristocracy." After a party trial, he was stripped of his honors and reduced to the rank of an ordinary citizen, but not until he had created an international scandal by writing about the love life of a Jugoslav general and a beautiful movie actress.

The Djilas case was not just another Communist purge like those of Beria or Slansky, but was unique in several respects. In the first place, almost all of the facts are available. About most Communist purges we can only speculate; for this one the world had a ringside seat. Djilas himself in his articles presented a revealing exposé of the Communist Party, the government and

[1] "Tito's Communism," by Josef Korbel. Denver: University of Denver Press, 1951.
[2] "Tito," by Vladimir Dedijer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953.

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the private lives of the Communist hierarchs. His trial was fully covered by both press and radio, providing additional peeks into the Communist inner circle. Djilas apparently was not subjected to "brain-washing," was not accused of Trotskyism, of collaborating with the enemy, or of spying for foreign Powers, and he did not make the usual type of Communist "confession."

The case is revealing also for the light it throws on the difficulties which the Jugoslav leaders are having in developing a new kind of "Socialist democracy" which is neither the old-style Stalinism of 1945–48 nor Western-style "bourgeois democracy." Of additional interest is the fact that Djilas and his critics have reenacted with surprising similarity some of the classical controversies of Marxism which raged in the early twentieth century among Leninists, "Ekonomists," Mensheviks, Bernsteinists, etc.

II

The Djilas case was an outgrowth of important changes which have taken place in the Jugoslav Communist Party, government and economy since the Cominform break of 1948. The dispute with Moscow led the Jugoslav leaders to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. was not the workers' paradise they had long imagined, but rather a centralized, undemocratic despotism—in a word, Socialist democracy had succumbed to "bureaucratism." The words "bureaucracy" and "bureaucratism" acquired a special meaning in Jugoslavia. They referred not so much to administrative inefficiency and red tape as to compulsion, arbitrariness and undemocratic methods, all of which were now recognized as being characteristic of the U.S.S.R.

The Jugoslav Communists knew, of course, that they had been pushing Jugoslavia along the same path, but they resolved that they would return to the "true teachings" of Marxism-Leninism and get rid of its "Stalinist deviations." Consequently, beginning in 1950 the Jugoslav leaders introduced a series of reforms intended to weaken arbitrary rule and increase to some extent the element of democracy in Jugoslav life. These reforms included the introduction of workers' management in industry, the dissolution of most of the forcibly-organized collective farms, the decentralization of economic and governmental administration, and some liberalization in the field of civil liberties. Changes in the government and the economy called for changes in the body which directed them both—the Communist Party. Thus the

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Sixth Party Congress was convoked in November 1952 and a new "democratic" program for the Party was set forth. The major change announced was that the Party should thereafter rule not by "administrative measures" (*i.e.* compulsion, arbitrary arrests, etc.), but should exert its influence through persuasion, education and example.

The Sixth Congress also proclaimed that the basic organizations of the Party (*i.e.* Party cells) should thereafter be more independent, that meetings should be open to the public, that the number of professional Party functionaries would be reduced, and Party secretaries would no longer hold the top positions in the local government. Communists were expected to continue to lead the masses along the path of Socialism, but to do it by genuine leadership rather than by force. To dramatize the new policy, the name of the Communist Party was changed to the Communist League.

But changing the actual character of the organization proved more difficult. In trying to introduce both Socialism and democracy, the Jugoslav leaders ran into the same contradiction which Lenin faced after the Russian Revolution: How can you introduce Socialism democratically, when the majority of the people do not want Socialism? Lenin's answer was to sacrifice democracy in order to achieve "Socialism" through the dictatorship of an all-powerful Party. Since the Jugoslav leaders had no intention of abandoning the goal of Socialism, they ran into the same contradiction, despite their attempts to reconcile it at the Sixth Congress. Regardless of their declarations that the Communist League would thereafter use only democratic methods, the fact remained that Communists continued to hold a monopoly of power in the country. The government, the economic system, the police, the army and all means of communication were still firmly under Communist control, where, indeed, they were intended to be. Under such conditions one could talk of democracy, but achieving it was out of the question. Communists might speak more softly than before, but they still carried a big stick.

This contradiction between democratic declarations and dictatorial practice was reflected in the difficulties which the Party rank and file had in interpreting the decisions of the Sixth Congress. Some Communists believed that no change at all was intended, that the new line was merely "an agitation-propaganda tactic." They continued to operate in the old "bureaucratic"

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manner of issuing orders and using the power of the state to enforce obedience. Other Communists took the talk about democracy much too seriously, became passive, relaxed Party discipline, spread "petty-bourgeois-anarchist ideas of freedom and democracy" and failed to suppress "foreign and anti-Socialist manifestations."

These two "negative tendencies" among Jugoslav Communists were discussed and condemned by a plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee (a body of about 100 officials) which met on the island of Brioni in June 1953. Although the Plenum criticized the "bureaucrats" within the Party, it concentrated most of its fire on the "democrats," those who favored a relaxation of Party dominance. The Brioni Plenum was the signal for a general tightening of discipline within the Party and of control by the Party over anyone who acted contrary to official policy.[3]

Djilas did not agree with his colleagues at the Brioni meeting. He revealed at his trial that he felt the attitude of the Central Committee was "one-sided," that "the struggle against bureaucratism" was being forgotten. It was partly to overcome this one-sidedness, he said, that he began writing a series of articles for *Borba,* the official newspaper of the Communist League.

III

Djilas's articles, which appeared from November 1953 into early January 1954, added up to a most thorough critique of present-day Jugoslav society. His main ideas can be summarized as follows: 1. Jugoslav Communists are not willing to trust the Socialist consciousness of the masses, although actually the majority of the people are ready to support the régime. 2. Communism will come about in Jugoslavia spontaneously, regardless of, or even in spite of, the Communist vanguard. 3. The class struggle in Jugoslavia has been successfully brought to an end, except that despotic officials sometimes recreate it artificially. 4. The chief enemy in Jugoslavia today is not the bourgeoisie but the Communist bureaucrat, not capitalism but bureaucratic despotism. 5. Communist bureaucrats wield a monopoly of power, trample on the law and prevent freedom of expression, which is essential for progress. 6. The only way to avoid developing further into Stalinist bureaucratism is by permitting greater democracy. 7. The goals for which Jugoslav Communists should

[3] The decisions of the Brioni Plenum were published in *Kommunist,* July 1953.

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strive are democracy and Socialism—not Communism. 8. To achieve democracy the Communist League must be completely reorganized, with discipline greatly relaxed. 9. Leninism—and not only Stalinism—contains within itself the seeds of despotism.

At the basis of most of Djilas's arguments was his faith in the Socialist consciousness of the people of Jugoslavia. The revolution, he said, has been successfully completed and the old ruling class has been so thoroughly destroyed that there is no longer any danger of counter-revolution. Socialist relations have on the whole been established, he said, except among the private peasantry.[4] Large segments of the population, especially the workers, support the policies of the government and have attained a high level of Socialist consciousness:

> The conscious—or so-called subjective—forces today are not limited to Communists and Socialist-conscious workers alone . . . but they also include all those who are in practice in favor of an independent, democratic and Socialist . . . Jugoslavia, regardless of whether their ideological or other conceptions are identical with this or that . . . Socialist dogma.[5]

Communism in Jugoslavia is inevitable (continued Djilas's argument) and will come about spontaneously, as the result of the objective forces of society rather than because of anything Communist leaders might do:

> Communism is not the product of geniuses or of noble wishes and purposes but of social necessity. And something that is necessary is . . . spontaneous, revolutionary and evolutionary, at any rate inevitable, like all other objective processes in history.[6]

The class struggle in Jugoslavia, said Djilas, is for all practical purposes at an end, although some Communists continue a "futile search" for class enemies.[7] Bureaucrats, he said, artificially create class struggle by arbitrary actions and violations of the law. They "justify their arbitrariness and rule over the people by the danger of counter-revolution, although by their pressure and despotism they are provoking the resistance and dissatisfaction even of ordinary working people."[8]

During the revolution and the consolidation of power, said Djilas, it was necessary for the Communists to conduct a struggle against the bourgeoisie and capitalism, but the chief danger today

[4] "The Importance of Forms," *Borba*, November 8, 1953.
[5] "Subjective Forces," *Borba*, December 27, 1953.
[6] "Is There a Goal?" *Borba*, December 6, 1953. The "Ekonomists" and Mensheviks used much the same arguments against Lenin in the controversies of 1900–1917.
[7] "Subjective Forces," *Borba*, December 27, 1953.
[8] "Is It for All?" *Borba*, November 22, 1953.

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is not these but a new enemy—bureaucratism. According to Djilas, Soviet influence is still strong and there is a definite possibility that Jugoslavia is degenerating into a centralized bureaucratic despotism of the Soviet type, bossed by undemocratic Communists. These Communists "consider that freedom is not for everybody but only for them, because they regard themselves . . . as the most progressive, leading force of society."[9]

Djilas argued that bureaucracy could not be abolished by the passing of resolutions; bureaucracy was inherent in any system where one political party held a monopoly of power:

> Today no party or group, not even a class, can be the exclusive expression of the objective needs of the whole of society; it cannot assume exclusive rights to "manage" the productive forces without enslaving them, including the most important productive forces—people. . . . To weaken the monopoly of political movements . . . that is the demand of the times. . . . (Things have been reversed: from the necessary monopoly of the Party during the war, to the necessity of abolishing this monopoly during Socialism. . . .)[10]

With the establishment of Socialism, said Djilas, the objective conditions of society have changed, but the subjective forces (the Communists) have not changed. They still exercise all power, and they continue to behave in the old Stalinist manner. Although a new system of democratic, Socialist laws has been enacted, Communist "bureaucrats" violate the law on the assumption that "two kinds of citizens exist—one to whom law applies and one to whom it does not."[11] Instead of the freedom of thought which is necessary for the development of new and better ideas, "there is still too much of a prescribed truth, a truth which is . . . revealed from above."[12]

Jugoslav society, said Djilas, can now develop in one of two possible ways—Stalinist bureaucracy or Socialist democracy. "Today relations are such that those . . . who pretend that only their opinion is Socialist theory . . . must enter into conflict with the objective . . . processes. There is no and can be no other way out but more democracy."[13] "Liberation of human labor from any domination, *i.e.* constant struggle for democracy, is the only real and permanent purpose for us today."[14]

Djilas even went so far as to assert (as Eduard Bernstein had

[9] *Ibid.*
[10] "General and Particular," *Borba,* December 20, 1953.
[11] "Respect for Law," *Borba,* November 15, 1953.
[12] "Subjective Forces," *Borba,* December 27, 1953.
[13] "General and Particular," *Borba,* December 20, 1953.
[14] "Is There a Goal?" *Borba,* December 6, 1953.

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done many years before) that Communists should not look upon Communism as a final goal, since no such distant, final goal can be realized by the struggle of individuals. "The goal is not and cannot be Communism or a Communist society because in the end it will come anyhow."[15] Instead of speaking about such a far-off goal as Communism, one should strive for constant movement toward the realization of specific, realizable tasks such as democracy and Socialism. "The goal today is . . . quick progress of Socialism and democracy through concrete and feasible forms—not Communism." Talk about an ideal Communist society, he said, merely "distracts attention from the bureaucratic reality."[16]

Typical of the un-Communist individualism of Djilas were his many statements in favor of freedom of ideas. All new ideas, he said, will at the beginning be the ideas of a minority and will "seem to the majority at the beginning as 'stupid,' 'mad,' and 'illogical.' " Yet such ideas must have free expression because "no one can know in advance which new idea is the progressive one." "The first task of Socialists . . . is to make sure that *no one* be really persecuted because of his ideas. Because only in such an atmosphere can these new ideas . . . come to the surface."[17]

In spite of the critical and even heretical ideas which they contained, Djilas's writings before December 27 did not attract much attention. President Tito, Vice-President Edvard Kardelj, Vice-President Alexander Ranković and other prominent figures were also writing and speaking along superficially similar lines in favor of "democracy" and "freedom" and against "bureaucracy" and "arbitrariness," etc. Tito himself admitted that some time in the fall of 1953 Djilas asked him what he thought of the articles, and he replied that, although he did not agree with everything in them, the good outweighed the bad and the articles should be continued.

Later, at Djilas's trial, several of the members of the Central Committee claimed that they had either neglected to read all of Djilas's articles, or had read them hastily, or had not understood much of what he was trying to say anyhow. While these might sound like simply alibis, the author is inclined to believe them, for he was in Belgrade at the time, reading *Borba* carefully every day, and his reaction was at first the same—namely, that Djilas's

[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] "Concretely," *Borba*, December 22, 1953.

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articles were usually abstract, obscure and wordy, and the ideas they contained were not particularly different from what other leaders were saying.

Yet Kardelj noticed important differences, and on December 22 he voiced his criticisms to Djilas in a private conversation. Djilas responded with an astounding series of statements which showed what exceedingly heretical notions lay behind the comparatively vague ramblings of his articles. Djilas made the following assertions (as reported by Kardelj):

> First, that Comrade Tito was defending bureaucracy, and that he, Djilas, would sooner or later have to fight it out with him. Second, that Comrade Ranković and I were in fact in agreement with him, but that we were opportunists, and therefore did not want to argue with Tito. Third, that, whether we wanted it or not, a Socialist left wing was emerging in our country. And fourth, that the possibility of two Socialist parties emerging in our country cannot be discounted.

Kardelj was understandably "dumfounded." He presented counter arguments, and thought he had convinced Djilas. But two days later Djilas published another article in which he rather scornfully rejected any criticisms.[18]

IV

While Kardelj and a few of the other top policy makers were privately expressing their doubts, the public assumed that Djilas was speaking for the Party, as had often been his function in the past. It was not until December 27, when Djilas began to make his criticisms more specific, that the readers of *Borba* sensed something big was happening. On that date Djilas lashed out at the Communist ruling caste in a manner normally heard only in the whispers of "reactionaries:"

> The bureaucratic and dogmatic theory that Communists alone constitute the conscious force of Socialism . . . is only a stimulus encouraging their separation into something apart and outside of society. . . . This theory conceals . . . a tendency for a special, privileged position in society, for functions based on political and "ideological" adherence and not founded on abilities and professional knowledge. Through such practice and theory Communists must become isolated from the masses and be turned into priests and gendarmes of Socialism. . . .
>
> Having arrived . . . at the position where they can centrally control everybody and everything—ranging from morals to philately—many Commu-

[18] Speech by Kardelj at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee, *Borba*, January 18, 1954.

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nists have failed to change their conceptions and even less their practice . . . following the "sudden" appearance of the spirit of democracy. Democracy is gradually more and more revealing not only who is the true enemy of Socialism, but also that the new enemy, bureaucracy, is even more dangerous than the previous one, capitalism. . . .

Public astonishment was compounded when Djilas went further and called for a radical reorganization of the Communist League and the complete abolition of the People's Youth and the trade unions:

The basic organizations of the Communist League . . . have reached an impasse. From above they are requested to do something, and they do not know what to do! Indeed they have nothing to do in the old manner. The themes for the so-called educational-ideological work . . . are obsolete and tedious. . . . Complaints about frequent and barren meetings are a normal and daily occurrence. . . . In my opinion, they should hold meetings occasionally at long intervals. . . .

. . . Is there really any need for a centralized political youth organization of the kind that exists today?

And what about the trade unions?

In my opinion . . . professional Party, youth and other workers are superfluous.

In a subsequent article Djilas declared that during the period of the seizure of power, the old type of Communist Party had been necessary, but that today this kind of Party led inevitably to bureaucratism. What Djilas then proposed was the transformation of the Communist League from a centralized, disciplined Communist Party (which it had never ceased being despite the change in name) into a loose, undisciplined league of "ideologically close people." Meetings of the basic organizations would be held only "in exceptional cases;" they would be truly public and they would consist only of lectures. "No one would 'control' their work, nor would they 'receive the line,' but by discussing theses and lectures they would determine their own attitudes."

The present Communist League . . . would "wither away" as a classical party, while . . . the real, conscious, voluntary discipline of true Communists would be gaining in strength. The Communist League would be gradually gaining the character of powerful cores spread everywhere, and would be losing the character of a party. It would merge with the Socialist Alliance, and the Communist with the ordinary citizen.[19]

Whereas his colleagues rejected only Stalinism, Djilas was now ready to go much further and reject Leninism, particularly Lenin's concept of the Party:

[19] "League or Party?" *Borba*, January 4, 1954.

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> The basic thing in . . .[Lenin's] teaching is . . . his teaching about the state (. . . revolution) and . . . his teaching about the party. . . . These forms (a party of a certain type) were meant only for a certain period while the armed struggle for power was being prepared and while it continued in order to deprive the bourgeoisie of its power. . . . The essence of Stalinism lies in the fact that he has changed the revolutionary Leninist party, "consolidated" it, put it in the center as the only force of Socialist construction. . . . But even if Lenin's ideas and practice had remained unchanged in the course of a longer period of development, the result would be despotic forms resembling those of Stalin's. . . .
>
> The Leninist type of both party and state (dictatorship by means of the party) has become obsolete and must become obsolete everywhere and always . . . when the conditions of revolution cease, as soon as democracy actually comes into being.

These radical ideas, published in the official newspaper of the Communist League by one of the top men in the country, created heated discussion among Jugoslav Communists. Several newspapers published articles or letters expressing enthusiastic approval for Djilas's proposals. A writer who identified himself as "a Communist with 29 years of Party membership" endorsed Djilas's view that meetings of basic Party organizations were a waste of time, and predicted that "the Party . . . is headed for the museum."[20] A citizen of Bosnia reported that a majority of the people were "fully in agreement with Djilas's ideas," while another declared that Djilas's articles came "as powerful sunbeams shining upon our life and people."[21]

What did Djilas expect to accomplish? His popularity among certain elements of the Party and the enthusiastic response to his articles seem to have gone to his head. He apparently began to think of himself as a hero chosen by fate to lead the people of Jugoslavia from bureaucratic despotism to democratic Socialism. It is difficult to believe that Djilas could have been so blind as to think that he could replace Tito, but his conversation with Kardelj does indicate that he imagined himself as the leader of a second Socialist (or Communist) party, or at least as the head of a faction within the Party. There is no evidence, however, that Djilas was taking any practical steps to organize a faction.

Perhaps Djilas felt that he and his program were so popular among both Communists and non-Communists that Tito, Kardelj, Ranković and the other "defenders of bureaucracy" would be afraid to attack him. Having failed to win the Communist

[20] *Vjesnik u Srijedu*, Zagreb, January 6, 1954.
[21] *Oslobodjenje*, Sarajevo, January 8 and 9, 1954.

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leaders to his point of view at Brioni and after, Djilas appealed over their heads to the Communist rank and file. The majority of the Party, he apparently believed, would support his "democratic" aims in opposition to the "bureaucratic" policy of Tito. Tito would then be forced to adopt the "democratic" policy as his own or face a split in the Party.

The Party leadership was now in a quandary. To permit Djilas to continue publishing his heresies would add further to the confusion which reigned throughout the ranks of Communists. How serious this confusion was is shown by the fact that several members of the Central Committee of the Communist League later admitted that they had agreed with most of his ideas, and one confessed that he had even written an article propagating "Djilasism."[22]

Kardelj and Ranković spoke to Djilas in the early days of January and tried to bring him into line, but to no result. Tito was in Slovenia, trying to recover from an illness. What to do? To silence Djilas would reveal to the world the existence of a split at the very apex of the supposedly monolithic Communist League.

By this time Djilas apparently knew he was heading for a showdown, as he had been told by his fellow Montenegrin, Svetozar Vukmanović, that Tito did not approve of the article of December 27. Djilas's reaction was: "Will they convoke a plenum [of the Central Committee]?" But the prospect of being called before a meeting of the Central Committee did not bring him to a halt; it only spurred him to faster and more drastic action. He now prepared a new bombshell which removed any doubts which may have lingered in Tito's mind as to whether Djilas should be disciplined.

This bombshell took the form of a lengthy article entitled "The Anatomy of Morals" which Djilas secretly prepared and turned over to the printer without letting anyone see it except two or three intimates. It appeared on the streets in the January issue of *Nova Misao,* one of the top theoretical magazines in the country, and was promptly bought up by the public before Kardelj, Ranković, and apparently Tito, even knew of its existence. This article is probably the most devastating satire of top Communist society that has ever been published by a person currently belonging to it. The two chief characters were Djilas's Montenegrin friend, Colonel General Peko Dapčević, Chief of Staff of

[22] Krste Crvenkovski in *Borba,* January 19, 1954.

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the Jugoslav Army, and Milena Vrsajkov, the General's 21-year-old actress bride. Although no one was named in the article, these two were described with sufficient detail for the public to identify them, and Dapčević later said the identification was correct.[23]

"The Anatomy of Morals" was primarily a condemnation of the "caste" snobbishness of the wives of high government and Party functionaries. These "selfish monsters" who had once been heroic women, said Djilas, greeted Dapčević's young bride with "insidious hatred, scorn and icy boycott" because she was an actress and because she was not prominent in the Party. They also held it against her that she had not fought with the Partisans, in spite of the fact that she was only 13 at the end of the war.

While Djilas devoted most of his scorn to the wives of top Communist officials, he did not leave the husbands unscathed. His fellow members of the Central Committee must have burned at his references to the "closed world" which "had automobiles and Pullman cars, got its food and clothing from special stores, spent its holidays in special villas and summer resorts." This "inner circle," he said, maintained its solidarity "not so much from ideological and moral unity but rather from the same way of living and similar interests, from the nature of power and the manner in which it was attained."

The *Nova Misao* article was in a way the culmination of Djilas's attack on the whole Communist system in Jugoslavia. Greed, immorality, consciousness of rank and luxurious living were pictured by him as widespread among the Communist hierarchy. The heroes of the revolution, he said, had become not only despotic bureaucrats; they were also "sham aristocrats." In their private lives as well as in their official capacities, they were enemies of democracy. Djilas's piece of "political pornography" (as Moša Pijade called the article) constituted a frontal attack on the very Communist officials who would try his case. It was as if Djilas, in a final mad gesture, deliberately tried to rob himself of any support he may previously have had among the members of the Central Committee.

"The Anatomy of Morals" was the last straw. If Djilas had been worrying earlier that a Plenum of the Central Committee would be convoked to discuss his heresies, he must have known that this article made it inevitable. Tito's analysis of Djilas's actions at this point may very well be correct:

[23] Speech by Dapčević at the 3rd Plenum, *Politika*, January 19, 1954.

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Comrade Djilas was acquainted with my negative opinion before he published his latest article in *Nova Misao*. He published it in a rush. And what was to be achieved by it? . . . The intention was in fact to disqualify us, the "circle" which he attacked in *Nova Misao*, from the moral point of view. . . .[24]

There was no point in trying to cover up the dispute any longer. On January 10 *Borba* published an announcement declaring that the articles of Djilas were "contrary to the opinions of all other members of the Executive Committee." The whole subject, it was said, would be discussed at a forthcoming Plenum of the Central Committee.[25]

V

The Third Plenum at which heretic Djilas was put on trial was unlike other meetings of the Central Committee in that the proceedings were fully reported in the press and many of the speeches were broadcast over the radio. For two days various members of the Central Committee attacked Djilas, and only one defended him—his close friend, Vladimir Dedijer, the official biographer of Tito, and former member of the Jugoslav delegation to the United Nations.

The brunt of the attack was launched by Tito and Kardelj, with the other speakers mostly repeating or elaborating the same points. Tito made it clear at the beginning that Djilas's primary sin was his call for liquidation of the Communist League as presently constituted. But while criticizing Djilas on this point, Tito made the rather surprising admission that he himself had been the first to speak of the "withering away of the Party." He emphasized, however, that this would be a long process, not something which could take place in six months or a year or two. The Communist League, added Kardelj, could not be converted "into some sort of debate club without any internal discipline." Nor was Jugoslavia ready for a multi-party or two-party system, which Djilas was accused of favoring.

A disciplined Communist League is essential, said Tito, as long as it is still necessary to wage the class struggle. "Until the last class enemy is eliminated," he said, "until Socialist consciousness embraces the widest masses of our citizens at large, there can be

[24] First speech by Tito at the Third Plenum, *Borba*, January 18, 1954.

[25] The proceedings of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist League were reported in detail in the January–February 1954 issue of *Kommunist*. Most of the speeches were also published in *Borba*, January 18–21.

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no question of the . . . liquidation of the Communist League, because the Communist League is responsible for the fruits of the revolution." In the meantime, asserted Kardelj, the Communist League is the "exclusive expression of the interests of the whole of society."

Whereas Djilas had written with optimism about the acceptance of Socialism by the majority of the people, his critics found themselves in the rather awkward position of having to argue that most of the population were not behind the government. Kardelj emphasized especially the prevalence of anti-Communism among the peasants, who represent "over 65 percent of our population," in addition to the other "class enemies" in the cities. Tito and Kardelj both showed by their statements that they had not been fooled by the results of the national elections of November 1953, in which 85 percent of the voters had cast their ballots for the régime in supposedly free voting. They also admitted that the government depended upon coercion to maintain its rule and carry out its program. "We are forced," said Kardelj, "to retain even in economic relations, let alone in political life, certain elements of coercion in order to get away from old and backward ways as soon as possible." To extend democracy to the bourgeoisie, said Tito, would lead "to anarchy, to a terrible uncertainty . . . If we permitted this, in a year's time our Socialist reality would not exist; it would not exist, I tell you, without a bloody battle." On this particular point of popular opposition to the régime there seems little doubt the Djilas was the visionary optimist, while his opponents were the hard-headed realists.

While Djilas had emphasized throughout his articles the primary necessity of immediately extending democracy, his critics insisted that Socialism was a prerequisite for the further development of democracy. Djilas, said Kardelj, had put forward the old slogan: "First of all democracy, and only after that Socialism." "Such a slogan," said Kardelj, "is senseless, especially under our conditions where any kind of democracy is impossible without Socialism, even bourgeois democracy." "True democracy," said Tito, "cannot exist without Socialism nor Socialism without democracy. But to preach and write about democracy for the sake of democracy, and at that about democracy of the Western type—formal democracy—is going back to old forms rather than going forward."

To put such emphasis on democracy, said Kardelj, was espe-

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cially dangerous when, as in the case of Djilas, "democracy is reduced to the formula of free discussion." Such a proposal, he said, "means supporting petty-bourgeois-anarchic tendencies which are just as serious a hindrance for the development of Socialist democracy as bureaucratism itself."

Tito and Kardelj also accused Djilas of "reformistic opportunism" in the tradition of the famous revisionist of German Marxism, Eduard Bernstein. Djilas imitated Bernstein's ideas, they said, when he advocated the renunciation of Communism as a final goal. Djilas's ideas were not new, they said, but were merely a restatement of the well-known phrase of Bernstein: "The final goal of Socialism is nothing, evolution is everything." Djilas wished to renounce the goal of Communism, said Kardelj, because in fact he no longer desired Communism. By calling for the abandonment of Communism as the final goal he was "taking the compass from the hands of the Communists" and permitting the smuggling in of "various tendencies consciously or unconsciously aimed at disrupting or weakening the ideological unity of Communists."

Kardelj denied Djilas's charge that bureaucratism as a system had established itself in Jugoslavia:

> We have shattered gradually the bureaucratic system of the first years . . . by a number of measures of decentralization, by developing social self-government, by organizing workers' councils, by new methods of work in people's committees with producers' councils, by the democratic organizational mechanism of social management which will enable every citizen to decide on all questions of social life.

This, said Kardelj, was the way to build democracy and not, as Djilas seemed to say, "through intellectual arguments and disputes in debate clubs."

Other speakers at the Plenum painted a picture of an egotistical Djilas wasting his time in abstract theorizing about freedom and democracy while his comrades wore themselves out day after day in the concrete job of building Socialism. Djilas, they charged, was "an intellectual with his head in the clouds" who refused to tackle any of the practical tasks in the political or economic administration, and who consequently had lost touch with Jugoslav reality. He had come under the influence of Western ideas, they said, through his trips abroad and his friendship with Aneurin Bevan, who had been his guest the previous year.[26]

[26] Speech by Petar Stambolić at the Third Plenum, as reported in *Borba*, January 19, 1954.

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In contrast with most Communist trials, the accused in this case did not make much of a confession; in fact his first statement was hardly a confession at all. The second day he was more contrite, and admitted that if he had continued with the articles, he "would have become the leader of the Opposition against Tito." But he still defended his principal ideas.

The only one to take Djilas's side was Vladimir Dedijer. He threw some rather bitter taunts at his fellow members of the Central Committee:

> I am no robot to accept a matter immediately only because of the authority of the man who said it. . . .
>
> A week ago Milovan Djilas's postulates in *Borba* were more or less adopted by the majority of us who are sitting here. . . .
>
> Then, all of a sudden . . . the Executive Committee made an announcement that it disagreed with Milovan Djilas's articles. All at once the very same people who approved of these articles are attacking Milovan Djilas fiercely. . . .
>
> . . . How can we think one thing today and all of a sudden change our opinion overnight?

No one supported Dedijer; in fact, Djilas himself immediately repudiated his speech. The Plenum then voted to expel Djilas from membership in the Central Committee, to relieve him of all functions in the Communist League and to give him a reprimand. Djilas himself resigned from the Presidency of the People's Assembly. The constituency in Montenegro which had elected him to the Assembly with the record figure of 99.9 percent of the votes now demanded his recall. Three months later Djilas unexpectedly took the further step of resigning from membership in the Communist League.[27]

Neither Djilas nor Dedijer has been executed or even imprisoned. Djilas moved from his villa to a modest apartment, where he is living with his wife and son on a government pension. In August 1953, an article by Dedijer appeared in the official magazine, *Review of International Affairs*.

VI

What conclusions can be drawn from the Djilas episode?

One thing clear is that Tito is still the boss. No decisive action was taken to curb Djilas until Tito entered the scene, but once Tito had spoken the entire Central Committee excepting Dedijer

[27] *The New York Times*, April 22, 1954.

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was against Djilas. There is probably a considerable amount of "collective leadership," *i.e.* collective decision-making and division of responsibility within the Jugoslav hierarchy. But the Djilas affair confirms the impression that Tito's voice carries by far the greatest weight.

It is probably safe to speculate that the Djilas affair will lead to a slowing up of the liberalization program of the past few years, in spite of official protestations to the contrary. Liberalization has led to deviation, even among members of the Central Committee, and it would be logical for Tito to conclude that there has been too much of it. The masses of the people, and many Communists, automatically welcome any relaxation of the dictatorship; a taste of democracy whets the appetite for more. Hence the Djilas affair will probably lead to a tightening up of discipline not only in the Communist League but in Jugoslav life generally. The fact that Djilas could publicly deviate from the official line over a period of several weeks indicates a certain laxness in controls at the top level, and measures will doubtless be taken to prevent a recurrence. At the Fourth Plenum in March 1954, Ranković announced that somebody would be put in charge of "guiding" publishing activities.

The heresy of Djilas also shows that, despite their denials, some of the top Jugoslav leaders are being influenced by the West. They have taken many small steps in the direction of Western democracy, although they balked when Djilas wanted to take a big step. They are frightened by the mere thought that they might be abandoning Marxism and approaching "bourgeois democracy," but the past five years have shown that they can take Western influence in small doses, a bit at a time.

The conduct of the trial itself is an indication of the differences which exist between Jugoslav and Soviet Communism. The treatment which Djilas got would be inconceivable in Russia. His articles would never have been published, the trial would not have been as genuine, the accused would not have gotten off with only half a confession, and he would no longer be alive. The contrast with the treatment accorded Beria could hardly be greater.

The Djilas case is, further, a demonstration of the difficulties which the Jugoslav leaders are having in finding a new kind of "Socialist democracy" which is supposed to be different from both Soviet Communism and Western democracy. With no other models to go by, there is always a temptation for them either to

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continue to imitate Soviet methods or to move in the direction of Western democracy, although actually they want to copy neither. The disillusionment resulting from their ejection from the Cominform has enabled them to see many of the faults of Stalinist Communism and they have tried to break away from this despotic pattern in a number of minor ways. But they have refused to see, as Djilas did, that Stalinism is a natural outgrowth of the undemocratic nature of Leninism. Djilas was the only one of the top leaders who was honest enough to admit that the fundamental basis of Soviet "bureaucratic despotism" is Leninist vanguardism—the concentration of all power in the hands of a centralized, disciplined Party, which in turn is controlled by a small group of Party hierarchs.

In his attacks Djilas pointed up once again the old conflict inherent in attempts to introduce democratic Socialism in a backward peasant country. The Jugoslav Communists, like their Russian predecessors, are determined to build a Marxian society based on Socialist ownership, economic planning and materialist philosophy. But the majority of the Jugoslav people want private ownership, free enterprise and freedom of thought. Hence the government cannot permit democracy. Since the people will not freely choose Communism, it must be imposed upon them by force. The leaders assume that after a transitional period (which is not expected to last very long), the people will voluntarily support the government's program. But as Djilas pointed out, the very process of imposing Communism by force antagonizes the people still further and indefinitely postpones the day when democracy can be permitted.

In imposing Marxism the Communists sacrifice democracy, and once democracy has been suppressed it is difficult to turn back. It is on this essential point that the Jugoslav leaders have not broken away from the Stalinist pattern. As long as the people are not permitted freely to elect or reject their rulers, Jugoslav Communism will remain basically similar to Soviet Communism. Until that time comes, all "democratic reforms" in Jugoslovia exist only at the whim of the rulers and can be withdrawn at their pleasure. The Jugoslav régime may be a liberalized dictatorship, but as Djilas came to see, it is still a dictatorship.

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THE WONDER OF DIPLOMACY

By Lindsay Rogers

MEMOIRS OF THE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND. Edited, with a Preface and Notes, by the Duc de Broglie. Translated by Raphaël Ledos de Beaufort. With an Introduction by Whitelaw Reid. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1891.

ONE should not keep on placing every question of principle or every practical question in the light of suspicion," exclaimed Andrei Vishinsky during the first General Assembly of the United Nations, in London in 1946, when the good faith of some of his remarks had been questioned. "It reminds me of a story (I do not know how true it is) of the days of the Congress of Vienna. It is said that when Talleyrand's death was announced, a diplomat, who heard about it, asked: 'But what were Talleyrand's real intentions?' "

The record does not disclose that any of Mr. Vishinsky's fellow delegates told him that the story was apocryphal. Death interfered only once with the Congress of Vienna and then not seriously. The octogenarian Prince de Ligne (author of the much quoted jest, *"Le Congrès ne marche pas, mais il danse"*), keeping a midnight street corner assignation, caught cold and got pneumonia. Talleyrand lived on for a third of a century and his last achievement, as French Ambassador in London, was a fitting climax to his career. He helped to arrange—one may even say that he engineered—the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands and its creation as an independent state.

Moreover, the Vishinsky story could have had no point whatever if applied to a successful diplomatist, let alone the man whom Lord Acton called "one of the wonders of modern politics." When he defined an ambassador as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country," Sir Henry Wotton was punning. The man would have to live abroad, but he would not cease to be honest. In the days when diplomacy sought agreements between states—and was not concerned as it now so often seems to be with propaganda victories in the market place of international conferences—foreign ministers and their ambassadors could practise deceit only at great peril. A lie might effect a temporary success

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but the resulting distrust would insure a later failure. Hence in diplomacy honesty was the best policy. In his last public utterance, at the French Academy in March 1838, two months before his death, Talleyrand declared that no matter how outstanding an ambassador's or a foreign minister's abilities, "they may prove insufficient if good faith does not give them the guarantee that they almost always need. I must say this here in order to destroy a misconception that is ofttimes quite widespread. No! Diplomacy is not a science of stratagem and duplicity." The representatives of foreign states with whom he dealt could always trust Talleyrand's word. Otherwise he would not have been a political wonder. He was something of a wonder also in fields other than politics.

Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord was born in Paris, February 13, 1754. He came of an old and illustrious but not too well-heeled family whose position at the court could nevertheless guarantee offices to care for its sons. While he was still an infant the boy's nurse dropped him; an injury to a foot was neglected, and Charles-Maurice was crippled for life. Since he was unfitted for a military career, his parents deprived him of his rights of primogeniture and almost washed their hands of him. "I am, perhaps," Talleyrand wrote, "the only man of distinguished birth and belonging to a numerous and highly esteemed family who never enjoyed, for a week of his life, the joy of living beneath the parental roof." Against his will the parents forced Talleyrand to enter the church. With the backing of the court a young Abbé of such distinguished ancestry could soon be Archbishop of Paris or a Cardinal. But Talleyrand was more interested in wild oats than in theology or church ritual, and only the dying request of his father to Louis XVI (with the mother pleading against such a disgrace to the church) moved the King to appoint the Abbé Bishop of Autun. He was then nearly 35 years of age but he had, nevertheless, already learned a good deal about the art of rising.

In 1780, he had been appointed one of two Agents General of the clergy of France. His colleague was lazy, so Talleyrand gained a good deal of experience in administering the wealthy corporation that the clergy formed and whose affairs, in contrast to those of the government, were well conducted. His perquisites as Agent General, the income from two abbeys, and now the revenue of the bishopric made Talleyrand a wealthy man. He visited his see to be consecrated, stayed there a month, and never returned.

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Great political events were impending. The King had summoned the Estates General which had not met since 1614, and the Bishop of Autun wished to be chosen by his clergy to represent them in the First Estate. He made them a speech setting forth the grievances he thought needed correction, and his constituents used his remarks almost verbatim when they prepared a *cahier* of their views for Talleyrand to take to Paris. It was not the last time that he was to draft his own instructions. In the Estates General, the Bishop of Autun proposed a bill to secularize church property, to strip the church of its vast wealth, and make it a spiritual power in a laic society. The state would pay the priests and administer the charities: in other words nationalization rather than expropriation. Talleyrand also brought forward a grandiose scheme for the reform of public education, and in February 1790 was elected President of the Assembly by a large majority.

But the positions of Catholic ecclesiastic and revolutionary leader were clearly incompatible; and when the Assembly defied the Vatican and required the clergy to swear allegiance to the new constitution, Talleyrand resigned his bishopric. The Pope formally excommunicated him but Talleyrand viewed the act tranquilly and continued to keep his public duties from interfering with his life of pleasure. The ex-bishop, said a report to President George Washington, was being blamed "not so much for adultery, because that was common enough among the clergy of high rank, but for the variety and publicity of his amours, for gambling and above all for stock jobbing . . ." The writer was Governeur Morris and he should have been in a position to know, for at the time he was paying strenuous court to a lady by whom Talleyrand had had a son.

The new constitution made the Assembly's members ineligible for places in the new legislature. They were barred also from posts in the Ministry. Talleyrand, therefore, had insufficient opportunities to use his talents, and anyway he thought that the probable turn of events might make it wise for him to absent himself from the country. So in 1792 he went on a semi-official mission to London, and a few months later was made head of an official mission. But after Louis XVI was executed (January 21, 1793), Pitt expelled him from the country and Talleyrand sought refuge in the United States. "Thirty-two different religions and only one course at dinner," he is supposed to have said. "If I have to stay here another year, I shall die," he wrote Madame de Staël. In 1795 he

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returned by slow stages to Paris where, with some assistance from Madame de Staël he became in 1797 Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Directory, a post which save for an interval of four months he was to hold for ten years.

"Society," Talleyrand once wrote, "is divided into two classes: the shearers and the shorn. We should always be with the former against the latter." His eye was always on the main chance; he was never careless of his own interest and always tried to be on the successful side. Hence when he foresaw that the days of the Directory were numbered, he decided not to fall with it and resigned his post in 1799. He correctly anticipated that Napoleon, whom he had been cultivating, would draw more and more power into his hands. Four months later he aided him during the Brumaire coup d'état and was rewarded with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1804, he became Grand Chamberlain and two years later was made Prince of Benevento. But he was far from happy. His advice was frequently better than the actions that Napoleon took, and he was compelled to carry out decisions of which he thoroughly disapproved.

In 1807, after Tilsit, Talleyrand resigned his office as Grand Chamberlain and left the Cabinet, but Napoleon took him to Erfurt the following year where the former minister intrigued with the Russian Emperor for a softer policy towards Austria. "Sire, it is in your power to save Europe," Talleyrand said, "and you will accomplish that only by refusing to give way to Napoleon. The French people are civilized; their sovereign is not. The sovereign of Russia is civilized and his people are not: thus the sovereign of Russia must be the ally of the French people." The French people wanted but one thing—to enjoy the fruits of conquest and to be done with further wars. Only Napoleon and his military men took a contrary view, and they knew that in Paris Talleyrand headed a group that espoused moderate policies; that in this context, he had publicly associated himself with the Minister of Police, Fouché—an alliance that Napoleon might well have thought as formidable as an Austrian mobilization. Why was there no purging? Perhaps Napoleon's confidence in himself was too complete: no intriguers would be able to put real obstacles in *his* path. Perhaps he thought that Talleyrand could still be useful to him and later he did make some overtures. At St. Helena, Napoleon said that if he had only hanged both Talleyrand and Fouché he would still be on the throne of France. That could have

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been true only if immediately thereafter he had acted on Talleyrand's advice. Instead he spurned the advice, allowed his former Grand Chamberlain to continue in the honorable and lucrative sinecure post of "vice grand elector," and contented himself with invective.

Why did Talleyrand seem so indispensable? What led Lord Acton to describe him as "the most intelligent man in the Empire?" Talleyrand thought that his theological studies, neglected though they had been, had improved his mind and had given it not only "strength, but at the same time subtlety in reasoning." He was widely read but after his formal studies were over, he was "self taught in lonely silence." He could use only his own judgment on the author he was reading. The method, which worked for him, "enlightened" his mind "but never enslaved it." In other words, he avoided a danger that George Savile, Marquess of Halifax, warned against: "Men who borrow their Opinions can never repay their Debts. They are Beggars by Nature, and can therefore never get a Stock to grow rich upon."

Moreover, Talleyrand knew that a "Stock" was absolutely indispensable to anyone who tried to shape policy. As early as 1792 he noted that while the details of the reigns of Henry IV and Louis XIV were fairly well known, "recent events appear confused and problematical, even to the very men who played a part in them; they followed each other with such rapidity, that each in turn almost stamped out the recollection of what had occurred before." This seems to be a description of our own times, and it is a counsel on which present-day statesmen might well reflect. Talleyrand never forgot it, and, as his years in office increased and his comprehension grew, he took care that no one would ever put to him Frederick the Great's question to his generals: "What is the value of experience if you do not reflect on it?"

Voltaire asserted that French was more suitable than any other tongue for meaningful and unambiguous conversation. It permitted great flexibility without sacrificing precision and it could be firm without neglecting courtesy. For these reasons it became the language of diplomacy. (It was the only official language at the Congress of Vienna; there were two languages at Paris in 1919 and five in San Francisco in 1945. When Germany is admitted to the United Nations, there will be six.) Talleyrand was a master of his tongue. He never lectured and his auditors never endured what a Trollope character described as "the verdure and malle-

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ability of pupildom." He was incomparable in using only a few words to express a thought, to sum up a situation, or to make a neat riposte. People like him, Albert Sorel said, do not cite; they speak in order to be cited. And Talleyrand did so deliberately. In his "Memoirs" he recounts some derogatory remarks he made about the Finance Minister, M. Necker, and adds: "I said, I believe, a thousand other things that it would be useless to repeat, because today they are on everybody's lips." But such a strategy can be dangerous. Those who are much cited suffer from having *bons mots* falsely attributed to them. And it is possible to get on when one's remarks live only for the moment. After Metternich had served his apprenticeship as Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Napoleon said to him: "You have succeeded here because you do not talk and people cannot quote any saying of yours." But Talleyrand's talk was so good that it helped him to get on.

But Lord Acton's high opinion of Talleyrand's intelligence was based most of all on the views the Frenchman held concerning the foreign policy his country should have. He had formed them early and they remained unchanged. They were the views of a good Frenchman who was also a good European. While he was the foreign minister of two conquering governments, he publicly lent his skill to consolidating the spoils of war, and he privately condemned such excesses. In December 1792, writing from London, he gave it as his opinion that France's territory could not be extended without risking the happiness of her people. In a report to the Directory just five years later he said: "In truth, what is a military capitulation? It is a temporary contract between two parties who remain enemies. What then is a treaty of peace? It is one which, settling generally points in dispute, not only makes a state of peace succeed a state of war, but allows friendship to take the place of hatred. Now all the powers with which we have treaties are not only our secret enemies but remain in a coalition against us." He wrote this with the Treaty of Campo-Formio in mind, but could say the same things of treaties that followed.

He saw no point in a war whose end would create a situation more unfavorable than the situation the war had been intended to correct. In his view, this was a disastrous use of the instrument that Clausewitz later defined as "a continuation of policy by other means." He realized that, as the English historian Herbert Butterfield has put it, "the most essential thing of all is to guard against the kind of war which, if you win it absolutely, will pro-

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duce another 'predicament' worse than the one you started with." He knew the falsity of the slogan, "There is no substitute for victory," and never forgot as American generals and statesmen did in 1945 that, although their first job was to wage war, they must also think about the continuation of policy when the "other means" had been successful. Talleyrand always desired a "Dominion over palm and pine" that would let "the Captains and the Kings depart."

In 1814, therefore, Talleyrand wanted no more of Napoleon and sought the return of Louis XVIII. Even though, during his long exile, the new king had watched the workings of the British Government (which Talleyrand greatly admired) he had not sufficiently learned that the French monarch must now reign rather than govern. He was not a heroic figure—quite fat, and nicknamed *Louis des Huitres*—but in Talleyrand's view, "only the House of Bourbon could cause France nobly to conform once more to the happy limits indicated by policy and by nature. With the House of Bourbon, France would cease to be gigantic in order to become great." There would be an end to the "folly of surrounding the Empire with a girdle of helpless Bonapartes."

When the Allies reached Paris on the last day of March, Talleyrand was ready. The Senate convened, set up a provisional government with him as its head, pronounced the overthrow of Napoleon, restored the Bourbons, and adopted a Constitutional Charter which, however, in its restrictions on the press was more reactionary than Talleyrand thought wise. Nevertheless, he could at Vienna proclaim his famous principle of "legitimacy:" France's Government was accepted by the country; the proof of this was that it could tolerate an opposition, and it should, therefore, be a full partner in the peace that was about to be made.

How at Vienna Talleyrand took advantage of differences of opinion between the Four Allies (Austria, England, Prussia and Russia), insinuated himself into their councils, and procured a settlement far more favorable than France had dared hope for has been told and retold in many monographs; the most recent and not the least eloquent is Sir Harold Nicolson's "The Congress of Vienna." As Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII, the peace was to be judged by the way in which the peoples of the Allies viewed it. In St. Petersburg and Berlin, the Russian Emperor and the Prussian King had met with cold receptions because the Treaty disappointed their subjects. "France had everywhere raised huge

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contributions for the cost of the war; there was the expectation that the like would be levied on her; she did not have to pay any; she kept possession of art treasures she had seized; all her monuments were respected; in short, France was treated with a moderation to which, under similar circumstances, no period of history furnishes a parallel." France's frontiers were those of 1792.

But satisfaction was short-lived. Talleyrand had over-estimated the "legitimacy" of the Bourbon Government. Discontent had become rife and when Napoleon returned from Elba, troops sent to oppose him espoused his cause. Louis XVIII fled; Napoleon began his "Hundred Days" (March 20–June 29, 1815), confronted vast European armies, engaged those under the command of the Duke of Wellington, and the phrase, "He met his Waterloo," became part of the English language. Napoleon abdicated and Louis XVIII returned to Paris "in the baggage of the Allies." Talleyrand became President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs and formed a government of moderate men. But the Chamber that was elected proved more royalist than the King. Talleyrand feared that "legitimacy" would again become attenuated and, foreseeing that the terms of the peace were likely to be harsh, he did not wish to incur odium by signing them. So he told the King that, lacking the support of the Chamber, he must insist on unequivocal assurances of His Majesty's confidence or offer his resignation. Louis surprised him by saying: "Very well, I shall have a new government." The terms of the Treaty were indeed harsh, although it is doubtful whether Talleyrand could have softened them much. They made France pay an indemnity, deprived her of territory, and ordered the return of the art treasures that had been looted.

Shortly after his resignation, Talleyrand was given the post of Grand Chamberlain—a dignified and well paid sinecure. He thought that he would not be out of power for long but, during the 15 years that they had left, the Bourbons, whom he had twice helped to restore to the throne, failed to restore him. In the end Talleyrand had his revenge. He helped finance the movement against Charles X; told the Duke of Orleans that he should be prepared to head it; and advised him to accept when he was offered the leadership. The July Revolution ushered in the reign of Louis Philippe, and for him, France and Europe Talleyrand undertook his last public service.

During the 15 years he had been made to wait he worked on his

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"Memoirs." His will stipulated that they should not appear until 30 years after his death and then only if they could "be published without inconvenience to anyone." His heirs and trustees delayed 20 years longer, and there were rumors that this was because earlier publication would blast the reputations of persons still living. When the volumes did begin to appear it was found that they contained no *chroniques scandaleuses* and nothing explosive politically. There is much sound advice to men who may want to be statesmen but there are few important contributions to history.

Since Talleyrand must have realized that he would make no startling revelations, why did he insist that publication be postponed? A possible explanation is that he hoped for a reappraisal by historians whose passions had not been stirred by events through which they had lived. Down to his death, and for some time after it, Talleyrand drew floods of invective and calumny. Critics like Chateaubriand had made up their minds and no memoirs would change them. Shortly before the Prince's death, George Sand, made confident by the success of "Lélia," published a vicious article in the *Revue des Duex Mondes*. Victor Hugo was about to enter the lists and Balzac's "Les Secrets de la princesse de Cadignan" proved to be a *roman à clef* with the Princess modelled on Dorothea, the Duchess of Dino, who at 15 had married Talleyrand's nephew and who, five years later, transferred her affections to the older man and remained with him until his death. Sainte-Beuve's bitter essay, published in 1870, dealt only with what Albert Sorel, the ablest French historian of the period, called the Prince's "infirmities" and ignored him as "the statesman and the negotiator."

Twenty years later, the critics had at their disposal a wealth of material on Talleyrand. The correspondence between Louis XVIII and his Minister in Vienna had been published, and no one who read it could maintain that the man who wrote to the King had not been a statesman, and that he had been wrong either in his estimate of "the *true* interests of France" or in his conviction that they had never been "contrary to the *true* interests of Europe." Sorel, dealing with the fact that the negotiators at Vienna had been unanimous in ignoring their speckled pasts and in uttering pious hopes for the future, was of the opinion that "in this spontaneous regeneration the former Bishop of Autun found himself the most pure and the most immaculate of those who came out of the baptismal waters."

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True it was that, while in office under the Directory, Talleyrand opposed their measures and plotted for Napoleon's success. As the Emperor's Foreign Minister he served him to the best of his ability and betrayed him with skill and without shame; he conspired with Russia and Austria to defeat Napoleon's plans and looked to the return of the Bourbons. While he was Louis XVIII's principal minister, he planned for his overthrow and the accession of Louis Philippe, but there is much truth in his boast: "I have never conspired in my life, except at those times when I had the majority of France for an accomplice, and when I sought with her, the salvation of the country."

There was much truth also in what, during the twilight of his life, he said to Lamartine: "I have never given evil counsel to a Government or a Prince; but I do not share their fall. After shipwrecks there must be pilots to save the victims. My pretended crimes are the dreams of imbeciles. Has a clever man ever the need to commit a crime? Crime is the resource of the political half-wits. I have had weaknesses, some would say vices, but crimes, *fi donc.*"

When Louis Philippe became King in 1830, his first need was the friendship of older and more obviously legitimate governments, and of these England was the most important. Talleyrand refused the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs but accepted the Ambassadorship to London and remained there until the autumn of 1834. At Vienna, statesmen had underestimated—they may not have been sufficiently aware of—the threatening fires of nationalism that Napoleon had done so much to kindle. (Nowadays it seems as if every little language must have a nation all its own.) By 1830 it appeared that the Congress of Vienna had been less than judicious in blending Belgium with Holland under the House of Orange in order to have an efficient sentinel on France's northern border. The Belgians were Catholics and the Dutch Protestants; they spoke different languages. Belgium could not go to France because then, in Napoleon's phrase, Antwerp would be a pistol pointed at the head of England and this England would never permit. Independence was therefore the answer.

Only one or two details of how a peaceful settlement was arranged need concern us here. A cartoon of Talleyrand and Palmerston carried the caption, "The Lame Leading the Blind." This was gross exaggeration, for the French Ambassador described "Pam" as perhaps the cleverest man with whom he had ever nego-

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tiated. But on one crucial question the old veteran led the younger man. Who would occupy the throne of the new Kingdom? The Belgians wanted Louis Philippe's younger son, but Talleyrand persuaded the King to refuse the offer. His own candidate was George IV's son-in-law, the brother of the future Queen Victoria's mother, "Uncle" Leopold of Saxe-Coburg—a house which, as Crane Brinton has said, was "destined in the nineteenth and even in the twentieth century to provide the best of constitutional monarchs in all countries of Europe where its luck at marriage carried it."

In discussing the question with Palmerston, the Ambassador manœuvred the conversation so that the British minister brought up the name first. "I showed some astonishment," Talleyrand wrote, "but my astonishment had the air of a happy discovery." The more Palmerston thought over his idea the more he liked it. The Ambassador had demonstrated the truth of the maxim that "diplomacy is the art of letting the other fellow have your way." In this restricted sense the art seems for the time being to have become obsolete. Nevertheless those of the Western World who are charged with international negotiations can learn much from Talleyrand's "Memoirs" even though written history has long since put into capsule form their revelations of substance.

"In the days of the old diplomacy," wrote Sir Harold Nicolson, "it would have been an act of unthinkable vulgarity to appeal to the common people upon any issue of international policy," and noted that it was Canning who, in 1826, was the first to identify what he called "the fatal artillery of popular excitation." Now the telegraph, telephone, teletype, radio and popular press combine to introduce into the relations between states an element that the old chancelleries sought to banish: passion. Governments can no longer give their ambassadors instructions and hope that they will drive the best possible bargain. Foreign Ministers—and Prime Ministers—must be on the scene in person; press conferences and television appearances seem to them as important as what they are to say to their opposite numbers, and, having committed themselves in public speech, they find that they have enslaved themselves for the conference table. Sometimes their legislatures enslave them before they set out on their missions. Talleyrand and Palmerston could practise the old diplomacy and they separated Belgium from Holland. There is no statue of Talleyrand in Brussels; but there is none in Paris either.

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THE FRENCH PRIEST-WORKERS

By Robert F. Byrnes

DURING the fall and winter of 1953–1954, the case of the French priest-workers, or the "priests of the worker mission," created much controversy in France and considerable interest abroad. It illuminates the deep divisions which plague French political and social life and some of the perils which confront those who seek to struggle against Communism within its strongholds in the working class world. Above all, it suggests the enormous power which the combination of misery and Marxism has in France.

Early in World War II, a Paris priest, Father Godin, came to the conclusion that most of the workers in France were pagan and that their attitudes and ideas reflected a spiritual and intellectual vacuum. Godin recognized that these developments derived from the long-term decline of Christianity in France, but he concluded that the de-Christianization of the country was greatest among the workers, many of whom had grown up in a tradition which had for several generations been completely divorced from any knowledge of or interest in religious faith. He and a few associates discovered, for example, that some churches in the industrial suburbs of Paris had no parishioners, that only four of 19,000 men employed in one industrial complex were practising Catholics, and that in some port and mining cities virtually none of the workers were Catholic. Godin wrote a book in 1943 which stated that France was so de-Christianized that it should be declared a mission country, with missionaries sent to live and labor among the workers in particular. He believed that the workers were beyond immediate conversion, but that they would make the first steps back toward Christianity if priests worked in the ports, mines and factories, dressing as the workers did, living in workers' homes, and demonstrating that the clergy were willing to share the workers' hardships. At the same time, the priests were to celebrate Mass, read the office, and otherwise live a priestly life, though they were to have no parish duties. They would, in other words, serve as living examples of Christianity among the workers, who were not so much anti-Christian as simply divorced from and ignorant of Christianity.

Cardinal Suhard, the Archbishop of Paris, independently reached the same conclusions as Father Godin. Father Godin's book brought the two men together and led in July 1943 to the assignment of 25 volunteer priests to factories in the Paris "Red Belt." Later, missions to other port, factory and mining cities were established, and a seminary was opened at Lisieux (this was later moved to Limoges) to train priests for these missions. By 1953, there were about 150 secular and 25 regular priests, the latter mostly Dominicans and Jesuits, involved in this operation, and the Limoges seminary was training about 200 students in a special five-year program. This campaign caused considerable enthusiasm among French Catholics, especially those in the center and on the lively left wing, who saw it as the glorious beginning of the revival of Catholicism, as proof that the Church was returning to the French workers, and as an alternative to international Communism.

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By 1951, there were signs that many conservative Catholics, a few members of the French hierarchy, and some Vatican officials were becoming alarmed about the priest-worker movement. Many conservatives were persuaded that some of these priests were neglecting their spiritual duties and that many were coming to believe that political and social reform were as important as their goal of evangelism. These conservatives were also impressed by the radical economic and social programs advocated by the lay Catholic journals which supported the priest-workers, notably *Esprit, Témoignage Chrétien* and *Quinzaines,* which had strong Marxist tones. They were alarmed by the fact that the priest-workers had shown great sympathy for the workers and even for the Communists, and that they were critical of the government and of French employers for tolerating the conditions under which the workers lived. Some of these priests were officials in the Communist-controlled trade union federation, the C.G.T., and as union officials made strong public statements criticizing the government, French industrialists and French capitalism and supporting political and economic changes which were advocated by the Communists. Since some of these statements had a very radical and even a Marxist tone (it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a Marxist tirade from even a papal encyclical), many French conservatives came to believe that these priests had been heavily and even fatally influenced by the environment in which they were living and working and that they had indeed become Marxists, if not Communists. They concluded, in other words, that the workers were influencing the priests more than the priests were the workers.

These worries increased in 1952 when one priest-worker left the Church, when two were arrested for participating in the anti-Ridgway demonstrations, and when numerous others signed Communist "peace" petitions and attended "peace" congresses in France and abroad. In April 1953, 16 priest-workers signed an appeal for the release of Benoit Frachon, a Communist leader who had been arrested. In August 1953, 11 supported the C.G.T. strike, while five defended the C.G.T. as "faithful to the real interests of the proletariat" and denounced the Catholic trade-union federation, the C.F.T.C., as a tool of the capitalists and a traitor to the workers' interests.

The French hierarchy generally seems to have had a sympathetic understanding of the priest-worker problem and not to have been seriously alarmed by these developments, although in 1951 it decided not to increase the size of the incoming classes at Limoges. However, some important officials in the Vatican apparently became seriously disturbed. There are indications that some lay and clerical French Catholics sent private reports to the Vatican concerning these priests' "transgressions." To the Vatican, the priest-worker movement and some of the ideas advocated by the program's defenders probably appeared a kind of social and economic modernism,[1] an offspring of the theological doctrine condemned 50 years ago by Pius X. In addition, since the movement operated outside the regular channels

[1] Modernism has been defined as a body of methods and tendencies in the field of Scripture, apologetics, dogma, history and ethics seeking to adapt the teachings of the Catholic Church to the conclusions reached by modern scientific and critical research. Pius X, who was recently canonized, condemned it for substituting purely subjective criteria in matters of faith and morals for the authority of the Church.

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of the church organization, it attracted the attention of those who would have been suspicious of any irregular program. Finally, in modern times, there has been a great deal of suspicion in Rome concerning intellectual developments among French Catholics, who are considered the most lively and "dangerous" in the Church.

In any case, in the summer of 1953, apparently on orders of the papal nuncio, Monsignor Marella, the Limoges seminary was closed "temporarily," the seminarians were forbidden to work in the summer in industrial installations as they had in the past, and recruitment for the Paris mission was ended. After Cardinals Liénart, Feltin and Gerlier made a dramatic trip to Rome in November 1953, it was revealed that the French hierarchy had been under heavy pressure from the Vatican throughout the fall to end the priest-worker program and that the three Cardinals had made their almost unprecedented trip to salvage at least part of the program. A compromise agreement was reached at Rome. This agreement declared: (1) All priest-workers were to be selected by their bishops. (2) Each candidate would receive prolonged special spiritual and doctrinal training. (3) No priest-worker could work more than three hours a day. (4) No priest-worker could become either an officer or a member of a trade union. (5) Each priest-worker was to live in a parish or a religious community and to live a normal parish or community life.

Since it is almost impossible for a worker to obtain industrial work in France for only three hours a day, and since most jobs require trade-union membership, this agreement in effect ended the priest-worker movement.

The November agreement was followed by a series of other acts carried out from Rome. In December 1953, the ten Dominican priest-workers were ordered to abandon their mission work, the Dominican provincials in Paris, Lyon and Toulouse "resigned" their offices, and four prominent liberal Dominican publicists were removed from Paris and ordered to cease publication. These moves against the Dominicans caused particular dissatisfaction to French Catholics, because the Dominicans have provided the chief spark for Catholic intellectuals since the 1840's. The seven Jesuit priest-workers were recalled in January 1954. Late in January, the November 1953 agreement was confirmed by the assembled French bishops, and the priest-workers were ordered to accept the agreement by March 1, 1954.

Seventy-three of the priest-workers signed an open letter on February 13 which, in language resembling that of the Communist Manifesto, denounced the order and declared that it was dictated by conservative political interests. (This was categorically denied.) A series of sincere and moving published letters between groups of priest-workers and their superiors followed, with both groups presenting their arguments and appealing to each other and the public for support. As March 1 approached, it became obvious that a good many of the priests would not submit before the deadline. It is clear that the hierarchy adopted a conciliatory line, and that few if any threats of canonical punishment were made. Approximately 35 priests had not submitted ten days after the deadline, and apparently eight or ten were still holding out three weeks after March 1. By late March, it was impossible for the public press to obtain information concerning these priests. One

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priest (Father Gouttebarge in Saint-Etienne) defied the order and was elected to a high regional post in the C.G.T. There may have been other intransigents, but probably almost all submitted.

These events created a considerable stir throughout France and elsewhere on the Continent. Most of the Catholic press, lay as well as clerical, was extremely critical of the order and defended the priest-worker program, and the radical Catholic press was particularly outspoken in its comment. Papers such as *Le Monde* and *Figaro* gave great prominence to the issue, and Gallicanism for a while again became popular. The Communist press supported the priest-workers, and *Humanité* sought to persuade them to refuse to obey the order. The issue attracted little attention in the United States, but it does have considerable significance.

To begin with, the failure of the priest-worker campaign marks the end of another of the promising attempts to reform France which began during and after World War II. This attempt, it should be noted, lasted longer than most of the others, but it failed. It reflected some of the same forces and ideas which led to the establishment of the M.R.P., the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire,* which began under the German occupation as a movement for spiritual and social reform and at the close of the war became a political party almost accidentally. The M.R.P. and the strong postwar influence of Catholic democrats in France derive from the small but vital prewar democratic stock provided by the C.F.T.C., the Catholic Action groups, and the *Démocrates Populaires* and the *Jeune République,* the small but genuinely progressive democratic Catholic parties of the 1930's. They sprang also from the splendid Resistance rôle of Catholics and of Catholic organizations. However, at the time of liberation, the M.R.P. was small and poorly organized, and lacked even plans for its future. Although in August 1945 it had only 100,000 dues-paying members, it polled 4,500,000 votes and elected 150 deputies in the October elections to the First Constituent Assembly. This party, the party of Bidault and Schuman, which has played a critical rôle in the past ten years, has sought to resolve the political and economic problems which have divided France, to end the old quarrel between *les deux France,* and to have France lead Western Europe to renewed strength and unity.

The growing conservatism of the M.R.P. and the cancellation of the priest-worker program reflect the decline, if not the failure, of the Catholic political and social left. While the majority of French Catholics now appear reconciled to the Republic, it seems likely that the M.R.P. will become just another conservative party. Moreover, the reform spark which remains among Catholics will probably come under the influence and control of neutralist groups, such as those which publish *Esprit* and other radical Catholic publications. The neutralist plague-on-both-your-houses line of these groups has become gradually more anti-American, and they are at least as critical of the U.S. as of the U.S.S.R. Thus, this splendid zeal for social reform may not only be frustrated, but may even be turned against the West in general and the United States in particular.

Godin's program was a step toward solution of the problem he saw, but in ten years the Church devoted less than 200 priests to the mission, and

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then cancelled it. While the priests had some successes and did stimulate hope that the workers might ultimately be won away from Communism, their superiors concluded that the mission was a failure on the ground that the workers were exerting more influence upon the priests than the priests were upon them. While many consider the decision to end the program a mistake and a tragedy, it is clear that there was considerable evidence to justify the action. Probably never before has a mission been closed because the missionaries were being influenced to this degree by the people to whom they had been sent.

The interpretations given the failure are probably more important than the fact of failure itself. Generally, Frenchmen have interpreted it as proof that the Church has turned its back on the workers and has recognized the working class "world" as one in which it can have no influence. (This interpretation ignores the other efforts made by the Church, including the Catholic Action program, which for years has been quietly seeking to overcome the de-Christianization of France. It was also refuted by the April "Doctrinal Statement" of the French hierarchy, which asserted that the French Church does not intend to drop the social problem or to cease seeking a workable solution.) Many feel that the Church's surrender is an indication of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of breaking the Communist grip over the workers. This interpretation in particular may have profound meaning, regardless of the small number of men involved in this program.

The priest-workers were carefully selected and trained, and they were thought to be reliable anti-Communists. Even so, many of them denounced the economic system in France and advocated radical changes. Some of them were so shocked by the workers' lives and so influenced by the ideas they encountered in the trade-union meetings and in their other contacts with the workers that they came to admire and to coöperate with the Communists and to adopt the Marxist vocabulary and some Marxist theses. In other words, misery and Marxism together conquered this missionary effort, and misery and Marxism will continue to represent dual threats to France and to the West.

The recall of these dedicated men does not merely demonstrate the way misery and Marxism team up together and indicate the magnitude of the effort which will be required to win the French workers back into the French community. It also shows that the eradication of Communism in Western Europe will require more than economic recovery, political stability and military strength. A battle is being fought for men's minds on a field which we do not yet comprehend, and on which we are not yet prepared to struggle. A third conclusion would seem to be that the American public, and American policy-makers, should pay increasing attention to ideas and intellectual developments, especially in Western Europe, which is still an intellectual center for the West and an area where ideas play a great rôle.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

A STUDY OF HISTORY: VOLUMES VII, VIII, IX, X. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954, 4 v. $35.00.

With these four volumes Mr. Toynbee concludes his monumental excursion through history and its civilizations. Although the main lines of his interpretation have already been presented, summarized and widely discussed, it is pleasant to return without abridgment to the leisurely pace, the extended asides of the work in its fullness. The subjects of these final volumes are: Universal States and Churches, Heroic Ages, Contacts between Civilizations in Space and Time, Law and Freedom, the Prospects of the Western Civilization and the Inspirations of Historians. While Mr. Toynbee has, in the main, stayed within his original plan of work, there is much new wine in the old bottles.

POWER AND POLICY. By THOMAS K. FINLETTER. New York: Harcourt, 1954, 408 p. $5.00.

In this timely volume the former Secretary of the Air Force discusses the requirements for an American military and foreign policy under the shadow of the hydrogen bomb. Stressing the need for establishing correct priorities, Mr. Finletter finds that we are not doing enough to build up our Air-Atomic force, or our continental defense, but are wasting our energies in other directions. Although the reader may find points for disagreement, particularly as regards handling on-the-spot crises in the non-European areas, and his ideas for "enforced disarmament," the author has done a commendable job in presenting in all their unpleasantness the major difficulties with which the policy makers must deal.

A DECADE OF DECISION. By FRED HOYLE. London: Heinemann, 1953, 175 p. 6/.

A leading British astronomer leaves the stars to tackle, with a great deal of zest, a number of human problems. Among other things he rebukes the British political parties for failing to provide the electorate with real alternatives, recommends mass emigration from Great Britain, and offers a number of suggestions for dealing with the difficulties of the atomic age.

IN THE NAME OF SANITY. By LEWIS MUMFORD. New York: Harcourt, 1954, 244 p. $3.75.

Articles and lectures on the atomic age written over a period of several years. As the title itself suggests, Mr. Mumford is rather shrill in urging reasonableness.

FREEDOM AGAINST ITSELF. By CLARENCE K. STREIT. New York: Harper, 1954, 316 p. $3.75.

Mr. Streit returns to urge with some eloquence the immediate need for Atlantic Union. The principal theme is that freedom can be a divisive as well as unifying

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force and that it is up to Atlantic custodians of freedom to overcome their divisions in face of present and rapidly mounting dangers.

CHRISTIANITY, DIPLOMACY AND WAR. By Herbert Butterfield. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1953, 125 p. $1.75.

One of Britain's leading Christian historians reflects, in this series of lectures, on Christianity's contribution to the solution of political problems, above all those of power, conflict and war.

A NEW PATTERN FOR A TIRED WORLD. By Louis Bromfield. New York: Harper, 1954, 314 p. $3.75.

Mr. Bromfield, a novelist turned political and foreign affairs analyst, is angry in a number of directions and has a number of proposals to make. The pattern that emerges is an individual one that does not quite fit any of the usual classifications, but is not very helpful in meeting the problems confronting a policy-maker.

THE MYTH OF THE GOOD AND BAD NATIONS. By René A. Wormser. Chicago: Regnery, 1954, 180 p. $3.00.

The thesis here is that the belief that there are good nations and bad nations has seriously distorted American foreign policy in the wars and conflicts of this century. It is not clear, however, that a correction of this error takes one as far as the author feels in establishing a more satisfactory course.

STRATEGY: THE INDIRECT APPROACH. By B. H. Liddell Hart. New York: Praeger, 1954, 420 p. $5.95.

In what is clearly intended as a major treatise on military strategy Captain Liddell Hart undertakes to draw from an examination of historical experience the fundamentals of strategic theory. His general approach, which he has developed through many earlier studies, is that frontal assaults and massive showdowns are to be avoided; rather one should aim at the enemy's line of least expectation. A very stimulating study.

ESSAI DE STRATÉGIE OCCIDENTALE. By General P. E. Jacquot. Paris: Gallimard, 1953, 202 p. Fr. 390.

An essay on the strategy for the defense of Europe, dealing primarily with the extent of the Soviet military threat, the difficulties of creating a continuous line of defense, and the importance of aviation and atomic projectiles.

THE HYDROGEN BOMB. By James R. Shepley and Clay Blair, Jr. New York: McKay, 1954, 244 p. $3.00.

A highly controversial account, by two journalists, of the disputes over the U. S. decision to develop the H-bomb, and other associated matters. While it covers much of the same ground, it is far less informative than the transcript put out by the Atomic Energy Commission, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1954, through May 6, 1954." (Washington: G.P.O., 1954, 993 p.)

IDEAS AND WEAPONS. By I. B. Holley, Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, 222 p. $3.75.

Using as a case study the development of the aerial weapon by the United States in World War I, the author probes the serious and important question of the relationship between the pace of development of a new weapon and the doctrine concerning its operational function.

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CAVALRY OF THE SKY: THE STORY OF U. S. MARINE COMBAT HELICOPTERS. By Lynn Montross. New York: Harper, 1954, 270 p. $3.00.

An able report on the development and the rapidly growing importance of the helicopter, especially as demonstrated in the Korean War.

IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. By Trygve Lie. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 473 p. $6.00.

In these personal recollections, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations reviews the problems and crises of that organization in the seven years after the Second World War. An important contribution to recent international affairs.

LA COEXISTENCE PACIFIQUE. By François Houtisse. Paris: Monde Nouveau, 1953, 251 p. Fr. 450.

An essay on the Cold War and on the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" as purely a Communist tactic to achieve eventual victory.

L'ÉGALITÉ DES ÉTATS ET L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE. By Raoul Padirac. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1953, 246 p. Fr. 1500.

A history and analysis of the concept of the equality of sovereign states, with particular reference to its application in international organization.

THE PROBLEM OF STATE SUCCESSION WITH REGARD TO TREATIES. By R. W. G. de Muralt. The Hague: Van Stockum, 1954, 165 p.

A monograph on the treaty issues which arise in connection with the "death" of a state or the creation of a new one.

LA DISSOLUTION DES ASSEMBLÉES LÉGISLATIVES DANS LES CONSTITUTIONS MODERNES. By Federico Mohrhoff. Rome: Colombo, 1953, 386 p. L. 2000.

A monograph in comparative law, stressing the Italian and French experience.

DES INSTITUTIONS SPÉCIALISÉES: PROBLÈMES JURIDIQUES ET DIPLOMATIQUES DE L'ADMINISTRATION INTERNATIONALE. By C. Labeyrie-Ménahem. Paris: Pedone, 1953, 168 p. Fr. 1600.

A monograph on the principal problems of international and domestic law, diplomacy and administration created by the rapid development of the specialized agencies and institutions in the international field.

ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS, 1953. Edited by Clyde Eagleton and Richard N. Swift. New York: New York University Press, 1954, 213 p. $4.50.

The fifth in an annual series.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS. By Feliks Gross. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954, 179 p. $3.75.

In this effort to develop a scientific methodology for the analysis of foreign policy the author discusses such matters as the relation of ideologies to objectives, the variety of power factors, and the formulation of patterns of policy.

DECISION-MAKING AS AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By Richard C. Snyder and Others. Princeton: Princeton University, Organizational Behavior Section, 1954, 120 p.

This volume in the "Foreign Policy Analysis Project" is described by its authors as a "tentative formulation of an analytical scheme which we hope may serve as the core of a frame of reference for the study of international politics." The excessive scaffolding and jargon are probably inherent in the undertaking, which, however, is not without interest.

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THE ALLIES AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Robert D. Warth. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1954, 294 p. $4.50.

A monograph, stressing facts rather than conclusions, on the response of the Western European powers and the United States to the Russian Revolution up to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE TOWARD THE "ANSCHLUSS" OF 1938. By Sister Mary Antonia Wathen. Washington: Catholic University, 1954, 224 p. $2.50.

A doctoral dissertation.

THE REBEL. By Albert Camus. New York: Knopf, 1954, 273 p. $4.00.

M. Camus ponders the nature of revolts and revolutions and examines the minds of the revolutionary thinkers of the modern era and the revolutions they inspired. Particularly revealing are the chapters dealing with terrorism as practiced by states claiming to be the heirs of great revolutionary traditions. Believing in the intrinsic moral value of man, but opposing humanitarian cant, M. Camus urges the exercise of moderation which, "born of rebellion, can only live by rebellion." (A translation of "L'Homme Révolté," published by Gallimard, Paris, 1951, 382 p.)

THE INVISIBLE WRITING. By Arthur Koestler. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 431 p. $5.00.

In this second volume of his autobiography ("Arrow in the Blue," noted here January 1953) Mr. Koestler deals primarily with his years in the Communist Party, in the 1930's. While his definition of his life as a "typical case-history of a Central-European member of the educated middle classes, born in the first years of our century" requires a number of reservations, the book is exceptionally illuminating of one major cycle of experience of our time.

THE APPEALS OF COMMUNISM. By Gabriel A. Almond and Others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, 415 p. $6.00.

Based on case studies in France, Italy, England and the United States, this book deals with the appeals which have led people into the Communist Party. Although it does not escape some of the difficulties inherent in the sampling method, it is rich in information and useful in modifying a number of rather widely held notions about the motives for entering, and the composition of, the Party membership.

WESEN UND WANDLUNG DER DIKTATUREN. By Julius Deutsch. Vienna: Weg-Verlag, 1953, 316 p. Schillings 48.80.

An Austrian Socialist surveys the history of dictatorships from Tiberius Gracchus to Stalin in an effort to uncover the social conditions favoring their appearance.

THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM. By Louis L. Snyder. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954, 208 p. $4.50.

An examination and appraisal of the attempts made in the various disciplines—geography, history, political science, sociology and psychology—to work out a useful definition of nationalism. Of particular value as a round-up of the numerous twentieth-century efforts to track this powerful but elusive force to its source.

POLITICAL PARTIES. By Maurice Duverger. New York: Wiley, 1954, 439 p. $5.50.

A translation, including revisions, of an important French study of political party structures and party systems in contemporary society. (French edition noted here October 1952.)

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THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW. By Harold L. Cross. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953, 405 p. $5.50.

A scholarly discussion of the problems surrounding "legal access to public records and proceedings."

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

FAITH AND FREEDOM. By Barbara Ward. New York: Norton, 1954, 308 p. $3.75.

The author of "The West at Bay" here reflects, in a historical essay, on "what is conditioned and what is free in human affairs and the pattern which this interaction has created in the brief span of human history."

TRADE, AID, OR WHAT? By Willard L. Thorp. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954, 224 p. $4.50.

Based on eight weeks of discussion among experts at the Merrill Center for Economics in the summer of 1953, this report deals very broadly with American foreign economic policy in matters of trade and commerce, exchange and investment, and demonstrates a healthy awareness of the complexity of the issues. The author, who is well equipped for the task of pulling together and organizing the material, was formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

THE POOL OF KNOWLEDGE. By Katherine B. Shippen. New York: Harper, 1954, 148 p. $2.50.

A popular exposition, with examples, of the organization and accomplishments of the United Nations Technical Assistance Program.

THE DOLLAR DILEMMA: PERPETUAL AID TO EUROPE? By Melchior Palyi. Chicago: Regnery, 1954, 208 p. $2.75.

The author's conclusion is "to stop all aid to Europe other than in specific cases of emergency. Economic aid, even if masquerading in uniform, makes us responsible for perpetual inflation and financial parasitism in the recipient countries."

ART UNDER A DICTATORSHIP. By Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 277 p. $5.50.

A most interesting illustrated analysis of the perversion of art to propaganda under the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships.

THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION. By Adolf A. Berle, Jr. New York: Harcourt, 1954, 192 p. $3.00.

The co-author with G. C. Means of the major work, "The Modern Corporation and Private Property," here deals with the giant corporation as the instrument of "revolutionary capitalism" in the mid-twentieth century, presenting certain dangers, but beneficent if working in a frame of adequate political and social conceptions.

The Second World War

SICILY—SALERNO—ANZIO: JANUARY 1943 - JUNE 1944. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1954, 413 p. $6.00.

This ninth volume of Admiral Morison's magistral History of United States Naval Operations in World War II covers the three major amphibious operations in the Mediterranean in 1943 and 1944. More than in some of the other volumes, the author must also pass judgment on land as well as sea strategy, and he is quite critical of several features of the Sicilian and Italian campaigns.

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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES: THE ORGANIZATION AND ROLE OF THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES. By John D. Millett. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1954, 494 p. $4.25.

This volume in the official history centers very largely in the activities of Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell.

THE MARSHALLS: INCREASING THE TEMPO. By Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr. and Lt. Col. John A. Crown. Washington: U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, 1954, 188 p. $3.25.

A monograph on the assaults on Kwajalein, Majuro and Eniwetok Atolls.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST. VOLUME I: THE EARLY SUCCESSES AGAINST ITALY (TO MAY 1941). By Major-General I. S. O. Playfair and Others. London: H.M.S.O., 1954, 506 p. 35/. (New York: British Information Services, $8.00.)

The first volume in the Mediterranean and Middle East section of the authoritative and officially sponsored British History of the Second World War covers the period from 1939 to the disasters of May 1941.

THE WAR AT SEA, 1939–1945. VOLUME I: THE DEFENSIVE. By Captain S. W. Roskill. London: H.M.S.O., 1954, 664 p. 42/. (New York: British Information Services, $9.00.)

An able and weighty history of the war at sea—including also actions of the Fleet Air Arm and the R.A.F.—up to the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* in December 1941. The volume is one of three on the maritime war in the officially sponsored History of the Second World War.

SUNK: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE SUBMARINE FLEET, 1941–1945. By Mochitsura Hashimoto. New York: Holt, 1954, 276 p. $3.95.

One of the few surviving commanders of Japan's submarine fleet, which was virtually wiped out by the end of the war, attempts to explain this disastrous outcome and the generally unsatisfactory performance of the submarine arm.

WE REMAINED: THREE YEARS BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES IN THE PHILIPPINES. By Colonel R. W. Volckmann. New York: Norton, 1954, 244 p. $3.75.

A personal account of the American and Filipino guerrillas who continued the fight against the Japanese in northern Luzon.

KURZEMES CIETOKSNIS: VOLUME I. By O. Freivalds. Copenhagen: Imanta, 1954, 183 p.

A Latvian publicist describes a little-known chapter of the Second World War: what happened in German-held Kurland (Kurzeme) from August 1944 to V-E Day.

UNCONDITIONAL HATRED. By Captain Russell Grenfell. New York: Devin-Adair, 1953, 273 p. $3.75.

Unconditional criticism, by a British naval officer, of Churchill's attitude and policy toward Germany before and during the Second World War.

MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD IN THE GERMAN-OCCUPIED AND OTHER AREAS OF FORTRESS EUROPE. By Karl Brandt and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953, 707 p. $10.00.

This publication of the Food Research Institute is a very substantial inquiry into Germany's wartime efforts "to utilize the agricultural resources of countries she overran by armed force, annexed, divided, occupied, or absorbed as allies."

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BOLDNESS BE MY FRIEND. By Richard Pape. Boston: Houghton, 1954, 309 p. $3.50.

A narrative of the arrests and escapes through much of Nazi-controlled Europe of an R.A.F. navigator shot down over the Netherlands in 1941.

The United States

REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By George F. Kennan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, 119 p. $2.75.

In these lectures, delivered in March 1954, former Ambassador Kennan presents what he appropriately terms his "personal philosophy of foreign policy" and its application to the United States in the present international situation. After reviewing the background of American foreign relations, he sets forth the premises of our position in the Soviet and non-Soviet parts of the world.

THE LIMITS OF FOREIGN POLICY. By Charles Burton Marshall. New York: Holt, 1954, 128 p. $3.00.

Lectures, by a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, developing the theme that one cannot expect a foreign policy to perform miracles.

MACARTHUR: 1941–1951. By Major General Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954, 441 p. $5.75.

An admiring, partisan and comprehensive account of General MacArthur's rôle in the Pacific war, the occupation of Japan and the Korean war, by his former Chief of Intelligence.

THE UNTOLD STORY OF DOUGLAS MACARTHUR. By Frazier Hunt. New York: Devin-Adair, 1954, 533 p. $5.00.

An extensive and wholly admiring biography by a war correspondent and old friend. Scarcely an untold story, though giving more than usual attention to General MacArthur's career prior to Pearl Harbor.

PEOPLE OF PLENTY. By David M. Potter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, 219 p. $3.50.

Professor Potter's theme, the effect of American economic abundance upon the national character, has led him to some more fundamental considerations of the meaning of "national character" and the capacity of history and behavioral sciences to deal with it.

THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE. By Bertram M. Gross. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953, 472 p. $6.50.

An effort to develop a systematic and realistic approach to the American legislative process as well as to provide a guide to the handling of concrete legislative problems. The author's views are based in part upon his own behind-the-scences experiences as staff adviser to Senate committees.

RACE, JOBS, AND POLITICS. By Louis Ruchames. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953, 255 p. $3.75.

Though principally concerned with the history of the Fair Employment Practice Committee, this sociological study treats more broadly of the ability of legislation to influence such a social issue as discrimination.

THE GOLDEN DOOR. By J. Campbell Bruce. New York: Random House, 1954, 244 p. $3.75.

A vigorous criticism of American immigration policy and methods, especially of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.

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WHERE WE CAME OUT. By Granville Hicks. New York: Viking, 1954, 250 p. $3.50.

Mr. Hicks, who was a Communist Party member from 1935 to 1939, reflects on that experience, the social and intellectual climate which fostered it, and the present measures taken against Communists. He did not become part of the apparatus, nor was his emotional involvement so deep as that of some other former Communists who have written of their life in the party, but for that reason his story is perhaps more representative, though less revealing of the hard core of the movement.

THE ROSENBERG CASE: FACT AND FICTION. By S. Andhil Fineberg. New York: Oceana Publications, 1953, 159 p. $2.50.

Primarily concerned with the way the Communists exploited this much argued espionage case and with the propaganda successes they achieved.

CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA. New York: Harcourt, 1954, 242 p. $3.75.

A most enlightening symposium of articles, originally appearing in the periodical *The Commonweal.* With the exception of two pieces—by Reinhold Niebuhr and Will Herberg—representing the Protestant and Jesuit point of view—all the contributions are by Roman Catholic laymen.

PRELUDE TO POINT FOUR. By Merle Curti and Kendall Birr. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954, 284 p. $5.00.

A useful, scholarly and factual account of the movement of American technicians and technology abroad during the century 1838–1938.

SURVEY OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, 1953. By Gardner Patterson, John M. Gunn, Jr. and Dorothy L. Swerdlove. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, 317 p. $2.75.

The fifth and, regrettably, the final volume of a useful annual series of reports on the international economic activities and policies of the United States.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1953. Edited by Peter V. Curl. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1954, 458 p. $5.00.

This useful volume of selected documents is the fifteenth in the series begun by the World Peace Foundation in 1939 and the second to be published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Western Europe

EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE. By F. S. C. Northrop. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 230 p. $4.75.

The author of "The Meeting of East and West" examines in this "study in sociological jurisprudence" the movement toward a Continental European Community, which he feels to be a vitally important creative effort. Mr. Northrop's philosophical approach to contemporary affairs frequently yields new insights, though the reader may be disconcerted by his tendency to scrutinize a *New York Times* dispatch *sub specie eternitatis.*

ENTSCHEIDUNG UM EUROPA. By Otto von Habsburg. Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1953, 191 p. Schillings 48.

A selection of short pieces dealing with European problems, with particular emphasis on the Danubian area.

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THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF EUROPE. New York: Praeger, 1954, 188 p. $3.50.

A symposium of papers prepared for the second conference of the European Movement. The authors are André Philip, Lord Layton, Baron René Boël, G. M. Nederhorst, Ingvar Svennilson, Julian Amery, René Piaton, Johannes Semler and Muhlis Ete.

EUROPÄISCHE ARBEITERBEWEGUNG. By Ludwig Reichhold. Frankfurt/Main: Knecht, 1953, 2 v.

An extended attempt to relate the European labor movement to European history and society, which the author sets off against the Russian and the American, in order to establish new and appropriate goals and ideals for that movement.

POLITICS IN POST-WAR FRANCE. By Philip Williams. New York: Longmans, 1954, 500 p. $7.00.

An able discussion, by an Oxford historian, of the "parliamentary machinery of the Fourth Republic and the combinations of men who operate or obstruct it." The author is relatively optimistic, though feeling that political rather than constitutional changes are required if the régime is to function more successfully.

THE DEATH OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. By Ronald Matthews. New York: Praeger, 1954, 318 p. $5.00.

A British journalist reports on French politics in the post-liberation decade and on the evaporation of the dreams of the Resistance for a self-confident and coherent political order.

UNION FRANÇAISE 1953. Paris: Julliard, 1953, 397 p. Fr. 900.

A compendium of not particularly well-organized information on the institutions of the French Union and the overseas territories.

WHO'S WHO IN FRANCE: PARIS. Paris: Lafitte, 1953, 999 p. Fr. 6000. (New York: Lange, Maxwell, 1954, $20.00.)

"A biographical dictionary containing more than 5,000 biographies of prominent people in and out of Paris."

LE PARTI SOCIALISTE SUÉDOIS: SON ORGANISATION. By Raymond Fusilier. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1954, 372 p. Fr. 900.

A detailed and valuable monograph on the history, composition and structure of the Swedish Socialist Party.

DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE KRIEGSFINANZIERUNG 1939–1945 UND IHRE AUSSTRAHLUNGEN IN DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT. By Urs Schwarz. Winterthur: Keller, 1953, 149 p. Swiss Fr. 12.

A monograph on the Swiss experience with economic mobilization in the Second World War and the methods used to check inflation.

L'ALSACE ET LA LORRAINE (1940–1945): LEUR OCCUPATION EN DROIT ET EN FAIT. By Eugène Schaeffer. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1953, 158 p. Fr. 750.

A study by an Alsatian, of the plight of Alsace-Lorraine under the German occupation, with particular reference to the implications of the controversy surrounding the Oradour war crimes trial.

TOWARD UNDERSTANDING GERMANY. By Robert H. Lowie. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, 396 p. $6.00.

A distinguished anthropologist applies the methods of his discipline to German so-

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ciety and emerges with many interesting observations on German life and culture, though the picture is largely lacking the political dimension.

GERMAN HISTORY: SOME NEW GERMAN VIEWS. Edited by Hans Kohn. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954, 224 p. $4.00.

Ten articles and essays written by German historians since 1945, all concerned with a reconsideration of the principal concepts of recent German history.

LE RÉARMEMENT CLANDESTIN DU REICH, 1930–1935. By Georges Castellan. Paris: Plon, 1954, 571 p. Fr. 1650.

A detailed, documented survey of the information concerning Germany's clandestine rearmament in the five years 1930–1935, which was picked up and reported by the Deuxième Bureau of the French General Staff.

THE BORMANN LETTERS. London: Weidenfeld, 1954, 200 p. (New York: British Book Center, $3.75.)

This correspondence between Bormann and his wife, between January 1943 and April 1945, adds some light to our picture of the inner Nazi circle in the last years of the régime, but is of most interest for its peculiar but characteristic mixture of sentimentality and ruthlessness, family homeliness and Nazi mystique. Has a useful introduction by H. R. Trevor-Roper.

THE SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKA. By Lord Russell of Liverpool. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954, 259 p. $4.50.

A concise history of Nazi war crimes, which recounts the atrocities committed but without much attempt to interpret or explain this frightful phenomenon.

TYRANNY ON TRIAL. By Whitney R. Harris. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954, 608 p. $6.00.

An extensive digest, account, and analysis of the Nuremberg trials and the acts which gave rise to them, by a former trial counsel at Nuremberg, now executive director of the American Bar Association. An important addition to the very considerable body of literature on these trials.

THE SWORD IN THE SCALES. By Hans Fritzsche As Told to Hildegard Springer. London: Wingate, 1953, 335 p. 15/.

A not very rewarding or accurate account and criticism of the Nuremberg Trial, by one of the defendants, who was acquitted. (German edition, "Das Schwert auf der Waage," Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1953, 271 p.)

THE SEVEN MEN OF SPANDAU. By Jack Fishman. New York: Rinehart, 1954, 276 p. $3.50.

A journalistic account of the lives of the imprisoned major Nazi war criminals.

THE REDEEMERS. By Leo W. Schwarz. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1953, 385 p. $4.50.

A moving narrative of the vicissitudes of the Jews of Germany after the Nazi defeat: their emergence from the concentration camps, international efforts at their aid and rehabilitation, and the growing attraction of Israel as their main hope.

TOTALITÄRE ERZIEHUNG. By M. G. Lange. Frankfurt/Main: Frankfurter Hefte, 1954, 432 p.

A substantial survey of the education system in the Soviet Zone of Germany—its political aims, its method, and its rôle in the consolidation of totalitarian power.

CLOSE CONTACT. By Brigadier C. H. Dewhurst. Boston: Houghton, 1954, 173 p. $4.00.

Brigadier Dewhurst, who was Chief of the British Mission to the Soviet Forces of

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Occupation in Eastern Germany from March 1951 to March 1953, here records his personal impressions of, and communications with, the Russians. Many anecdotes, but also a number of observations about the Cold War.

THE DANCING BEAR: BERLIN DE PROFUNDIS. By Frances Faviell. New York: Norton, 1954, 246 p. $3.50.

A personal but observant record of Berlin and Berliners in the years 1946–1949, by the wife of a British official.

DIECI ANNI PERDUTI. By Paolo Emiliani. Pisa: Nistri-Lischi, 1953, 153 p. L. 300.

Ten years of crisis and schism in the Italian Socialist Party, 1943–1953.

MES ANNÉES D'ESPAGNE, 1940–1948. By François Piétri. Paris: Plon, 1954, 295 p. Fr. 840.

In this useful document on the diplomacy of the war years the Vichy Ambassador to Spain from 1940 to 1944 discusses the aims of his mission, and the broader issue of the relations between France, Spain and the Western Allies.

Eastern Europe

RELIGION BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. By George N. Shuster. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 281 p. $4.00.

The President of Hunter College reviews the story of Communist action against religion—especially against the Roman Catholic Church—in Eastern Europe.

RUSSIA'S DANUBIAN EMPIRE. By Gordon Shepherd. London: Heinemann, 1954, 262 p. 21/.

A general review, competent though not novel, of the means by which the Russians gained control over the Danubian countries, of the obstacles to complete consolidation of that control, and of future prospects. The author is the Vienna correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*.

THE SOVIET REGIME: COMMUNISM IN PRACTICE. By W. W. Kulski. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954, 807 p. $8.00.

A massive and important study, based entirely on Soviet sources, intended as a reference book but of broader interest. The last 90 pages are devoted to a survey of the post-Stalinist era and the development of "collective leadership" policies.

LA RUSSIE D'HIER ET D'AUJOURD'HUI. By Robert Pinoteau. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1953, 283 p. Fr. 690.

A former commercial counsellor in the French Embassy in Moscow, contrasts Soviet with traditional Russian society. Of most interest in the areas of the author's direct competence, it straggles off into some dubious history and sociology.

THROUGH THE GLASS OF SOVIET LITERATURE: VIEWS OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY. Edited by Ernest J. Simmons. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953, 301 p. $4.50.

In these interesting and informative studies the fate of Soviet writing and writers is taken as a mirror of the quality and transformations of Soviet life.

FARMING IN FINLAND. By W. R. Mead. London: Athlone Press, 1953, 248 p. 30/.

An able study of Finnish farming and husbandry, including a chapter on the problem of resettlement after the loss of Karelia.

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A KING'S HERITAGE. By King Peter II of Yugoslavia. New York: Putnam, 1954, 304 p. $5.00.
A sad autobiography of a particularly luckless young monarch.

BULGARIE D'HIER ET D'AUJOURD'HUI. By Jean Kanapa. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1953, 236 p. Fr. 300.
A Communist effusion.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS. By P. A. Reynolds. New York: Longmans, 1954, 182 p. $2.25.
A concise, judicious survey and appraisal. British failures are seen to have resulted from two errors—the pursuit of traditional policies under changed and inappropriate circumstances and the pursuit of conciliation to the extent of not recognizing evil.

PURSUIT OF PROGRESS. By Roy Jenkins. London: Heinemann, 1953, 186 p. 10/6.
A young Labor M.P., of the conservative wing, reviews the Labor Party's past aims and achievements and attempts to chart a course for the future. A thoughtful contribution to British Socialism's effort to rediscover its purpose in life.

THE PARTY SYSTEM IN GREAT BRITAIN. By Ivor Bulmer-Thomas. New York: Macmillan, 1953, 328 p. $5.00.
A history and appraisal of the structure and operation of Britain's Parliamentary party system. Is useful in filling a gap in the literature, without being a particularly profound analysis.

TOWARDS THE RESCUE OF STERLING. By R. G. Hawtrey. New York: Longmans, 1954, 159 p. $2.75.
A discussion of the requirements for a stable monetary standard, the first half of which is concerned with a review of events between 1946 and 1952, including the convertibility crisis, devaluation and the effects of the Korean War.

SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. By Ronald Mendelsohn. New York: De Graff, 1954, 391 p. $7.00.
A comparative study of the social security systems of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

INTERNATIONAL CYCLES AND CANADA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1921–33. By Vernon W. Malach. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954, 154 p. $3.00.
A monograph on the applicability of theories of business cycles to the Canadian experience in the decade 1921–1933.

CANADA AND THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLE, 1927–1939. By Edward Marcus. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954, 211 p. $3.75.
A monograph on the way Canada reacted to the impact upon it of the turns of the business cycle in the 12 years before the Second World War.

The Middle East

THE MIDDLE EAST 1945–1950. By George Kirk. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954, 338 p. $7.50.
This volume in the wartime series of the Survey of International Affairs is a

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sequel to Mr. Kirk's preceding volume, "The Middle East in the War" (noted here January 1954). The Middle East for the period after 1950 will be covered in the annual Survey volumes. An important reference for this troubled period, though the coverage is somewhat uneven.

THE MIDDLE EAST: PROBLEM AREA IN WORLD POLITICS. By Halford L. Hoskins. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 311 p. $4.75.

An informed survey by the Senior Specialist in International Relations at the Library of Congress. Problems abound, solutions are sparse, but the fault is not the author's.

CITIES AND MEN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. VOLUME II: AEGEAN, CYPRUS, TURKEY, TRANSCAUCASIA AND PALESTINE (1914–1924). By Sir Harry Luke. London: Bles, 1953, 262 p. 25/.

In this second volume of his attractive autobiography, the author, a distinguished British public servant, recalls the years 1914–1924, during which time he served in the eastern Mediterranean, witnessed the rise of Mustapha Kemal, headed the diplomatic mission in the ephemeral Transcaucasian republics, and participated in the establishment of the Palestine Mandate.

OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ITS DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT. By Stephen Hemsley Longrigg. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954, 305 p. $4.00.

A competent history which includes a good bit about the rivalry between the various concerns. The author, whose work, "Iraq, 1900 to 1950," was noted here in October 1954, was for many years an executive of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

INTRODUCTION À L'ÉTUDE DU DROIT MUSULMAN. By Louis Milliot. Paris: Sirey, 1953, 822 p. Fr. 3600.

A massive treatise by a professor of law who has spent much of his life in the Islamic world.

THE ROAD TO MECCA. By Muhammad Asad. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954, 400 p. $5.00.

At heart the story of a spiritual journey which led an Austrian Jew to Islam, but also containing much of interest about society and political events in the Middle East, prior to 1932. More recently the author has served as Pakistan's Minister Plenipotentiary to the U. N.

END OF AN EXILE. By James Parkes. London: Vallentine, 1954, 192 p. 15/.

An Anglican clergyman, who has written extensively on Judaism and Jewish problems, here undertakes to relate the new state of Israel to the traditions of Jewish culture and to Jewish–gentile relations.

OIL DIPLOMACY: POWDERKEG IN IRAN. By Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi. New York: Whittier Books, 1954, 405 p. $4.50.

A highly partisan interpretation, by an Iranian writer, of the history of the Iranian oil question since 1901.

South and Southeast Asia

SOUTH-EAST ASIA: A SHORT HISTORY. By Brian Harrison. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954, 268 p. $3.50.

A general history for the nonspecialist, by a professor of history at the University of Hong Kong. Relatively little on twentieth century developments.

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ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA. By Robert I. Crane and Burton Stein. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954, 137 p. $2.00.

A progress report, with some analysis and evaluation, on the economic development in India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon.

COMMUNISM AND PEASANTRY: IMPLICATIONS OF COLLECTIVIST AGRICULTURE FOR ASIAN COUNTRIES. By Ram Swarup. Calcutta: Prachi Prakashan, 1954, 194 p.

In this book, written for Asians, the author analyzes and warns against Communist tactics in relation to the peasantry. He also makes his own proposals for the reconstruction of Indian agriculture.

MEN AGAINST THE JUNGLE. By Ritchie Calder. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954, 231 p. 15/. (New York: Macmillan, $3.50.)

A report by an able journalist, on behalf of U.N., on the work being done by the various specialized agencies to combat disease, malnutrition and ignorance in South and Southeast Asia.

FRAM RAJ TO SWARAJ. By Dhirendranath Sen. Calcutta: Vidyodaya Library, 1954, 544 p. Rs. 16.

An Indian journalist and university teacher, General Secretary of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, engages in a comparison of political norms and institutions, especially in India, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. His preference for the Soviet pattern is strong and is argued at considerable length.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A CONTINENT DECIDES. By Lord Birdwood. New York: Praeger, 1954, 315 p. $4.50.

The author, who has had many years residence in the sub-continent and is exceptionally well informed, sets out the problems and progress of the two states since partition. Taking up internal questions, foreign affairs and the Kashmir dispute, the book is a judicious and valuable contribution.

DANGER IN KASHMIR. By Josef Korbel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, 351 p. $5.00.

Dr. Korbel, who was Czechoslovak chairman of the U.N. Commission to the Kashmir in 1948, discusses the Indian-Pakistan dispute and is critical of India for failing to recognize the dangerous uses the Communist Powers can make of such a rift in the sub-continent.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA. By M. R. Masani. New York: Macmillan (for the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1954, 302 p. $3.50.

The author, at one time Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party, writes with authority on the history and developing tactics of the Indian Communist Party from 1919 to 1954. Despite the many failures of the party he does not underestimate the potential danger it represents.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE MAHATMA. By G. D. Birla. Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1953, 337 p. Rs. 5/8.

This selection of correspondence over many years between Gandhi and the industrialist G. D. Birla, is a valuable aid to our understanding of the late Indian leader and of Indian-British relations in the years before independence.

MALAYA: COMMUNIST OR FREE? By Victor Purcell. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1954, 288 p. $3.00.

A longtime member of the Malayan Civil Service discusses the political and eco-

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nomic situation in postwar Malaya. He is critical of recent British measures which he feels are based on military considerations alone and are retrogressive as far as eventual self-government is concerned.

JUNGLE GREEN. By Arthur Campbell. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954, 298 p. $4.00.

A vivid picture of the nature of the fighting in Malaya, though dealing with only one episode—the battle against the "Kajang Gang" south of Kuala Lumpur.

INDONESIA: LAND OF CHALLENGE. By Margueritte Harmon Bro. New York: Harper, 1954, 263 p. $4.00.

Useful observations on contemporary Indonesia by the wife of an American cultural affairs officer in 1950 and 1951.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION IN TAIWAN. By George W. Barclay. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, 274 p. $5.00.

A REPORT ON TAIWAN'S POPULATION TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ON RURAL RECONSTRUCTION. By George W. Barclay. Princeton: Office of Population Research, Princeton University, 1954, 120 p. $2.50.

The first book is a demographic study, based largely on the data compiled by the Japanese during their rule and dealing with the relationship between the growth and structure of the population and the colonial economic program pursued by Japan. The second volume, in a way a supplement, is a study of contemporary demographic trends in Taiwan. Together they provide a useful basis of information for further consideration of the economic and social prospects of the island.

SELECTED WORKS. By Mao Tse-tung. New York: International Publishers, 1954, 2 v. $6.00.

Of these two volumes of a projected five-volume English translation of Mao's writing and speeches, the first covers the years of civil war, 1926–1936, the second, two years of the conflict with Japan, 1937–1938. An important source, especially for the strategic concepts revealed.

THE UMBRELLA GARDEN. By Maria Yen. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 268 p. $4.00.

Behind this unfortunate title is a useful personal account of a Chinese university student's process of disillusionment with the Communist Party after the victory in 1949. While the sequence of enthusiasm, concealed doubt and revulsion is a familiar one, it is interesting to follow it in the specific Chinese context.

JAPAN'S DECISION TO SURRENDER. By Robert J. C. Butow. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 259 p. $4.00.

A scholarly narrative of the background of the Japanese decision to surrender, a decision that was in process of forming well before the dropping of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war.

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By Ruth Savord

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